Block v. Alzamzami

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 HENDRIK BLOCK, Case No. 1:23-cv-00061-SKO 8 Plaintiff, 9 ORDER DISCHARGING ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE v. 10 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 11 TO DECLINE SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFF’S ESKANDAR T. ALZAMZAMI dba Fatboy 12 STATE LAW CLAIMS Market, et al.,

13 (Docs. 1, 8, 9) Defendants.

14 14 DAY DEADLINE

15 Clerk to Assign District Judge

_________________________________ ___/ 16

17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 On January 12, 2023, Plaintiff Hendrik Block (“Plaintiff”) filed his Complaint against 19 Defendants Eskandar T. Alzamzami dba Fatboy Market and Nahla Mohammed Muharram alleging 20 claims under the American with Disabilities Act (ADA), California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, and 21 California’s Health and Safety Code. (Doc. 1). These claims stem from alleged barriers Plaintiff 22 encountered (such as a lack of designated accessible parking stalls) while he visited a facility owned, 23 operated, or leased by Defendants—Fatboy Market. (See id.) Neither Defendant has appeared. 24 Plaintiff has obtained a clerk’s entry of default against Defendants but has not yet moved for entry 25 of default judgment. (Docs. 6, 7.) 26 On March 20, 2023, the undersigned ordered Plaintiff to show cause why the Court should 27 not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his Unruh Act claim in light of the Ninth 28 Circuit’s decision in Vo v. Choi. (See Doc. 8.); Vo v. Choi, 49 F.4th 1167 (9th Cir. 2022) (affirming 1 a district court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim); see 28 2 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Plaintiff timely filed a response on April 3, 2023. (Doc. 9.) For the reasons 3 discussed below, the undersigned shall discharge the order to show cause and shall recommend that 4 supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim, as well as his California Health & Safety Code claims, be declined and those claims be dismissed without prejudice. 5 6 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 7 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), a court that has original jurisdiction over a civil action “shall 8 have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within 9 such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the 10 United States Constitution.” The Ninth Circuit has concluded that ADA and Unruh Act claims that 11 derive from a common nucleus of operative fact “form part of the ‘same case or controversy’ for 12 purposes of § 1367(a).” Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202, 1209 (9th Cir. 2021). 13 However, even where supplemental jurisdiction over a claim exists under § 1367(a), the 14 Court may decline jurisdiction over the claim under § 1367(c) if: 15 (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, 16 (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, 17 (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, 18 or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining 19 jurisdiction. 20 § 1367(c)(1)-(4). 21 Pertinent here, a court deciding whether to apply § 1367(c)(4) must make “a two-part 22 inquiry.” Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1210. “First, the district court must articulate why the circumstances 23 of the case are exceptional within the meaning of § 1367(c)(4).” Id. (citations and internal quotation 24 marks omitted). “Second, in determining whether there are compelling reasons for declining 25 jurisdiction in a given case, the court should consider what best serves the principles of economy, 26 convenience, fairness, and comity which underlie the pendent jurisdiction doctrine articulated in 27 [United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966)].” Id. (citations and internal quotation 28 marks omitted). 1 After considering § 1367(c)(4) and California’s requirements for bringing Unruh Act claims, 2 “[n]umerous federal district courts across California have declined to exercise supplemental 3 jurisdiction over Unruh Act . . . claims brought alongside ADA claims.” Rutherford v. Nuway Ins. 4 Agency Inc., No. SACV 21-00576-CJC-JDE, 2021 WL 4572008, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2021). 5 Underlying these decisions is “the recent confluence of several California-law rules [that] have 6 combined to create a highly unusual systemic impact on ADA-based Unruh Act cases that clearly 7 threatens to have a significant adverse impact on federal-state comity.” Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1211. 8 Notably, Congress adopted the ADA to address the discrimination encountered by persons 9 with disabilities, providing a private cause of action to seek injunctive, but not monetary, relief. See 10 Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2021) (discussing background and relief available 11 under the ADA). The Unruh Act likewise prohibits disability discrimination, containing a provision, 12 Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f), stating that a violation of the ADA also violates the Unruh Act. However, 13 unlike the ADA, the Unruh Act allows a plaintiff to recover “up to a maximum of three times the 14 amount of actual damage but in no case less than four thousand dollars.” Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a). 