Bledsoe v. City of Lincoln City

455 P.3d 587, 301 Or. App. 11
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedDecember 4, 2019
DocketA167971
StatusPublished

This text of 455 P.3d 587 (Bledsoe v. City of Lincoln City) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bledsoe v. City of Lincoln City, 455 P.3d 587, 301 Or. App. 11 (Or. Ct. App. 2019).

Opinion

Argued and submitted August 21, reversed and remanded December 4, 2019

In the Matter of the Compensation of Jared L. Bledsoe, Claimant. Jared L. BLEDSOE, Petitioner, v. CITY OF LINCOLN CITY, Respondent. Workers’ Compensation Board 1702447, 1702259; A167971 455 P3d 587

Claimant seeks review of an order of the Workers’ Compensation Board con- tending that the board erred in allowing employer to offset claimant’s permanent partial disability award by an amount that employer asserts it overpaid claimant for temporary total disability. Held: The record before the board does not permit a finding that claimant received an overpayment of benefits for temporary total disability. Therefore, employer was not entitled to take an offset. Reversed and remanded.

Paul B. Meadowbrook argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner. Howard R. Nielsen argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief was Bohy Conratt, LLP. Before DeHoog, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Chief Judge, and Mooney, Judge.* EGAN, C. J. Reversed and remanded.

______________ * Egan, C. J., vice Hadlock, J. pro tempore. 12 Bledsoe v. City of Lincoln City

EGAN, C. J. Claimant seeks review of an order of the Workers’ Compensation Board, contending that the board erred in allowing employer City of Lincoln City to offset claimant’s permanent partial disability award by the amount that employer asserts it overpaid claimant for temporary total disability. For the reasons described here, we conclude that the board erred in approving the offset of benefits, and we therefore reverse. The facts are undisputed. Claimant, who worked for employer as a police officer, has a compensable claim for post-traumatic stress disorder resulting from a work incident in August 2014. After claim acceptance, employer issued a notice of closure on March 9, 2016, setting forth a medically stationary date of November 12, 2014, and a period of temporary total disability ending on November 12, 2014. Claimant sought reconsideration, checking a box on the reconsideration request form asserting that the claim had been closed prematurely. Claimant did not check a box on the form disputing the duration of temporary disability. On reconsideration, the Appellate Review Unit (ARU) agreed with claimant that closure had been prema- ture and set aside the notice of closure. Employer resumed payment of temporary total disability benefits. See OAR 436-060-0020(8) (“If a closure * * * has been found to be pre- mature and there was an open ended authorization of tem- porary disability at the time of closure, the insurer must begin payments under ORS 656.262, including retroactive periods, and pay temporary disability for as long as authori- zation exists or until there are other lawful bases to termi- nate temporary disability.”). On September 9, 2016, employer issued a second notice of closure, setting forth a medically stationary date of August 1, 2015, and a period of temporary total disability through July 17, 2015. Claimant again sought reconsider- ation, again asserting that the claim had been prematurely closed; and again, claimant did not check the box challeng- ing the duration of temporary disability. On November 8, 2016, the ARU agreed with claimant once again that the claim had been prematurely closed and set aside the notice Cite as 301 Or App 11 (2019) 13

of closure. Employer resumed payment of temporary total disability benefits. On February 27, 2017, employer issued a third notice of closure. Once again, the notice stated that claim- ant had become medically stationary on August 1, 2015, and that claimant’s period of temporary disability ran through July 17, 2015. Claimant sought reconsideration, again asserting that the claim had been closed prematurely. Claimant also asserted that he was not yet medically sta- tionary. Claimant did not check the box on the reconsider- ation request form challenging the duration of temporary disability. The ARU, in its reconsideration order, extended claimant’s medically stationary date to February 17, 2017, but determined that the claim had not been closed prema- turely. The ARU did not explicitly address the duration of temporary total disability. Employer requested a hearing, challenging the February 17, 2017, medically stationary date and seeking approval for an offset of claimant’s permanent disability award by the amount that employer asserted had been overpaid for temporary total disability because of payments made after July 17, 2015.1 See ORS 656.268(14)(a) (provid- ing that “[a]n insurer or self-insured employer may offset any compensation payable to the worker to recover an over- payment from a claim with the same insurer or self-insured employer”). The administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld the February 17, 2017, medically stationary date. The ALJ also rejected employer’s request for an offset, reasoning that, “as a result of my decision affirming the medically station- ary date, * * * claimant is entitled to the temporary disabil- ity benefits that were paid by the employer. Therefore, I decline to authorize an offset.” Employer appealed the ALJ’s order. The board upheld the medically stationary date of February 17, 2017, but allowed employer’s offset, the effect of which was to reduce 1 In a letter of March 2, 2017, employer advised claimant of an overpayment of $59,931.42 based on the payment of benefits after July 17, 2015, that it sought to deduct from claimant’s permanent partial disability award of $62,241.52. 14 Bledsoe v. City of Lincoln City

claimant’s permanent disability award from $62,241.52 to $2,310.10. The board noted that, under ORS 656.268(9), an issue not raised on reconsideration will not be consid- ered at hearing, unless the issue arises out of the recon- sideration order.2 The board rejected claimant’s contention that the ARU’s determination that the medically stationary date was February 17, 2017, necessarily raised the issue and extended claimant’s temporary total disability benefits to February 17, 2017. The board explained that a medically stationary date does not necessarily coincide with an enti- tlement to temporary disability benefits, and concluded that, “under the particular circumstances,” claimant’s “enti- tlement to substantive temporary disability benefits did not flow from the ‘medically stationary’ date, but instead from claimant’s uncontested temporary total disability award[.]” The board determined that, because claimant had not, before the ARU, disputed the period of temporary disability stated in the February 27, 2017, notice of closure, claimant could not dispute employer’s request for an offset based on benefits paid after July 17, 2017. The board allowed the off- set and held that the ALJ had erred in “modifying claim- ant’s temporary disability award.” On judicial review, claimant challenges the board’s allowance of an offset. Although he acknowledges that he did not specifically raise the issue of temporary disability before the ARU, he continues to assert that the issue of the medically stationary date, which he did raise, implic- itly encompassed the issue of temporary disability. He also asserts that, in light of the ARU’s extension of the medically stationary date, temporary disability was an issue “arising out of the reconsideration order,” ORS 656.268(9), that may be considered at hearing. Additionally, he contends that there was no overpayment of benefits.

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Bluebook (online)
455 P.3d 587, 301 Or. App. 11, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bledsoe-v-city-of-lincoln-city-orctapp-2019.