Block, Inc. v. HS&D LLC

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: December 9, 2025
• Docket: 01-23-00428-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued December 9, 2025

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-23-00428-CV ——————————— BLOCK, INC., Appellant1 V. HS&D LLC, Appellee

On Appeal from the 189th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2022-65488

1 Angelica Alvarez, one of two codefendants in the underlying case, appealed from the trial court’s default judgment against her. Three months later, Block, Inc. filed a restricted appeal from the same default judgment. This Court dismissed the appeal because Alvarez failed to pay the filing fee after notice. Block, Inc. moved for rehearing, and the Court granted the motion rehearing and reinstated Block, Inc.’s appeal. Thus, Block, Inc. is the sole appellant. MEMORANDUM OPINION

Block, Inc. (“Block”) filed a restricted appeal from the trial court’s no-

answer default judgment, which found that Block failed to comply with a

temporary restraining order and temporary injunction and that it was jointly and

severally liable for $133,481.15 plus interest and attorney’s fees. On appeal, Block

argues that the trial court erred by entering default judgment because (1) no

citation was on file with the court, (2) it was not named as a defendant in any

pleading, (3) neither the restraining order nor temporary injunction named Block,

(4) Block did not receive notice of the restraining order, temporary injunction, or

hearing on either, and (5) noncompliance with a restraining order or temporary

injunction cannot support a default judgment awarding compensatory damages.

HS&D did not file a brief in our Court.

Because we hold that error exists on the face of the record, we reverse and

remand.

Background

HS&D provides payment services to its customers, “act[ing] as a middleman

for its customers who want to pay vendors using a service like CashApp when such

vendors don’t accept payment by CashApp.” HS&D maintained that Angelica

Alvarez, a former employee, had stolen funds by depositing customer funds into

her personal CashApp account instead of the HS&D CashApp account. Alvarez,

2 who was separated from her then-husband Michael Stevenson, blamed Stevenson,

and he denied the allegation and blamed Alvarez.

HS&D sued both Alvarez and Stevenson alleging causes of action for fraud,

money had and received, and violation of the Texas Uniform Trade Secret Act. In

its original petition, which is the live pleading in this case, HS&D identified

Alvarez and Stevenson as defendants, and it pleaded, “Block, Inc. is a necessary

party and may be served through its registered agent . . . .” Block is not mentioned

again in the petition. Nevertheless, according to the return of service affidavit,

Block was served with a copy of the HS&D’s original petition and request for

injunctive relief and temporary restraining order, by service on its registered agent

for service of process, CT Corporation.

HS&D obtained a temporary restraining order and then a temporary

injunction. The October 7, 2022 temporary restraining order provided:

Upon the amount of the bond being posted, Defendant Angelica Alvarez and Defendant Michael Allan Stevenson are hereby temporarily restrained from: (1) attempting to withdraw or remove any funds held in any CashApp account in the name of Angelica Alvarez and/or Michael Allan Stevenson and or Lucky Bunny or over which they have control, including but not limited to the account under CyberKing8011@gmail.com; (2) contacting Plaintiff’s [HS&D’s] customers; and (3) closing or interfering with Plaintiff’s gmail accounts, until this case is resolved.

Block was not mentioned in the temporary restraining order. Similarly, the

October 24, 2022 temporary injunction included, word-for-word, the same three

3 prohibitions and failed to mention Block. The temporary injunction set the case for

trial, and the certificate of service shows that Alvarez was sent a copy of the

temporary injunction. But neither Block nor Stevenson was included in the

certificate of service.

About four months after the trial court entered the temporary injunction,

HS&D filed a motion for default judgment. In that motion, HS&D stated:

“Defendants are Angelica Alvarez, Michael Allan Stevenson and Block, Inc.”

