Bledsoe v. Martinez

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: January 15, 2026
• Docket: 24-2198
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 15 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DONNELL BLEDSOE, No. 24-2198 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:18-cv-02710-DAD-KJN v. MEMORANDUM* MARTINEZ, Sgt.; LEATUGE; MICHELL; CHRISTEN; SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY JAIL,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Dale A. Drozd, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 15, 2026**

Before: PAEZ, BENNETT, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff-Appellant Donnell Bledsoe, proceeding pro se, appeals the district

court’s entry of judgment in favor of Defendant, Sergeant Martinez, following a

jury trial and verdict in favor of Martinez. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). § 1291, and we affirm.

Bledsoe challenges two of the district court’s evidentiary rulings, which we

review for abuse of discretion. United States v. Preston, 873 F.3d 829, 835 (9th

Cir. 2017). Further, as a general rule, evidentiary rulings are subject to harmless

error analysis. See id.

1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bledsoe’s

request to admit into evidence the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendation

addressing Martinez’s motion for summary judgment. “Irrelevant evidence is not

admissible.” Fed. R. Evid. 402. Evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to

make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence” and “the

fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. The

magistrate judge’s summary judgment recommendation is not relevant evidence

because it does not tend to make any fact of consequence more or less probable.

Bledsoe argues that the summary judgment recommendation is admissible under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 as the court’s findings of fact. But the

summary judgment recommendation does not constitute findings of fact under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52; it reflects only the magistrate judge’s

assessment of the pre-trial record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party. That assessment has no evidentiary value at trial.

2. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of

2 24-2198 Bledsoe’s past convictions for purposes of impeachment. Under Federal Rule of

Evidence 609, evidence “that a witness in a civil or criminal trial has been

convicted of a felony must be admitted within ten years of the conviction; after ten

years, the conviction is admissible [for impeachment] only if its probative value,

‘supported by specific facts and circumstances, substantially outweighs its

prejudicial effect.’” SEC v. Jensen, 835 F.3d 1100, 1116–17 (9th Cir. 2016)

(quoting Fed. R. Evid. 609(b)(1)). Bledsoe’s January 2017 and August 2014

convictions were introduced only for the purpose of impeaching Bledsoe and were

less than ten years old at the time of trial in March 2024.

Bledsoe relies on California S.B. 731, but that state law does not govern the

admission of evidence in federal court. To the extent Bledsoe argues that

expungement under S.B. 731 constitutes “a pardon, annulment, certificate of

rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding that the person has

been rehabilitated” rendering his convictions inadmissible, Fed. R. Evid. 609(c)(1),

the record “does not reveal any such finding of rehabilitation,” United States v.

Wood, 943 F.2d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 1991).

AFFIRMED.

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