Bluetooth SIG, Inc. v. FCA US, LLC

Opinion

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5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE 10 11 BLUETOOTH SIG, INC., a Delaware CASE NO. 2:18-cv-01493-TL corporation, 12 ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO Plaintiff, 13 v. SEAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE 14 FCA US LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, 15 Defendant. 16

17 18 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Bluetooth SIG, Inc.’s unopposed motion 19 to seal its omnibus motion in limine and a supporting exhibit (Dkt. No. 236) as well as Defendant 20 FCA US LLC’s unopposed motion to seal portions of its own motions in limine and several 21 supporting exhibits (Dkt. No. 241). Having reviewed the relevant record and governing law, the 22 Court DENIES the motions. 23 /// 24 /// 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 In brief, this case concerns Plaintiff’s trademark licensing agreements. The Parties 3 stipulated to a protective order that allows them to designate documents containing trade secrets 4 or other confidential or proprietary information as “CONFIDENTIAL” or “HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL

5 — ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY.” Dkt. No. 31 at 2–3. 6 II. LEGAL STANDARD 7 There is a strong presumption of public access to judicial records. Kamakana v. City & 8 Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006). A party seeking to seal records related 9 to motions that are dispositive or otherwise “more than tangentially related to the merits of a 10 case,” must “meet the high threshold of showing that ‘compelling reasons’ support secrecy.” See 11 Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1098–99, 1102 (9th Cir. 2016); 12 Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180 (internal citation omitted). “[P]lenty of technically nondispositive 13 motions—including routine motions in limine—are strongly correlative to the merits of a case.” 14 Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1099.

15 III. DISCUSSION 16 Local Civil Rule 5(g) expressly incorporates the strong presumption of public access, 17 requiring motions to seal to include “[a] specific statement of the applicable legal standard and 18 the reasons for keeping a document under seal.” LCR 5(g)(3)(B). The party's reasoning must, at 19 minimum, include an explanation of “the legitimate private or public interests that warrant the 20 relief sought”; “the injury that will result if the relief sought is not granted”; and “why a less 21 restrictive alternative to the relief sought is not sufficient.” Id. Where, as here, a stipulated 22 protective order is in place (see Dkt. No. 31), a party wishing to file a confidential document 23 obtained from another party during discovery “may file a motion to seal” but need not satisfy the

24 1 requirements of the local rules. Id. “Instead, the party who designated the document confidential 2 must satisfy subpart (3)(B) in its response to the motion to seal or in a stipulated motion.” Id. 3 The Court has previously warned the Parties that it “cannot allow documents to remain 4 under seal unless the parties better articulate their reasons for doing so.” Dkt. No. 148 (order

5 striking prior motions to seal (citing Apple Inc., v. Phystar Corp., 658 F.3d 1150, 1162 (9th Cir. 6 2011))). The instant motions include scant reasoning to justify a denial of public access, 7 providing conclusory statements of the interests warranting sealing and no information as to why 8 alternatives to sealing are insufficient. See Dkt. Nos. 236, 241. Additionally, neither party filed 9 responses as required under LCR 5(g)(3)(B) to support why the documents they themselves 10 designated as confidential should be filed under seal. In short, as with the prior motions to seal, 11 the Parties have not complied with LCR 5(g)(3)(B). 12 IV. CONCLUSION 13 For the above reasons, the Court DENIES the motions to seal (Dkt. Nos. 236, 241) 14 WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Parties have leave to re-file their motions in accordance with this Order

15 within three (3) days. 16 Dated this 8th day of February 2023. 17 A 18 Tana Lin United States District Judge 19

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