Bloxom v. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co.

131 So. 520, 15 La. App. 467, 1930 La. App. LEXIS 111
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedDecember 23, 1930
DocketNo. 3924
StatusPublished

This text of 131 So. 520 (Bloxom v. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bloxom v. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co., 131 So. 520, 15 La. App. 467, 1930 La. App. LEXIS 111 (La. Ct. App. 1930).

Opinion

WEBB, J.

Plaintiff, W. E. Bloxom, and wife, Mrs. Daisy E. Bloxom, joined in this action against the Texas & Pacific Railway Company to recover damages sustained by them individually which resulted from the death of their son, Arthur Bloxom, who died following and as the result of injuries received when an' automobile, driven by him was struck at a grade crossing at Lucas, Louisiana, where defendant has a flag station, by a passenger train operated by defendant.

The accident occurred in the afternoon of March 23, 1928, and plaintiff alleged in substance that their son approached Lucas from the south over a paved highway, which lies to the east of and practically parallels defendant’s tracks; that he turned from the highway into a side road, referred to as the south road, which bears west from the highway leading over a spur track, referred to as the east spur track, thence over the main and passing tracks, referred to as the south crossing, and thence over a spur track, referred to as the west spur track; that the main and passing tracks curve from a point south of the south crossing to the northwest. Plaintiff further alleged that their. son stopped at or near the railroad “stop sign” (which is east of the crossing at the east spur track, or about 59 feet from the east side of the main track at the south crossing), “where his view' would be unobstructed, looked and listened for approaching trains, at which time there was a long freight train on the passing track, and his view of the main track north was obstructed by said freight train, except for a distance of about 180 yards from the crossing,” and their son neither seeing nor hearing any train, started his car and drove over the first track (east spur track) and thence onto the main track (south crossing) and that he could not clear the track before the passenger train came along said track from the north, driven at a high and negligent rate of speed, without giving any warning of its approach and ran down and struck the automobile driven by their son; that from the direction (east) their son approached the crossing, he stopped his car at the proper place to have a clear and unobstructed view of the tracks north as far as he could see, which was approximately 540 feet, and that he could not see the main track farther on account of the freight train parked on the passing track and the curved tracks. Plaintiff further alleged that their son was without fault, and that the accident was due solely to the fault of defendant.

In answer defendant admitted plaintiffs’ son had been killed, as alleged, and otherwise denied plaintiffs’ allegations, especially denying that it was guilty of any fault, and that deceased was without fault, and alleged in event it should be held to have been guilty of any negligence, that plaintiffs’ son was guilty of contributory negligence.

There was judgment rendered in favor [469]*469of W. E. Bloxom in the sum of $5,273, and in favor of Mrs. Daisy E. Bloxom in the sum of $5,000, with legal interest from judicial demand. Defendant appealed from the judgment and plaintiffs have answered the appeal, praying that the judgment be amended and judgment rendered in favor of W. E. Bloxom in the sum of $20,275, and in favor of Mrs. Bloxom in the sum of $23,317.

On trial, there was introduced in evidence a map or plan and photographs which show that the maim and passing tracks are curved, and the location of the tracks with reference to the paved highway, south road, and the crossing at the east spur track, and main and passing tracks, or south crossing, to have been as alleged in plaintiffs' petition; which also show that at a distance of about 120 feet above the south road another side road, referred to as the north road, leads off from the highway, bearing towards the northwest, leading over the east spur track and thence over the main and passing tracks, referred to as the north crossing; that the main and passing tracks parallel each other for a distance of about a mile from the station building, which is located 21.5 feet east of the main track between the south and north crossings, which are 294 feet apart; that on the east side of the main track there is located a small building referred to as the “tool house,” at a distance of 247 feet north of the north crossing; that the east spur track leads out from the main track south of the south crossing, bearing northeast, and passing to the rear of the station building; that the west spur track leads out from the passing track at a point opposite the station- building, about 106 feet from the south crossing, and bears towards the southwest.

It is conceded that a freight train was 'parked on the passing track, which parallels the main track, on a rather sharp curve which continued some distance above the tool house, and that the view of the main track of one approaching the south crossing and when within an approximate distance of 21 feet of the south crossing would be restricted by the freight train and the curving track to a distance of about 540 feet, or to a point about the tool house, and that the distance one could see from the south crossing would be, as stated, and as shown by the map, or about to the tool house.

The theory on which plaintiffs apparently base their case is that when their son stopped before going upon the crossing, the train had not reached the tool house, and therefore that he did not see same, but that just as he started again, the train reached the tool house and that the speed of the train was such that the car of deceased was struck before it could clear the south crossing; while the theory of the defendant appears to be that the train was in view of the deceased when he is alleged to have stopped, and if not, that the train came within view before he reached the crossing, and that had deceased looked he would have seen the train and been able to stop before driving on to the crossing.

There were ten witnesses called on behalf of plaintiff, and six on behalf of defendant. Those called by plaintiff were Dudley, Mitchell, Schopini, Brown, J. C. and F. F. Webb, Jr., Roberts, Riggens, Marlin and Graham; and those called by defendant were Smith, New, McCormick, Hall, Deeper and Fried.

Dudley, Mitchell and Schopini claim to have seen the car which was driven by deceased just prior to or at the time of [470]*470the collision, and they gave their version of the accident and also stated that they had not heard any signals given of the approach of the train, and Dudley estimated the speed of the train at 40 to 50 miles per hour, and Schopini at 45 to 50 miles an hour, and Brown, J. C. and F. F. Webb, Jr., stated that they had not heard any signals of the approach of the train and estimated the speed of the train at 35 to 40 miles per hour; while Roberts, Riggens, Marlin and Graham, who were from one-half to a mile above the station building, said they did not hear any signals given for the crossings and they also estimated the speed of the train.

The witnesses for defendant, Smith, the engineer, and New, the fireman, on the passenger train stated that the signals had been given of the approach of the passen ger train and their statements were confirmed by the statement of McCormick, the conductor; and Hall, the flagman, on said train, and also by Leeper, the conductor on the freight train which was standing on the passing track, and their estimates of the speed of the train at the time it reached the tool house were from 25 to 30 miles per hour. H.

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Bluebook (online)
131 So. 520, 15 La. App. 467, 1930 La. App. LEXIS 111, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bloxom-v-tex-pac-ry-co-lactapp-1930.