Bloom v. Willis

60 So. 2d 415, 221 La. 803, 221 La. 893, 1952 La. LEXIS 1260
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedJune 2, 1952
DocketNo. 40205
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 60 So. 2d 415 (Bloom v. Willis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bloom v. Willis, 60 So. 2d 415, 221 La. 803, 221 La. 893, 1952 La. LEXIS 1260 (La. 1952).

Opinion

HAMITER, Justice.

• As coguardians of Flora M. Alward (Rohnert), a mentally incompetent person residing in Wayne County, Michigan, plaintiffs, who are also residents of such County and State, instituted these three petitory actions (consolidated in the district court and here) in which they assert on behalf of their ward, ownership to approximately 1108 acres of land in Rich-land Parish, together with the oil produced therefrom. They impleaded as defendants all parties in the actual possession of the property and others claiming oil and gas rights and leases affecting it.

[806]*806For a cause of action plaintiffs alleged that their ward, Flora M. Alward Rohnert, was the wife of Frederick Rohnert from prior to January 27, 1893 until'the latter’s death on October 26, 1936, the marriage having been of the common-law type, without license or ceremony, which was valid and legal under the laws of Michigan (the domicile of those persons) and recognized by the State of Louisiana insofar as it concerns property of the spouses in this state; that the named husband, during such marriage, acquired the above-mentioned land in Richland Parish under deeds dated January 27, 1893 and April 4, 1893; that he never disposed of it and died intestate without leaving ascendants or descendants; and that on the husband’s death the said wife, as his surviving widow in community and his sole and only heir at law, became and was the owner of all of such property which had belonged to the community of acquets and gains that existed between them.

In the alternative plaintiffs pleaded that their ward is entitled to one-fourth of the property (the marital fourth) as a surviving widow in necessitous circumstances.

To the actions the defendants tendered numerous exceptions, all of which were overruled. Also, they filed pleas of prescription of ten years acquirendi causa. The court referred these pleas to the merits.

Answering, the defendants reurged their exceptions and pleas, and they denied that a marriage ever existed between plaintiffs’ ward and Frederick Rohnert. Further, they averred that Frederick Rohnert had disposed of the property in contest by a recorded deed translative of title, from which their respective rights flowed, and that his alleged widow likewise had disposed of any interest which she might have had therein.

After a trial of the merits the district court rendered judgments in the three cases rejecting the demands of plaintiffs and dismissing their suits. These appeals (consolidated and docketed in this court under one number) followed.

Subsequent to the filing of the transcript here plaintiffs’ ward died leaving certain heirs, all . of whom are nonresidents of this state. A curator for these absent heirs has been appointed and, through proper motion and order, he is now a party plaintiff and appellant herein.

In rendering the judgments appealed from the district judge assigned no written reasons. The briefs filed in this court, however, disclose his conclusion to have been that appellants failed to establish the existence of the alleged common-law marriage — concededly a prerequisite for any recovery herein. Thus, appellees’ counsel say that the judge “found no evidence sufficient to prove a common-law marriage and correctly concluded that in the absence of such a marriage plaintiffs had no claim.” And appellants’ counsel state: “Plaintiffs face the burden of showing that the judgment of the district court is manifestly er[808]*808roneous in holding that a common-law marriage was not established by a preponderance of the evidence.”

With respect to this paramount issue of marriage all parties agree that the following observations, contained in the brief of appellees’ counsel, are correct:

“A marriage such as is alleged upon in these proceedings is not recognized by our laws, but, out of comity, the Courts of this State will give effect to any marriage valid under the laws of the state where the parties reside. Succession of Marinoni, 177 La. 592, 148 So. 888. Michigan recognizes the common-law marriage, and since Flora Alward and Frederick Rohnert were both residents of that State, we must look to the laws thereof in order to determine if the marriage existed.”

As to the proof required hy the laws of Michigan for establishing a non-ceremonial marriage there can be no doubt. According to the settled jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of that state the existence of such a marriage can not be concluded unless it clearly appears from the evidence (1) that the parties presently agreed to take each other as husband and wife and (2) that they lived together and cohabited in conformity with their agreement and in the usual manner of married people. The latest case on the subject in which the Michigan court recognized the mentioned two requisites seems to be Hannigan v. Hannigan, 328 Mich. 378, 43 N.W.2d 895 (decided September 11, 1950), and in giving that recognition it cited with approval numerous earlier decisions, including Griffin v. Griffin, 1923, 225 Mich. 253, 196 N.W. 384; In re Meredith’s Estate, 1937, 279 Mich. 298, 272 N.W. 683, and People v. Spencer, 1917, 199 Mich. 395, 165 N.W. 921.

In the Griffin case the following was said [225 Mich. 253, 196 N.W. 385]:

“As has been said in numerous decisions of this court, the test of a common-law marriage is: Did they presently agree to take each other for husband and wife, and thereafter live together in that relation ? * ■ * *”

In the Meredith case we find this statement [279 Mich. 298, 272 N.W. 685]:

“ * * * However, to- establish a common-law marriage, it is not alone sufficient that the parties cohabited and were known as husband and wife, but it is essential that it also be shown that there was a present agreement between the parties to take each other as husband and wife. * * * ”

In explaining the necessary cohabitation as husband and wife the court observed in the Spencer case as follows [199 Mich. 395, 165 N.W. 923.]:

“ * * * In this state a marriage is not proven by evidence only that the parties, inter se, agreed to take each other for husband and wife. To' establish a nonceremonial marriage, there must be proof, not only of the agree[810]*810ment, but of the setting up of the relation of husband and wife by cohabitation. The parties must act in conformity with such an agreement and live together and cohabit as husband and wife — live together in that relation. * * *
“The common-law marriage, so-called (or miscalled), is recognized in the interest of the family and of legitimacy of offspring. If the family relation is established and maintained in •consequence of, and pursuant to, the mutual agreement to marry, the law recognizes the union; the family. Cohabitation in this behalf means ■dwelling together; living in the usual manner of married people. It is a manifestation that the parties have •consented between themselves to contract the marriage relation, a holding forth to- the world by daily life, conduct, demeanor, habit, that the man and woman who live together have agreed to marriage and to stand to each other in the mutual relation of husband and wife. * * *”

We do- not find that the law applied in Re Yokom’s Estate, 1949, 325 Mich. 472,

Related

Ghassemi v. Ghassemi
998 So. 2d 731 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2008)

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Bluebook (online)
60 So. 2d 415, 221 La. 803, 221 La. 893, 1952 La. LEXIS 1260, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bloom-v-willis-la-1952.