15 In response to perceived abuses of the Unruh Act, California has enacted requirements for 16 bringing such claims, which requirements the Ninth Circuit has assumed, without deciding, “apply 17 only in California state court.” Vo, 49 F.4th at 1170. For example a provision was added (1) 18 regarding the contents of demand letters, Cal. Civ. Code § 55.31; (2) imposing heightened pleading 19 requirements, Cal. Civ. Code § 425.50(a); and (3) requiring an additional filing fee of $1,000 for so 20 called “high-frequency litigants,” Cal. Gov’t Code § 70616.5(b), see Cal. Civ. Code § 425.55(b) 21 (defining a high-frequency litigant to include “[a] plaintiff who has filed 10 or more complaints 22 alleging a construction-related accessibility violation within the 12-month period immediately 23 preceding the filing of the current complaint alleging a construction-related accessibility 24 violation.”). 25 All of these requirements1 apply to claims alleging a construction-related accessibility 26 violation, defined as involving “a provision, standard, or regulation under state or federal law 27 requiring compliance with standards for making new construction and existing facilities accessible 28 1 to persons with disabilities,” including those related to the ADA. Cal. Civ. Code § 55.52(a)(1), (6); 2 see Cal. Civ. Code § 55.3(a)(2). By enacting such restrictions, California has expressed a “desire 3 to limit the financial burdens California’s businesses may face from claims for statutory damages 4 under the Unruh Act.” Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1209 (internal quotations omitted). However, “Unruh 5 Act plaintiffs have evaded these limits by filing in a federal forum in which [they] can claim these 6 state law damages in a manner inconsistent with the state law’s requirements.” Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 7 1213 (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, “the procedural strictures that California 8 put in place have been rendered largely toothless, because they can now be readily evaded.” Id. 9 Recently, the Ninth Circuit provided substantial guidance on this issue in Vo v. Choi in 10 affirming a district court’s order denying supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim under 11 § 1367(c)(4). Vo, 49 F.4th at 1168. In that case, the district court declined supplemental jurisdiction 12 over the Unruh Act claim after giving the plaintiff the opportunity to respond and before addressing 13 the merits of the case. Id. at 1168-69. In reviewing the district court’s decision, the Ninth Circuit 14 held that the district court sufficiently explained why the circumstances of the case were exceptional 15 under § 1367(c)(4), agreeing with the district court that “it would not be ‘fair’ to defendants and ‘an 16 affront to the comity between federal and state courts’ to allow plaintiffs to evade California’s 17 procedural requirements by bringing their claims in federal court.” Id. at 1171. The Court also 18 affirmed the district court’s finding that the balance of the Gibbs values—economy, convenience, 19 fairness, and comity—provided compelling reasons to decline supplemental jurisdiction, stating that 20 “the district court [properly] analyzed Vo’s situation under the Gibbs values and determined that the 21 values of fairness and comity favored not retaining jurisdiction over the claim.” Id. at 1172. 22 Accordingly, “[g]iven these very real concerns, in addition to the deferential standard of review, 23 [the Ninth Circuit saw] no reason to hold that the district court abused its discretion in determining 24 there were compelling reasons to decline jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim.” Id. 25 III. ANALYSIS 26 The Court begins with the first part of the two-step inquiry under § 1367(c)(4)—whether the 27 circumstances here are exceptional. Vo, 49 F.4th at 1171. 28 As discussed above, California has enacted various requirements that apply to claims 1 alleging a construction-related accessibility violation. If the Court were to exercise jurisdiction over 2 Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim, Plaintiff would be permitted to avoid these requirements. See Arroyo, 3 19 F.4th at 1213 (noting that potential evasion of California’s requirements met exceptional- 4 circumstances prong of § 1367(c)(4)). Further, such evasion would undermine California’s policy 5 interests in enforcing its requirements—providing monetary relief but limiting burdens on small 6 businesses and disincentivizing plaintiffs’ attorneys from obtaining “monetary settlements at the 7 expense of forward-looking relief that might benefit the general public.” Id. Plaintiff offers no 8 argument for why such circumstances should not be deemed exceptional, and there is “little doubt 9 that the first prong [under § 1367(c)(4)] is satisfied here.” Vo, 49 F.4th at 1171. See also Garcia v. 10 Maciel, No. 21-CV-03743-JCS, 2022 WL 395316, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2022) (collecting cases). 11 Turning to the second part of the inquiry—whether there are other compelling reasons for 12 declining jurisdiction—the Court considers the Gibbs values of economy, convenience, fairness, 13 and comity. Vo, 49 F.4th at 1171. Importantly, this case is an early stage of the litigation— 14 Defendants have not appeared. While Plaintiff has obtained a clerk’s entry of default against 15 Defendants, he has not yet moved for default judgment, and thus, the merits of Plaintiff’s claims 16 have not yet been addressed. See Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1214 (noting that the Gibbs values did not 17 support declining supplemental jurisdiction where the case was at a “very late stage”). This is not 18 a case “where it makes no sense to decline jurisdiction . . . over a pendent state law claim that that 19 court has effectively already decided.” Id. Notably, Plaintiff makes no argument that the stage of 20 this case warrants exercising jurisdiction. 