HS&D also asserted that the deadline for Block to file an answer was

November 7, 2022 based on service by certified mail on October 17, 2022. The

motion for default judgment was set for a Zoom hearing, and the notice of hearing

was sent by the efiling system to HS&D’s lawyers and to Alvarez, but not to

Block. Block did not attend the hearing. At the hearing, Sandra Brignoni, the

owner and president of HS&D, testified that Block is the parent company for

CashApp and that she sued Block along with Alvarez and Stevenson. In response

to counsel’s questions, she agreed that the temporary restraining order and the

temporary injunction “ordered that the funds were to be frozen in that CashApp

account.” And in regard to Block’s liability, she again agreed with counsel’s

statement:

Q. Okay. And so HS&D, likewise, hold Block, Inc. accountable for the money that was in that CashApp account, [$]133,481.15, for violating the terms of the TRO and the TI and not freezing that–those funds because we are–although we don’t have 4 specific access to that account, we’re fairly certain, based on vehicles and other assets that you’ve learned about Ms. Alvarez and Mr. Stevenson purchasing, that they’ve taken that money and used it for their own devices; is that right?

A. Correct.

After the hearing, the trial court entered judgment, stating that “Block, Inc.

failed to file an answer in this case.” The trial court found that Alvarez and

Stevenson committed fraud against HS&D, and that Block “failed to comply with

the Court’s Temporary Restraining [O]rder and Temporary Injunction with respect

to Plaintiff’s funds held in Defendant Block, Inc.’s account.” The trial court

ordered Alvarez, Stevenson, and Block to pay $133,481.15, plus pre- and post-

judgment interest at the rate of 7.75%, taxable court costs, and attorney’s fees of

$20,000, “all for which . . . Alvarez . . . Stevenson and Block, Inc. are jointly and

severally liable.” No post-judgment motions were filed.

Just over four months later, Block filed a notice of restricted appeal.

Analysis

I. Restricted Appeal and No-Answer Default Judgment

A restricted appeal is a type of direct attack on a default judgment. Am.

Servs. U.S., LLC v. Identity Built, LLC, No. 01-23-00540-CV, 2025 WL 1256273,

at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 1, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.); TEX.

R. APP. P. 30. To prevail on a restricted appeal, a party must prove that (1) it

brought the appeal within six months after the trial court signed the judgment;

5 (2) it was a party to the suit; (3) it did not participate in the hearing that resulted in

the complained-of judgment and did not timely file any post-judgment motions or

requests for findings of fact and conclusions of law; and (4) error is apparent from

the face of the record. See Pike-Grant v. Grant, 447 S.W.3d 884, 886 (Tex. 2014);

see Invesco Inv. Servs., Inc. v. Fid. Deposit & Disc. Bank, 355 S.W.3d 257, 259

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (“The face of the record consists of

all the papers on file in the appeal, including any reporter’s record.”).

“A no-answer default judgment is properly granted if (1) the plaintiff files a

petition that states a cause of action; (2) the petition invokes the trial court’s

jurisdiction; (3) the petition gives fair notice to the defendant of the claim asserted;

and (4) the petition does not disclose any invalidity of the claim on its face.”

Composite Sols., LLC v. Composite Advanced Techs. LLC, No. 01-20-00413-CV,

2021 WL 4095249, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 9, 2021, no pet.)

(mem. op.). Although a party’s failure to answer a petition acts as a deemed

admission of the properly pleaded facts (except the amount of unliquidated

damages), the failure to file an answer cannot create liability where none exists as a

matter of law. Pinter v. Asafi Law Firm, No. 01-12-00048-CV, 2012 WL 5458426,

at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 8, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). For

example, if the facts alleged in the plaintiff’s petition do not state a cause of action,

or if the facts alleged affirmatively disclose the invalidity of the plaintiff’s cause of

6 action, then there is error on the face of the record. Composite Sols., LLC, 2021

WL 4095249, at *2.

II. Timely Filing, Party to Suit, Non-Participation, No Post-Judgment Filings

The appellate record shows that Block satisfied the first three elements

necessary to prevail on a restricted appeal. See Pike-Grant, 447 S.W.3d at 886.

First, Block filed its notice of appeal within six months after the trial court signed

the judgment. See id. The trial court signed the judgment in this case on April 27,

2023, and Block filed its notice of appeal four months and five days later on

September 1, 2023. We conclude that Block satisfies the first element of its

restricted appeal. See id.

Second, Block was a party to the suit. See id. Block was named as a

“necessary party” in the petition, and it was served with the original petition and

citation on October 17, 2022. Block was also named as a party in the trial court’s

final judgment. In its notice of appeal, Block notes that it is “a party affected by the

trial court’s judgment.” We conclude that Block satisfies the second element of its

Third, the record reflects that Block did not file any pleadings or any

response to the motion for default judgment before the hearing and that neither it

nor its counsel appeared at the hearing. The reporter’s record shows that John J.

