Blomberg v. Riley (In Re Riley)

351 B.R. 662, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 2057, 2006 WL 2563460
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedJuly 10, 2006
Docket19-21582
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 351 B.R. 662 (Blomberg v. Riley (In Re Riley)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Blomberg v. Riley (In Re Riley), 351 B.R. 662, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 2057, 2006 WL 2563460 (Wis. 2006).

Opinion

DECISION

JAMES E. SHAPIRO, Bankruptcy Judge.

INTRODUCTION

There is a bitter lesson to be learned from this adversary proceeding:

When a majority stockholder of a corporation lets personal and/or family interests interfere with and dictate the course of the corporation’s business operations to the detriment of the minority stockholders, it spells “trouble — big, big trouble — with a capitalT.” 1

That is precisely what happened here.

This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(I) and (J).

*665 BACKGROUND

Elizabeth Riley (“Riley”), the debtor in this case, was the sole stockholder of Eli Environmental Contractors, Inc. (“Eli”) when it was incorporated in November of 1993. Eli originally engaged primarily in the business of providing residential building underground fuel storage tank removal. It later expanded its operations to include budding demolition.

On June 11, 2002, Gerald A. Blomberg Jr., (“Blomberg”) and Gerald A. Burger (“Burger”) each acquired 24.5% of the stock in Eli. This gave them collectively a 49% interest in the company, with Riley retaining a 51% majority interest. Burger and Blomberg each paid $50,000 for their shares of stock. Blomberg, who owns Midwest Rail & Dismantling Inc., a company which performs demolition work and which in the past worked with Eli as its subcontractor on some jobs, paid for his stock by contributing $50,000 worth of equipment. Burger paid $50,000 cash for his share of the stock. At the time of this stock purchase, Burger, Blomberg and Riley also entered into a shareholders’ agreement. The shareholders’ agreement, among other things, spelled out certain restrictions on Eli’s future operations. These restrictions included the requirement of unanimous shareholder approval to:

1. Hire any employee (other than laborers);
2. Pay any sums exceeding $2,500; and
3. Enter into any contracts in which the consideration exceeded $2,500.

Blomberg and Burger joined Riley as Eli’s directors. Riley continued to serve as president, and the following parties became officers: Blomberg, vice president; Burger, treasurer; and Thomas Jacobson (“Jacobson”), who is Riley’s son, secretary.

Riley, Blomberg and Burger also each signed separate contracts with Eli. The agreement between Eli and Riley was an employment agreement in which Riley was designated as chief executive officer. Her duties included overseeing the day-to-day operations of Eli, which duties she agreed to carry out solely for the benefit of Eli. Blomberg’s consulting agreement required him to advise on demolition practices. Burger’s consulting agreement required him to advise on insurance, construction bonding, finance and related matters. Jacobson also signed an agreement with Eli to serve as its general manager. He had been employed by Eli since 1999 starting as an equipment operator. When Blom-berg and Burger acquired their respective stock interests, Jacobson became Eli’s general manager. Jacobson was also the person who informed his mother that Blomberg and Burger were interested in purchasing stock in Eli and further told her that he thought it was a good idea. Under his employment agreement, Jacobson was required to devote all of his full-time efforts to the sole benefit of Eli. Jacobson’s agreement also contained a 2-year non-competition agreement. Thomas Jacobson Jr., Andy Jacobson and Dan Jacobson, who are the sons of Jacobson and grandsons of Riley, were also on Eli’s payroll when Blomberg and Burger became stockholders, and they continued to be employed by Eli thereafter.

WHAT WENT WRONG?

Less than a year after Blomberg and Burger acquired their stock interests, a serious rift developed between Blomberg and Burger on one side and Riley and Jacobson on the other side. According to Blomberg and Burger, the major factors which contributed to this rift included vari *666 ous actions taken by both Jacobson and Riley without their approval. These actions included the following:

1. Jacobson signing collective bargaining agreements on behalf of Eli with Wisconsin Laborers’ District Council 113 and with International Union of Operating Engineers Local 139 in October of 2002.
2. Riley filing a bankruptcy petition under chapter 11 on behalf of Eli on August 19, 2003. This bankruptcy petition was subsequently dismissed by The Honorable Margaret Dee McGarity, United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, on September 15, 2003 because of a lack of proper corporate authorization.
3. Eli entering into an agreement with Underground Power Corp. (“UPC”), which required Eli to pay all of the wages of UPC’s employees in exchange for Eli’s use of UPC equipment and UPC labor on Eli’s jobs. (Tr. pp. 727, 948) Subsequently, UPC submitted an invoice to Eli for $175,000, which was challenged by Eli and was never paid. 2
4. Riley and Jacobson compromising a $130,000 account receivable due to Eli from Water Street Holdings, a company owned by Riley’s brother, Thomas Short. Under the terms of this compromise, the amount of the account receivable was shaved to approximately $21,000 in cash plus a $50,000 note receivable. The compromise was finalized as part of a real estate closing held in February of 2003 in connection with the sale of certain real estate by Water Street Holdings to 435 Partners LLC. The $21,000 in cash paid to Eli came from the real estate sales proceeds together with a $50,000 note receivable from 435 Partners LLC to Eli. This note was not paid and ultimately resulted in litigation with a judgment in favor of Eli. This judgment remains unsatisfied. Short also paid Riley personally $20,000 in cash from the real estate sales proceeds. This payment to Riley was not disclosed by her to Blomberg and Burger.
5. Riley diverting certain potentially profitable jobs obtained by Eli to various business entities owned or controlled by Jacobson and his three sons, who are also Riley’s grandchildren. Riley explained this had to be done because Eli lacked sufficient personnel to perform and complete these jobs.
6. Riley authorizing some of the Eli equipment to be used by Jacobson and his three sons for their separate business operations without any payment being received by Eli.

In response, Riley asserts that Blomberg and Burger knew of all or at least a portion of these actions and that some of these actions had been approved by them.

Other disputes between these parties widened the rift even further. Each side blamed the other for Eli’s problems. Riley contended that Blomberg did not live up to his commitment to provide labor and materials. Blomberg vigorously contested these assertions. (Tr. p.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Vara v. Motil
N.D. Ohio, 2023
Patriot Grp. v. Fustolo (In re Fustolo)
597 B.R. 1 (D. Massachusetts, 2019)
Brown v. Ferrari (In re Ferrari)
587 B.R. 504 (N.D. Illinois, 2018)
Sammarco v. Dini (In re Dini)
560 B.R. 741 (N.D. Illinois, 2016)
Ruter v. Schryver (In re Schryer)
558 B.R. 856 (N.D. Illinois, 2016)
Spohn v. Carney (In re Carney)
558 B.R. 250 (N.D. Illinois, 2016)
In Re Pisculli
426 B.R. 52 (E.D. New York, 2010)
Pisculli v. T.S. Haulers, Inc.
426 B.R. 52 (E.D. New York, 2010)
Neary v. Mosher (In Re Mosher)
417 B.R. 772 (N.D. Illinois, 2009)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
351 B.R. 662, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 2057, 2006 WL 2563460, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/blomberg-v-riley-in-re-riley-wieb-2006.