Bluegreen Vacations Unlimited, Inc. v. Timeshare Termination Team, LLC

District Court, S.D. Florida·Decided June 22, 2023·No. 1:20-cv-25318·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 20-cv-25318-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes

BLUEGREEN VACATIONS UNLIMITED, INC., and BLUEGREEN VACATIONS CORPORATION,

Plaintiffs,

v.

TIMESHARE TERMINATION TEAM, LLC, et al.

Defendants. __________________________________________/

ORDER ON FINAL PERMANENT INJUNCTION AS TO FREEDOM CONSUMER SERVICES, LLC d/b/a TIMESHARE FREEDOM GROUP, SYSTEMA MARKETING, INC., AND JORDAN SALKIN

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiffs Bluegreen Vacations Unlimited, Inc. and Bluegreen Vacations Corporation’s (“Plaintiffs” or “Bluegreen”) Amended Motion for Default Judgment Against Defendants Freedom Consumer Services, LLC (“TFG”), Systema Marketing, Inc. (“Systema”), and Jordan Salkin (“Defendants” or “Marketing Defendants”), ECF No. [567] (“Motion”). In an Order dated June 20, 2023 that was docketed on June 21, 2023 (“June 20, 2023 Order”), the Court found that Defendants Freedom Consumer Services, LLC, Systema Marketing, Inc., and Jordan Salkin are liable for Counts III, V, IX of the Amended Complaint, ECF No. [270]; and that Systema is liable under Count IV. See ECF No. [571]. However, the Court found Defendants were not liable on Count VII. See id. In addition, the Court found Plaintiffs are entitled to $717,292.00 in disgorgement damages against TFG and Systema Marketing only and determined that Plaintiffs are entitled to a final permanent injunction against Defendants (“Permanent Injunction”). See id. The June 20, 2023 Order stated that the Court would separately enter an order of final permanent injunction as to TFG, Systema, and Salkin. Id. at 22-23. Accordingly, the Court enters the Permanent Injunction, as set forth below.1 I. FINDING OF FACT In its June 20, 2023 Order, the Court detailed the allegations Defendants have admitted through their default, but it restates those allegations pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1) (requiring every injunction issued by a district court to state the reasons why the injunction issued). Plaintiffs are Florida corporations headquartered in Boca Raton, Florida. ECF No. [270] ¶¶ 22, 23. Plaintiffs have contractual obligations with Bluegreen Owners. Id. ¶¶ 3-5, 231. The Marketing Defendants operate as a timeshare exit company that induces Bluegreen Owners through advertising into hiring TFG to “cancel” or “exit” their timeshare. Id. ¶¶ 1, 61, 99, 206, 218. The Marketing Defendants operate across the United States and use the internet, radio, television, and telephonic sales presentations to advertise their services into Florida and elsewhere. Id. ¶¶ 34, 48, 49, 66, 98, 164, 165. TFG is the primary user of the advertising and Systema actively participates in TFG’s advertising. Id. ¶ 97. TFG and Systema are operated by Salkin, who owns

both companies, and Schroeder. Id. ¶¶ 35, 176. Salkin personally directs and controls the actions of TFG and Systema. Id. ¶¶ 35, 36. Salkin operates the active, internet-based operations of TFG and Systema that solicited individuals in Florida. Id. ¶ 48. After the Marketing Defendants and Bluegreen Owners enter into a contract, the Marketing Defendants instruct or persuade Bluegreen Owners to stop fulfilling their contractual payment obligations to Plaintiffs and do not advise Bluegreen Owners about the consequences of stopping payments to Plaintiffs. Id. ¶¶ 68, 71, 99. Thereafter, the timeshare interests are foreclosed for non-

1 In addition the entry of the Permanent Injunction, this Order clarifies below the scope of the Court’s entry of default against Defendants in its June 20, 2023 Order. payment, and the Marketing Defendants falsely claim they successfully obtained a cancellation or exit of a Bluegreen Owner’s timeshare contract despite taking no actions to lawfully obtain such cancellation or exit. Id. ¶¶ 70, 71. The Marketing Defendants guarantee that they “will get [Bluegreen Owners] completely out of [their] timeshare contract[s].” Id. ¶¶ 7, 10, 57, 70, 206. In

fact, the Marketing Defendants cannot get Bluegreen Owners “completely out” of their timeshare contracts; rather, the Marketing Defendants simply induce Bluegreen Owners to stop paying on their timeshare contracts and collect large up-front fees. Id. ¶¶ 11, 14, 15, 17, 58, 59, 67, 68, 69, 71. The Marketing Defendants divide fees collected from Bluegreen Owners amongst themselves. Id. ¶ 33. The Marketing Defendants advise Bluegreen Owners that ceasing payments on their timeshare contracts to Plaintiffs will assist in the “exit” from those contracts or, alternatively, that the Marketing Defendants’ “exit” services allow Bluegreen Owners to cease their payments “legally” or “safely” to Bluegreen; such representations convince Bluegreen Owners that the Marketing Defendants’ services are equivalent to legal representation. Id. ¶¶ 17, 18, 71, 73, 74.

The Marketing Defendants engaged in advertising through their website, www.timesharefreegroup.com. Id. ¶¶ 161, 162. Salkin personally owns the domain name www.timesharefreegroup.com. Id. ¶¶ 34, 36, 65(a), 161. The Marketing Defendants’ website contains a number of statements, including that the Marketing Defendants can cancel a timeshare “legally and permanently.” Id. ¶¶ 167, 168, 169, 172, 173, 174, 206. The Marketing Defendants’ website advertisements conceal from Bluegreen Owners that the Marketing Defendants’ “method” of cancelling timeshares is simply to procure a breach of the Bluegreen Owners’ Timeshare Contracts with Plaintiffs. Id. ¶¶ 170, 171. As a result of the Marketing Defendants’ efforts, some Bluegreen Owners ceased communicating with Plaintiffs. Id. ¶¶ 59, 75, 99, 238. In addition, Plaintiffs experienced financial loss due to the cessation of payments by Bluegreen Owners. See id. ¶¶ 21, 267, 286, 287. II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Lanham Act provides that the court “shall have power to grant injunctions, according to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable, . . . to prevent

a violation under subsection (a), (c), or (d) of section 1125 of this title.” 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a). Injunctive relief under the Lanham Act is appropriate upon the entry of a final default judgment. PetMed Express, Inc. v. MedPets.Com, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1223 (S.D. Fla. 2004). A plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy the following four-factor test before a court may grant such relief: “(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law . . . are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). The Court has previously found that Plaintiffs have satisfied the eBay test, entitling them

to entry of a final permanent injunction against Defendants. See ECF No. [571] at 21-22. Pursuant to Rule 65, the Court restates here its reasons for that finding. a. Irreparable Harm According to the Amended Complaint in the above-styled action, the Marketing Defendants caused irreparable harm to Plaintiffs because the Marketing Defendants disrupted customer and other contractual relations, including by causing Bluegreen Owners to cease all communications with Plaintiffs. ECF No. [270] ¶¶ 76, 297. As a result, Bluegreen Owners’ timeshare interests were foreclosed. Id. ¶¶ 70, 71.

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