Klevenhagen, III, counsel for HS&D, was the only person to make an appearance

7 at the hearing, and Brignoni was the only witness to testify (except for

Klevenhagen who made a statement about attorney’s fees on the record). Liberally

construing the non-participation requirement, as we must, see id., we conclude that

the record shows Block did not participate in the hearing resulting in the default

judgment. See Pike-Grant, 447 S.W.3d at 886; TEX. R. APP. P. 30.

The record further reflects that Block did not timely file any post-judgment

motions or a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law. See Pike-Grant,

447 S.W.3d at 886; TEX. R. APP. P. 30. Block’s notice of appeal states that it “did

not timely file either a post-judgment motion, request for findings of fact and

conclusions of law, or notice of appeal.” The clerk’s record does not include any

such filings. Accordingly, we conclude that Block satisfied the third requirement of

its restricted appeal. See Pike-Grant, 447 S.W.3d at 886.

III. Error Apparent on the Face of the Record

On appeal, Block argues multiple reasons why error is apparent on the face

of the record. We need not consider all of these reasons, however, because we

conclude that HS&D’s petition did not assert a cause of action against Block and

therefore cannot support the trial court’s default judgment against him. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 47.1.

A plaintiff’s pleading must plainly state the cause of action and “provide fair

notice to the defendant of the basis of a plaintiff’s cause of action.” Fairdale Ltd. v.

8 Sellers, 651 S.W.2d 725, 725 (Tex. 1982); see TEX. R. CIV. P. 45(b) (plaintiff’s

pleading must include “a statement in plain and concise language of the plaintiff’s

cause of action . . .” that gives “fair notice to the opponent . . . [of] the allegations

as a whole”); TEX. R. CIV. P. 47 (pleading setting forth claim for relief must

contain “a short statement of the cause of action sufficient to give fair notice of the

claim involved”). When determining whether a cause of action has been pleaded,

we must be able to ascertain the elements of the cause of action from the pleadings

alone. Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 683 (Tex. 1979); Pinter, 2012 WL

5458426, at *3 (cleaned up).

A trial court’s judgment must be based on the pleadings. TEX. R. CIV. P. 301;

see Fairdale Ltd., 651 S.W.2d at 725 (“A default judgment must be supported by a

petition which states a cause of action.”). In a restricted appeal, error is apparent

from the face of the record when judgment is rendered on an unpleaded cause of

action. Pinter, 2012 WL 5458426, at *6 (holding that there was error on face of

record when petition did not “contain sufficient factual allegations to state a cause

of action against Pinter”).

HS&D’s live pleading, the original petition, mentioned Block only once, and

it did not identify him as a defendant. The petition stated only that Block “is a

necessary party and may be served through its registered agent . . . .” The facts

alleged in the petition pertained to HS&D’s business of acting as a middleman for

9 customers who wished to pay vendors using CashApp when those vendors did not

accept payment by CashApp. The petition alleged facts about Alvarez’s and

Stevenson’s alleged involvement with the theft of over $133,000, but it made no

mention of whether or how Block was involved in any of the activities that formed

the factual basis for HS&D’s claims. The petition incorporated by reference an

attached affidavit from Brignoni, which also included no mention of Block.

The petition pleaded causes of action against Alvarez and Stevenson for

fraud, money had and received, and violation of the Texas Uniform Trade Secret

Act. But it did not state any cause of action as to Block. In short, the petition in no

way provided fair notice to Block of the basis of HS&D’s claims against it. See

Fairdale Ltd., 651 S.W.2d at 725; see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 45(b), 47. We cannot

ascertain from HS&D’s petition the elements of any cause of action against Block.

See Stoner, 578 S.W.2d at 683. We hold there is error on the face of the record

because HS&D’s petition does not contain sufficient factual allegations to state a

cause of action against HS&D. See Pinter, 2012 WL 5458426, at *6; see also

Composite Sols., LLC, 2021 WL 4095249, at *2.

Accordingly, we conclude that Block has satisfied the fourth and final

element of its restricted appeal.

10 Conclusion

We reverse the trial court’s default judgment and remand for further

proceedings.

Susanna Dokupil Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams, and Justices Morgan and Dokupil.