BMO Bank NA v. Raiden LLC

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: March 29, 2024
• Docket: 2:23-cv-01465
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3

4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 BMO Bank N.A., CASE NO. 2:23-cv-01465-JHC 8

Plaintiff, ORDER RE: DEFAULT JUDGMENT 9 v. 10 RAIDEN, LLC, a Washington limited 11 liability company; and MIKHAIL GOIMAN a/k/a MIHAI GOIMAN and the marital 12 community composed of MIKHAIL GOIMAN and JANE or JOHN DOE 13 GOIMAN,

14 Defendants. 15

16 I 17 INTRODUCTION 18 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Judgment on 19 Default Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1) and LCR 55(b)(3). Dkt. # 40. The motion is 20 unopposed. See generally Dkt. The Court has considered the motion, the record, and the 21 applicable law. Being fully advised, the Court GRANTS the motion as to Defendant Mikhail 22 Goiman a/k/a Mihai Goiman and the marital community composed of Mikhail Goiman and Jane 23 or John Doe Goiman (Goiman). 24 / 1 II 2 DISCUSSION 3 If a defendant fails to plead or otherwise defend, the clerk enters the party’s default. Fed.

4 R. Civ. P. 55(a). Then, upon a plaintiff’s request or motion, the court may grant default 5 judgment for the plaintiff. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2); see Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 6 (9th Cir. 1980). On default judgment motions, “[t]he court must accept all well-pled allegations 7 of the complaint as established fact, except allegations related to the amount of damages.” UN4 8 Prods., Inc. v. Primozich, 372 F. Supp. 3d 1129, 1133 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (citing TeleVideo Sys., 9 Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 91718 (9th Cir. 1987)). Courts typically consider these factors 10 when evaluating a request for a default judgment: 11 (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; 12 (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of 13 Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.

14 Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986). Default judgments are generally 15 disfavored, so “default judgment is appropriate only if the well-pleaded factual allegations of the 16 complaint suffice to establish a plaintiff’s entitlement to a judgment under the applicable law.” 17 Dentist Ins. Co. v. Luke St. Marie Valley Dental Grp., P.L.L.C., No. 2:21-cv-01229-JHC, 2022 18 WL 1984124 (W.D. Wash. Jun. 6, 2022) (citing DIRECTV, Inc. v. Hoa Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 19 855 (9th Cir. 2007)). 20 A. Application of Eitel Factors 21 1. Prejudice to Plaintiff 22 “[P]rejudice exists where the plaintiff has no recourse for recovery other than default 23 judgment.” Curtis v. Illumination Arts, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 3d 1200, 1211 (W.D. Wash. 2014) 24 1 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Goiman has failed to respond to this action, so 2 default judgment is Plaintiff’s only means for recovery. See Eve Nevada, LLC v. Derbyshire, 3 No. 21-0251-LK, 2022 WL 279030 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 31, 2022). Thus, this factor supports

4 default judgment. 5 2. Merits of Plaintiff’s Claims and Sufficiency of Complaint 6 “Courts often consider the second and third Eitel factors together.” Devs. Sur. and 7 Indem. Co. v. View Point Builders, Inc., No. C20-0221JLR, 2020 WL 3303046, at *5 (W.D. 8 Wash. Jun. 17, 2022). As mentioned above, the Court must accept all well-pleaded allegations in 9 the complaint as established fact. Accepting such allegations, the complaint suffices to state the 10 causes of action directed against Goiman. Dkt. # 1. Thus, the second and third Eitel factors 11 weigh in favor of Plaintiff. 12 3. Sum of Money at Stake

13 This factor “considers whether the amount of money requested is proportional to the 14 harm caused.” Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Est. of Wheeler, No. C19-0364JLR, 2020 15 WL 433352, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2020). Here, because Plaintiff seeks only the amount 16 mistakenly wired, there is proportionality. Thus, the fourth Eitel factor supports default 17 judgment. 18 4. Possibility of Dispute Over Material Facts 19 There is no sign that the material facts are in dispute. And again, “[t]he general rule of 20 law is that upon default the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to 21 damages, will be taken as true.” Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). 22 Goiman failed to respond, so the Clerk correctly entered default against it. Dkt. # 39.

23 / 24 / 1 5. Probability that Default was Because of Excusable Neglect 2 The sixth Eitel factor assesses whether the defendant’s default for failure to appear was 3 because of excusable neglect. Boards of Trustees of Inland Empire Elec. Workers Welfare Tr. v.

4 Excel Elec. Servs., Inc., No. 2:21-CV-00200-MKD, 2022 WL 1243663, at *4 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 5 26, 2022). Generally, courts do not find excusable neglect when defendants were properly 6 served with the complaint. See, e.g., Maersk Line v. Golden Harvest Alaska Seafood LLC, No. 7 C20-1140-JLR-MLP, 2020 WL 6083464, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2020), report and 8 recommendation adopted, No. C20-1140 JLR, 2020 WL 6077419 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 15, 2020). 9 Plaintiff establishes that it did properly serve Goiman. See Dkt. # 38. So this factor weighs in 10 favor of default judgment. 11 6. Policy Favoring Decision on the Merits 12 Generally, cases “should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible,” so

13 courts disfavor default judgment on this factor. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. But in this case, 14 Goiman’s failure to appear or respond “makes a decision on the merits impractical, if not 15 impossible,” so the Court is not precluded from granting default judgment. PepsiCo, Inc. v. 16 California Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002); see also Emp. Painters’ Tr. 17 v. Dahl Constr. Servs., Inc., No. C19-1541-RSM, 2020 WL 3639591 (W.D. Wash. July 6, 18 2020). Thus, default judgment is an appropriate remedy here. 19 In sum, the Eitel factors support default judgment. 20 B. Damages 21 Because the Court does not accept the amount of claimed damages as true in a default 22 judgment motion, it must assess whether Plaintiff’s claimed damages are appropriate to award.

23 Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560. The plaintiff has the burden of proving its requested damages are 24 1 reasonable and supported by evidence. Bd. of Trs. Of the Boilermaker Vacation Tr. v. Skelly, 2 || 389 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1226 (N.D. Cal. 2005). 3 The Affidavit of Henry Ollie (Dkt. # 41) provides sufficient evidence to support a 4 || judgment in the amount of $1,105 ,830.40,' comprised of the following amounts: 5 a. $982,733 in principal; and 6 b. $123,097.40 in prejudgment interest. 7 Il g CONCLUSION 9 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion for default judgment. 19 Plaintiff will have a judgment against Goiman as set forth above along with post-judgment 11 interest until paid. 12 Dated this 29th day of March, 2024. 13 - ob 4 Char 14 John H. Chun United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 ' Plaintiff seeks $1,143,95.06, but the amounts for principal and interest amounts in the Ollie 24 Declaration do not add up to this figure. ORDER - 5