Blittner v. Friesch-Groningshe Hypotheebank Realty Credit Corporation

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Blittner v. Friesch-Groningshe Hypotheebank Realty Credit Corporation

221 A.D.2d 152, 633 N.Y.S.2d 148, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10736

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York·Decided November 2, 1995·Published·Cited by 4 cases

Opinion

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Herman Cahn, J.), entered June 1, 1994, which, inter alia, granted defendant summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and granted defendant summary judgment as to liability on its counterclaim for reimbursement of certain expenses, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Despite language in the commitment letter that there could be no oral modification of its, terms, plaintiff argues that the deadline for closing of the loan was modified orally several times. There is, however, no evidence of performance unequivocally referable to the alleged waiver of the original closing deadline (see, Absolute Direction v Anderson, 201 AD2d 256). No deadline was extended orally on the basis of a "specific, identifiable promise” (Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v Gramercy Twins Assocs., 199 AD2d 214, 217). Nothing in the written agreement remotely suggests that defendant’s expenses would be paid from the $250,000 commitment fee. Concur— Murphy, P. J., Sullivan, Rosenberger, Ross and Tom, JJ.

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—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Herman Cahn, J.), entered June 1, 1994, which, inter alia, granted defendant summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and granted defendant summary judgment as to liability on its counterclaim for reimbursement of certain expenses, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Despite language in the commitment letter that there could be no oral modification of its, terms, plaintiff argues that the deadline for closing of the loan was modified orally several times. There is, however, no evidence of performance unequivocally referable to the alleged waiver of the original closing deadline (see, Absolute Direction v Anderson, 201 AD2d 256). No deadline was extended orally on the basis of a "specific, identifiable promise” (Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v Gramercy Twins Assocs., 199 AD2d 214, 217). Nothing in the written agreement remotely suggests that defendant’s expenses would be paid from the $250,000 commitment fee. Concur— Murphy, P. J., Sullivan, Rosenberger, Ross and Tom, JJ.

Blittner v. Friesch-Groningshe Hypotheebank Realty Credit Corporation, 221 A.D.2d 152, 633 N.Y.S.2d 148, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10736 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1995).

Pincite

221 A.D.2d 152 (Blittner v. Friesch-Groningshe Hypotheebank Realty Credit Corporation) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Opinion

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