Blossom Farm Products Co. v. Kasson Cheese Co.

395 N.W.2d 619, 133 Wis. 2d 386, 1986 Wisc. App. LEXIS 3833
CourtCourt of Appeals of Wisconsin
DecidedSeptember 17, 1986
Docket85-2064
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 395 N.W.2d 619 (Blossom Farm Products Co. v. Kasson Cheese Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Blossom Farm Products Co. v. Kasson Cheese Co., 395 N.W.2d 619, 133 Wis. 2d 386, 1986 Wisc. App. LEXIS 3833 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986).

Opinion

SCOTT, C.J.

Blossom Farm Products Company (Blossom) appeals from a judgment dismissing its suit on an open-account contract for $138,306 owed by defendant Kasson Cheese Company, Inc. (Kasson) for its last purchase of Isokappacase. 1 Blossom contends *388 that the trial court was in error when it concluded that the contract was illegal and unenforceable. Blossom argues that the contract for the sale of Isokappacase was not illegal because use of a yield-enhancing agent in cheese by Kasson was not illegal, even though Blossom knew Kasson was misbranding the product and selling it as real cheese. 2 In its cross-appeal, Kasson contends *389 that the contract between Blossom and Kasson was illegal because Blossom knew, not only that Kasson’s product was labeled illegally, but it participated in and benefited from the illegality.

The trial court held that the contract was illegal and unenforceable because both parties knew and benefited from Kasson’s “illegal use” of Isokappacase. Because we conclude that enforcement of the contract is against public policy, we affirm the trial court’s refusal to enforce the contract.

The dispositive issues on appeal are: (1) whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court’s findings of fact; and (2) whether the contract between Blossom and Kasson regarding the sale and purchase of Isokappacase is unenforceable.

Julian Podell, a salesman at Blossom, was sole United States distributor for PTX Food Corporation’s (PTX) production of Isokappacase. Blossom sold this product to Kasson from August 1981 until February 13, 1984. The label on Isokappacase indicated that the product was a “starter media, a bacteriophage preventive medium.” In fact, however, because Isokappacase contained more than 75% caseins or protein, its composition was characteristic primarily of a yield enhancer. Kasson introduced the Isokappacase directly into the cheese milk to enhance cheese yields from milk but did not label its final product as imitation cheese as required by federal standards.

Blossom was aware of the fact that Kasson’s extremely large volume purchases of the product could only be accounted for by Kasson’s use of Isokappacase *390 as a yield enhancer. Both Kasson 3 and Blossom 4 benefited economically from this volume purchase and use. When Kasson stopped using Isokappacase as a yield enhancer, PTX stopped making the product. 5 Further facts will be discussed as needed.

Generally, if a promisee has substantially performed its part of the contract, enforcement of a promise is not precluded on grounds of public policy because of some improper use that the promisor intends to make of what he obtains; however, if the promisee acts for the purpose of futhering the promisor’s improper use, the promisee is barred from recovering. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 182 (1981). Whether the promisee has acted for such purpose is a question of fact which may be evidenced by the promisee’s “doing of specific acts to facilitate the promisor’s improper use” and/or “a course of dealing with persons engaged in improper conduct.” Id. at comment b. A court engages in a balancing process to determine factually if the improper use or *391 conduct at issue is unenforceable on grounds of public policy. Id. at § 178 and § 182 comments a and b.

The trial court held the contract “illegal and unenforceable.” We restrict our holding to whether the contract is unenforceable. Our position is in keeping with the Restatement at §§ 178 and 182, which deal with the issue in terms of “unenforceability” rather than “illegality.”

We turn to the Restatement because the Wisconsin cases relied on by the parties do not distinguish between illegal contracts which are unenforceable and legal contracts which contravene public policy and are thus unenforceable. See Kryl v. Frank Holton & Co., 217 Wis. 628, 259 N.W. 828 (1935); Lowe v. Crocker, 154 Wis. 497, 143 N.W. 176 (1913). Despite some confusion in these cases regarding this distinction, we read these cases to be consistent with our decision and support our extension of this distinction, in keeping with the Restatement.

SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

We must first determine whether sufficient facts exist in the record to support the trial court’s findings of: (1) Kasson’s improper conduct; and (2) Blossom’s knowledgeable involvement with Kasson. Findings of fact by a trial court “shall not be set aside [on appeal] unless clearly erroneous_” Section 805.17(2), Stats. We conclude sufficient facts exist on both points.

Blossom, as promisee, performed its part of the contract; it delivered the $138,306 shipment of Isokap-pacase to Kasson. Blossom’s contract to sell Isokappa-case to Kasson was legal; use of a yield enhancer is legal *392 as long as the end product is properly labeled as an imitation or analog cheese with the concomitant ingredient line listed. Only when a promisor, such as Kasson, intends to use Isokappacase as a yield enhancer and sell its end product as a real cheese that purportedly conforms to federal standards of identity does the use of Isokappacase become improper. 6

Even with Kasson’s intended purpose of improperly labeling its end product, enforcement of Kasson’s promise to pay Blossom for sale and delivery of the Isokappa-case would not be precluded on grounds of public policy without knowledgeable involvement by Blossom. Testimony from several parties provides sufficient evidence of Blossom’s knowledgeable involvement in Kasson’s improper conduct.

Podell testified that Blossom knew Kasson was using Isokappacase as a yield enhancer. Podell acknowledged that once he recognized that Kasson was ordering about one hundred times more Isokappacase than would be needed if it were using the product as a starter medium, he realized that such large volume orders could only mean that Kasson was using the product as a yield enhancer. 7

*393 Likewise, Marvin Silverman, president of PTX, testified that while he sold 100% of its production of Isokappacase to Podell who, in turn, sold over 90% to Kasson, he did not know the exact percentage Blossom sold to Kasson because Podell kept “a secret list, confidential.” Silverman also testified that he knew Kasson was putting Isokappacase directly into its cheese milk because he was called in to solve a clotting problem at Kasson. In order to facilitate Kasson’s use of the product in this way, Silverman suggested the technical assistance of a pump.

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Bluebook (online)
395 N.W.2d 619, 133 Wis. 2d 386, 1986 Wisc. App. LEXIS 3833, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/blossom-farm-products-co-v-kasson-cheese-co-wisctapp-1986.