Blue Mountain Memorial Gardens v. Department of Licensing

971 P.2d 75, 94 Wash. App. 38
CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
DecidedFebruary 4, 1999
DocketNo. 17260-1-III
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 971 P.2d 75 (Blue Mountain Memorial Gardens v. Department of Licensing) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Blue Mountain Memorial Gardens v. Department of Licensing, 971 P.2d 75, 94 Wash. App. 38 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).

Opinion

Sweeney, J.

— The question here is whether, giving due [40]*40deference to the Cemetery Board’s knowledge and expertise, the Board erred in concluding that the term “interment vault” as used in prearrangement contracts, included commercial grave liners used by Blue Mountain Memorial Gardens. The Board correctly concluded that grave liners were not vaults. We therefore reverse the decision of the Walla Walla County Superior Court which reversed the Board’s suspension of Blue Mountain’s certificate of authority.

Facts

Bill and Virginia Walsh owned Blue Mountain Memorial Gardens until 1989. The Walshes manufactured both concrete vaults and liners at the cemetery. Between 1962 and 1971, the Walshes entered into “prearrangement contracts” whereby people paid in advance of need for cemetery lots, vaults, and markers. The prearrangement contracts were preprinted with the phrase “interment vault.” This referred to the outer container that surrounds the casket in the ground. The term “interment vault” was not defined in the contracts.

Lloyd and Virginia Mahan bought Blue Mountain from the Walshes in 1989. The sales price of the cemetery was reduced to account for the unfunded prearrangement contracts, which predated legislative requirements that funds be set aside for their execution.

The Mahans continued to manufacture concrete vaults and liners on site, and provided vaults to contract decedents until 1991. In 1991, Mr. Mahan stopped manufacturing and began to substitute commercially manufactured grave liners for the Walsh vaults.

Between July 1991 and August 1995, the Mahans provided grave liners instead of burial vaults for as many as 71 decedents who had contracts for burial vaults. Unless the families asked, they were not told about the substitution. No one asked. Mr. Mahan testified that his employees were instructed to explain that a liner was not sealed to [41]*41exclude air and water as was a vault, but that the commercial liner was an improvement over the Walsh vault they had contracted for. If they wanted a commercial vault, it cost an additional $300.

Louis Murray filed a complaint against Blue Mountain when he discovered his mother, a Walsh-contract decedent, was buried in a liner. Numerous cemeteries and funeral homes had told him there is a dramatic difference between a vault and a liner.

At the Board disciplinary hearing, experts on both sides gave conflicting evidence on whether the industry distinguishes between vaults and liners and whether such a difference was recognized as an industry standard.

The Board asserts that a vault, unlike a liner, seals out the elements. It comes with a manufacturer’s warranty against leaking; liners do not. And this difference has long been recognized as an industry standard. This being so, the Board concluded that the parties to the Walsh contracts intended “interment vault” to mean a sealed compartment. The Mahans knew this was the intended meaning. And Blue Mountain thus knowingly failed to honor the contracts when it supplied the liners.

Blue Mountain contends that the terms were then and are today essentially meaningless. “Vault,” “liner,” or “grave box” are merely marketing terms. And, even if the Board’s definition of a vault were accepted as an industry standard, the old Walsh vault did not meet this standard. A vault, the Mahans contend, must have an inner lining. The Walsh vault did not. According to Mr. Mahan, the chamber of the Walsh vault could seal only if the base were both level and unbroken; it usually was not.

The Board was not persuaded by Blue Mountain’s experts and believed the evidence from Ms. Walsh that the Walsh vault seal functioned to keep the burial chamber dry. The Board also found that the cemetery industry differentiates between vaults and liners; that vaults are a superior product, offering significantly greater protection to their contents than do liners; and that, although the technology [42]*42has evolved, the product contracted for was, by modern standards, a vault and not a liner.

The Board was persuaded that the parties to the Walsh prearrangement contracts had agreed to the use of vaults; and that at least some, if not all, of the Walsh prearrangement contracts were dishonored when Blue Mountain modified the agreement by substituting grave liners for vaults without the knowledge or consent of the families.

Based on these findings the Board issued an order, pursuant to RCW 68.05.300 and RCW 68.05.105, suspending Blue Mountain’s certificate for 24 months, subject to stay if the Mahans paid a $15,000 fine and replaced the offending liners with vaults for those families who wanted vaults.

Blue Mountain appealed. The superior court dismissed the action, holding that the record did not support the Board’s finding that there was an industry standard for the years 1962 to 1971. The court therefore found no basis for the Board’s conclusion the contracts had been breached. The Board appeals.

Discussion

Standard of Review. Review of administrative proceedings is governed by RCW 34.05. We must uphold the agency’s findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence in the record that was before the board. RCW 34.05.570(3)(e); RCW 34.05.574(1); Tapper v. Employment Sec. Dep’t, 122 Wn.2d 397, 402, 858 P.2d 494 (1993). Evidence is substantial if it is sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the proposition. Heinmiller v. Department of Health, 127 Wn.2d 595, 607, 903 P.2d 433, 909 P.2d 1294 (1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1006 (1996).

Review of the Board’s conclusions of law is de novo. RCW 34.05.570(3)(d). The standard is “error of law.” We review the agency’s action, not the superior court’s. Waste Management of Seattle, Inc. v. Utilities & Transp. Comm’n, 123 Wn.2d 621, 632, 869 P.2d 1034 (1994). The [43]*43reviewing court must give due deference to the agency’s knowledge and expertise. Clausing v. State, 90 Wn. App. 863, 871, 955 P.2d 394, review denied, 136 Wn.2d 1020 (1998). However, although the Board’s interpretation of the law it administers is accorded substantial weight, the error of law standard permits this court to substitute its interpretation of the law for that of the Board. Haley v. Medical Disciplinary Bd., 117 Wn.2d 720, 728,

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971 P.2d 75, 94 Wash. App. 38, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/blue-mountain-memorial-gardens-v-department-of-licensing-washctapp-1999.