21 Moreover, in light of the above discussion of California’s requirements for Unruh Act 22 claims, it would not be fair, nor would comity be served, by allowing Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim to 23 proceed without the state court being able to enforce its policy interests as reflected in its various 24 procedural requirements. Id. at 1213 (noting “comity-based concerns that California’s policy 25 objectives in this area were being wholly thwarted” by plaintiffs being able to bring Unruh Act 26 claims in federal court). On this issue, Plaintiff concedes in his response to the show cause order 27 that he would be considered a high-frequency litigant and would otherwise have to meet certain 28 1 California requirements, such as paying the $1,000 filing fee in state court.2 (Doc. 9 at 2 (“Plaintiff 2 acknowledges that he would be considered a high-frequency litigant under California law as he filed 3 more than ten construction-related accessibility claims in the twelve months preceding the filing of 4 the instant action.”).) 5 Plaintiff raises two arguments for why the Court should exercise jurisdiction. First, Plaintiff 6 states that his complaint meets the heightened pleading requirements of § 425.50. (See Doc. 9 at 2.) 7 At this stage, however, the Court only need to determine whether California’s requirements are 8 implicated, not whether they are in fact met. As Vo noted, whether a Plaintiff “has satisfied the 9 heightened pleading requirements” imposed in California is a question for the state court because 10 “[f]orcing the district court to determine if [this is] in fact true would itself run afoul of the Gibbs 11 values—especially comity,” and would deprive California of playing its “critical role in effectuating 12 the policies underlying [its] reforms.” Vo, 49 F.4th at 1173-74 (internal citation omitted). 13 Second, Plaintiff contends that requiring him to bring a second action in state court “would 14 be duplicative and would only increase the ultimate burden on the subject business, as Plaintiff 15 would be entitled to seek recovery of the additional attorney’s fees and costs spent bringing the 16 second action.” (Doc. 9 at 3.) As an initial matter, this argument improperly assumes that Plaintiff 17 will be successful in this action. However, even accepting such an assumption, the fact that the 18 litigation could prove duplicative or increase costs does not, in light of the other considerations, 19 warrant retaining jurisdiction. As one court has concluded, “if plaintiff legitimately seeks to litigate 20 this action in a single forum, plaintiff may dismiss this action and refile it in a state court in 21 accordance with the requirements California has imposed on such actions.” Garibay v. Rodriguez, 22 No. CV 18-9187 PA (AFMX), 2019 WL 5204294, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2019). Moreover, it is 23 California’s prerogative to impose a heightened filing fee for high-frequency litigants in an effort to 24 curb abuses of the Unruh Act at the risk of the fee being ultimately paid by defendants. It would 25 undermine comity and fairness were Plaintiff permitted to proceed with his Unruh Act claim in light 26 of California’s policy concerns. 27 2 While the Court acknowledges Plaintiff’s concession, it need not determine whether he is in fact a high-frequency 28 litigant. Vo, 49 F.4th at 1174 (noting that court was not required to determine whether the plaintiff was in fact a high- 1 Accordingly, considering the two-step inquiry under § 1367(c)(4), the undersigned 2 concludes that this case presents “exceptional circumstances” such that “there are other compelling 3 reasons for declining [supplemental] jurisdiction” over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act and Health & Safety 4 Code claims.3 5 IV. ORDER AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6 The Court’s order to show cause (Doc. 8) is hereby DISCHARGED. For the reasons given 7 above, IT IS RECOMMENDED as follows: 8 1. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4) and Vo v. Choi, 49 F.4th 1167 (9th Cir. 2022), 9 the Court DECLINE to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act 10 claim and Plaintiff’s Cal. Health & Safety Code § 19955 and § 19959 claims; and 11 2. Plaintiff’s Unruh Act and Cal. Health & Safety Code § 19955 and § 19959 claims be 12 DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). 13 The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to assign a District Judge to this action. 14 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 15 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen 16 (14) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 17 objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 18 Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 19 specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 20 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22

23 Dated: April 13, 2023 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto . UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 24

25 26

27 3 Plaintiff’s California Health & Safety Code claims are subject to the same heightened pleading and filing requirements as his Unruh Act claim. See Gilbert v. Singh, No. 1:21cv1338-AWI-HBK, 2023 WL 2239335, *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 28 2023). Therefore, the same considerations that counsel against maintaining supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s