Blue Legs v. United States Environmental Protection Agency

732 F. Supp. 81, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20831, 31 ERC (BNA) 1043, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2778
CourtDistrict Court, D. South Dakota
DecidedFebruary 5, 1990
DocketCiv. 85-5097
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 732 F. Supp. 81 (Blue Legs v. United States Environmental Protection Agency) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. South Dakota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Blue Legs v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 732 F. Supp. 81, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20831, 31 ERC (BNA) 1043, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2778 (D.S.D. 1990).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

BATTEY, District Judge.

NATURE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At the status hearing conducted by this Court on September 28, 1989, the Court heard oral presentations by counsel representing the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the Indian Health Service (IHS) (the federal defendants), and the Oglala Sioux Tribe (OST). The record of the proceedings reflect the concerns of all parties and the Court. At the conclusion of the status hearing, the Court gave defendants thirty days to submit additional information/proposals. The additional information submitted was “Option 1,” termed a supplement to defendants’ original plan.

Option 1 and the federal defendants’ accompanying “background” statement continue to disregard the clear mandate of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and the admonitions of this Court given to the parties at the status hearing. These submissions only reinforce the Court’s abiding conviction that the federal defendants have not as yet faced up to their responsibilities under Blue Legs v. United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir.1989). Such failure reflects bureaucratic indifference at its worst. Those officials charged with the responsibility to discharge their agencies’ statutory duties under the acts passed by Congress have taken an oath to fairly uphold the laws of the United States. They shall perform their duties, under sanctions if necessary, but perform they shall. When the federal defendants chose not to appeal Blue Legs, it became the settled law of this circuit. The time for equivocation and vacillation is over.

Perhaps a revisit to certain statements in Blue Legs is in order. “The Court found that Congress passed the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) to remedy national problems caused by hazardous waste and solid waste disposal.” Id. at 1096. “It thus seems clear that the text and history of the RCRA clearly indicates congressional intent to abrogate the Tribe’s sovereign immunity with respect to violations of RCRA.” Id. at 1097. “BIA and IHS argue that RCRA does not obligate them to participate in compliance efforts. We disagree. We think that they are obligated to participate by the RCRA and the Snyder Act 25 U.S.C. § 13.” Id. at 1098. “The RCRA obligates the BIA and IHS to insure compliance with Environmental Protection Agency regulations.” Id. “The district court has the power to order BIA and IHS to undertake whatever compliance efforts are necessary.” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6961). Id. at 1099. “The district court found that BIA and IHS were engaged in solid waste management activities in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 6964. We agree.” Id. “We agree with the district court’s conclusion that, under RCRA, BIA and IHS must share the blame and responsibility for the conditions of these sites.” *83 Id. at 1099-1100. “The Snyder Act directs the BIA to expend appropriated funds on, among other things, the relief of distress and the conservation of health. Insofar as the Snyder Act imposes affirmative obligations on BIA to relieve distress and conserve Indian Health, BIA’s conduct on the Reservation in knowingly contributing to health hazards violated BIA’s statutory duty; BIA’s duty to remedy the wrong is absolute and is not limited in proportion to their contribution to the problem.” Id. at 1100. “Our holding that BIA and IHS have a duty to clean up the dumps is buttressed by the existence of the general trust relationship between these agencies and the Tribe.” Id.

In the face of these clear and unequivocal statements by the Court of Appeals, the federal defendants continue to assert positions reflecting their refusal to accept the law of Blue Legs. A listing of their positions illustrates the point.

1. Federal defendants state that “[w]hile we respect the prior rulings of this court and the appellate court, as well as the authority of each, we reiterate our reading that the obligations established by prior proceedings for IHS and BIA fall outside RCRA and the Snyder Act; the absence of funding authority, pointed out herein accords with that view.” Docket # 118, p. 3. To take such a position in the face of the appellate decision is preposterous. It partakes of a cavalier, willful, and contumacious disregard of the clear mandate of the appellate decision. Continuing, the federal defendants assert that the reason they do not have to comply is that “clearly the matter of funding is for the Congress.” Id. at 5.

2. Federal defendants continue to downplay the seriousness of the pollution problems caused by the dumps. They assert that on inspection, “[t]he most significant environmental impact(s) of the dump sites were: visual pollution (windblown and scattered materials); air pollution from uncontrolled burning; and possible exposure due to uncontrolled access to the sites. None of the sites were judged to be currently affecting surface water.” Option 1, p. 3. The correct facts, solidified by the rule of res judicata, are set forth in Blue Legs, in part, as follows. “Laboratory analysis of water samples from the [dump] sites showed significant contamination including organisms capable of causing disease in wildlife and frequently humans ... urinary tract infections and infections of the respiratory system ... neonatal infections, involving the central nervous system and other organisms.” Blue Legs at 1096.

3. Federal defendants state that “... if ordered by the Court to implement Option 1, the IHS still envisions that its portion of the additional costs would be funded with Fiscal Year 1990 appropriations earmarked to provide water and sewer facilities to individual Indian homes on the Reservation.” Docket # 12, p. 2. Again, such position flies in the face of the clear mandate of Blue Legs that the federal defendants, together with defendant OST, are responsible for cleaning up the dumps. To state that the clean-up costs will be borne by Indian families who otherwise would be provided water and sewer facilities misses the point entirely. While federal defendants may want to shift their responsibility for complying with RCRA onto the backs of these families, this Court will not permit it.

4. Federal defendants conclude by admonishing the Court that they “respectfully note that they are not in the business of operating and maintaining solid waste disposal facilities.” Docket # 12, p. 3. The Court submits that Blue Legs put them precisely in that business.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the nature and procedural history outlined above, the Court draws certain conclusions.

1. The federal defendants intend to disregard the legal rules set forth in Blue Legs.

2. The federal defendants fail to recognize their trust responsibility under the Snyder Act.

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Bluebook (online)
732 F. Supp. 81, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20831, 31 ERC (BNA) 1043, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2778, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/blue-legs-v-united-states-environmental-protection-agency-sdd-1990.