Bliss v. Rochester City School District

103 F. App'x 421
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedJune 9, 2004
DocketDocket No. 02-7527
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 103 F. App'x 421 (Bliss v. Rochester City School District) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bliss v. Rochester City School District, 103 F. App'x 421 (2d Cir. 2004).

Opinion

SUMMARY ORDER

This is an appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Larimer, /.), entered on March 28, 2002, granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissing the action in its entirety. See Bliss v. Rochester City Sch. Dist. et al, 196 F.Supp.2d 314 (W.D.N.Y.2002). Mary Lou Bliss, a former teacher in the Rochester City School District, has brought a variety of discrimination-type claims against the Rochester City School District, the Rochester Teachers Association, and numerous officers and employees of those entities. Familiarity is assumed as to the facts, the procedural context, and the specification of appellate issues.

[422]*422The district court dismissed plaintiffs race discrimination and hostile work environment claims on the ground that they were time-barred. We affirm for the same reason.

As to the remaining claims, the district court dismissed on the merits. We affirm for substantially the same reasons stated in the district court’s opinion.

Plaintiff argues for the first time on appeal that she was denied the right to non-conflicting representation and that this Court should direct non-conflicting representation of the defendants. This argument is incomprehensible and was in any event waived because it was not raised below. See Mycak v. Honeywell, Inc., 953 F.2d 798, 803 (2d Cir.1992).

This appeal is frivolous and it appears that this action has been frivolous from beginning to end. Accordingly, our mandate does not preclude imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, including attorneys’ fees, in the district court upon motion by any defendant or by the court sua sponte.

For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Deanda v. Hicks
137 F. Supp. 3d 543 (S.D. New York, 2015)
Germain v. M & T Bank Corp.
111 F. Supp. 3d 506 (S.D. New York, 2015)
Cowan v. City of Mount Vernon
95 F. Supp. 3d 624 (S.D. New York, 2015)
Falso v. Sutherland Global Services
494 F. Supp. 2d 207 (W.D. New York, 2007)
Murphy v. BOARD OF EDUC. ROCHESTER CITY SCHOOL
420 F. Supp. 2d 131 (W.D. New York, 2006)
Garibaldi v. Anixter, Inc.
407 F. Supp. 2d 449 (W.D. New York, 2006)
Seils v. Rochester City School District
544 U.S. 920 (Supreme Court, 2005)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
103 F. App'x 421, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bliss-v-rochester-city-school-district-ca2-2004.