on 179 WESTBURY AVENUE, CARLE PLACE, NEW YORK 11514. PHONE (516)334-4500 FAX (516)334-4501_ WWW.SOKOLOFFSTERN.CC
Mark A. RADI MRADI(@SOKOLOFFSTERN.COM November 26, 2025 Via ECF Honorable Jessica G. L. Clarke United States District Court MEMO FN DORSED Southern District of New York 500 Pearl Street, Courtroom 1040 New York, NY 10007 Re: Blatt v. Town of Pleasant Valley, et al. Docket No. 25-cv-8693 (JGLC) Your Honor: We represent the Defendants in this action and request the Court stay discovery pending resolution of Defendants’ potentially fully dispositive motion to dismiss. The parties conferred on the issue but disagree that discovery should be stayed.! As fully set forth in Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff owns a large mansion situated on a 26- acre lot (“Property”) within the Town of Pleasant Valley (“Town”). Public documents the Court can consider show that, when Plaintiff purchased the Property, it was already located in a zone that prohibited short-term rental lodging and subject to a restrictive covenant that outlawed business activities on the Property. Despite those facts, Plaintiff used the Property for short-term rental income. After the Town issued him a violation, Plaintiff appealed to the Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) for a determination of whether his rental activities were permitted, but he withdrew the appeal before the ZBA ever issued a determination. In June 2025, the Town amended the Zoning Code to regulate short-term rentals within its borders (“STR Law”), which Plaintiff claims precludes him from using the Property for short-term rentals. Prior to passing the law, the Town held duly noticed public hearings that Plaintiff attended. Under the STR Law, a property owner must apply to the Town Code Enforcement Officer for a rental permit. The law allows the property owner to appeal any denial to the ZBA. Plaintiff does not allege he ever applied for a permit or appealed to the ZBA for a variance from the STR Law’s requirements (because he never did). This Court can take notice that, in May 2025, a state court held in a related action that the subject restrictive covenant “clearly prohibits” short-term rentals on the Property. Nevertheless, public information shows Plaintiff continues to rent the Property short-term, even as recently as one-month ago.”
' Defense counsel spoke with chambers which advised that, due to the nature of this motion, Defendants could submit this application as a letter motion rather than as a joint submission setting forth each party’s position. 2 See https://www.vrbo.com/2878622; https://www.rhinebrookestate.com/. LONGISLAND = HUDSON VALLEY
SHOoKnOoLraObFleF JSeTsEsRicNa LGL.P L . Clarke November 26, 2025 Page 2 of 3 Courts have discretion to stay discovery pending a motion to dismiss upon a showing of “good cause.” Concern for Indep. Living, Inc. v. Town of Southampton, NY, 2025 WL 327983, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2025); Al Thani v. Hanke, 2021 WL 23312, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2021). In determining whether it is appropriate to stay discovery pending a motion to dismiss, courts consider: “(1) whether the defendant has made a strong showing that the plaintiff’s claim is unmeritorious; (2) the breadth of discovery and the burden of responding to it; and (3) the risk of unfair prejudice to the party opposing the stay.” Concern for Indep. Living, Inc., 2025 WL 327983, at *2. Additionally, courts consider the nature and complexity of the action and posture of the litigation. Id. Defendants have met the first prong by showing “substantial arguments for dismissal.” Lawson v. Rubin, 2018 WL 4211446, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2018). This is “perhaps the most important consideration in determining whether a stay should be granted.” Concern for Indep. Living, Inc., 2025 WL 327983, at *4. In sum, and as fully set forth in Defendants’ brief, Defendants contend the Court lacks jurisdiction over this action because Plaintiff has never received a final decision prohibiting him from using the Property for short-term rentals. In fact, Plaintiff never even applied for a rental permit or sought a ZBA variance from zoning requirements. Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985). This defect bars all of Plaintiff’s federal and state law claims and is fully dispositive of this action. Congregation Rabbinical Coll. of Tartikov, Inc. v. Vill. of Pomona, 915 F. Supp. 2d 574, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Easton LLC v. Inc. Vill. of Muttontown, 2013 WL 1149149, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2013). Defendants’ motion also amply demonstrates Plaintiff’s failure to state any plausible claim. Defendants argue, among other things: Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim is barred because it challenges legislative activity, Interport Pilots Agency, Inc. v. Sammis, 14 F.3d 133, 142 (2d Cir. 1994); Plaintiff failed to allege a protected property right supporting takings and due process claims because public record shows short-term rentals were never permitted on the Property, Martinez v. Town of Clarkstown, 2025 WL 2731038, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2025); Plaintiff failed to plausibly plead differential treatment as compared to others similarly situated to support an equal protection claim, Ruston v Town Bd. for Town of Skaneateles, 610 F3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 2010); Plaintiff failed to plausibly allege sufficient loss of value or economic impact as required for a regulatory taking, Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Plaintiff failed to plausibly allege the local zoning law discriminates against interstate commerce in favor of intrastate commerce to state a Dormant Commerce Clause claim, Town of Southold v. Town of East Hampton, 477 F.3d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 2007); and Plaintiff’s state constitutional claims are redundant and dismissible for the same reasons as the federal claims, Sullivan v. MTA Police Dep’t, 2017 WL 4326058, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2017). This Court also lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Article 78 claim, which must be commenced in state court. Mai v. N.Y. State Office of Temp. & Disability Assistance, 2023 WL 5978032, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2023); S&R Dev. Ests., LLC v. Bass, 588 F. Supp. 2d 452, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). These substantial arguments have strong potential for at least partial, if not complete, dismissal of this action. See Honorable Jessica G. L. Clarke November 26, 2025 Page 3 of 3
Concem for Indep. Living, Inc., 2025 WL 327983, at *4 (finding ripeness arguments, among others, “made a strong showing that the Complaint may be unmeritorious” and staying discovery). The breadth of discovery will also be significant. As the subject matter of this action involves land use issues, zoning amendments, and public hearings, Defendants expect discovery will include voluminous, time-consuming, and expensive document production and involve a number of depositions. Considering the lack of ripeness and plausibility of Plaintiff's claims, engaging in such extensive discovery pending a decision on Defendants’ motion will likely prove wasteful. Staying discovery pending resolution of the motion is appropriate to avoid potentially unnecessary expenditure of party, municipal, and judicial resources. Id.
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on 179 WESTBURY AVENUE, CARLE PLACE, NEW YORK 11514. PHONE (516)334-4500 FAX (516)334-4501_ WWW.SOKOLOFFSTERN.CC
Mark A. RADI MRADI(@SOKOLOFFSTERN.COM November 26, 2025 Via ECF Honorable Jessica G. L. Clarke United States District Court MEMO FN DORSED Southern District of New York 500 Pearl Street, Courtroom 1040 New York, NY 10007 Re: Blatt v. Town of Pleasant Valley, et al. Docket No. 25-cv-8693 (JGLC) Your Honor: We represent the Defendants in this action and request the Court stay discovery pending resolution of Defendants’ potentially fully dispositive motion to dismiss. The parties conferred on the issue but disagree that discovery should be stayed.! As fully set forth in Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff owns a large mansion situated on a 26- acre lot (“Property”) within the Town of Pleasant Valley (“Town”). Public documents the Court can consider show that, when Plaintiff purchased the Property, it was already located in a zone that prohibited short-term rental lodging and subject to a restrictive covenant that outlawed business activities on the Property. Despite those facts, Plaintiff used the Property for short-term rental income. After the Town issued him a violation, Plaintiff appealed to the Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) for a determination of whether his rental activities were permitted, but he withdrew the appeal before the ZBA ever issued a determination. In June 2025, the Town amended the Zoning Code to regulate short-term rentals within its borders (“STR Law”), which Plaintiff claims precludes him from using the Property for short-term rentals. Prior to passing the law, the Town held duly noticed public hearings that Plaintiff attended. Under the STR Law, a property owner must apply to the Town Code Enforcement Officer for a rental permit. The law allows the property owner to appeal any denial to the ZBA. Plaintiff does not allege he ever applied for a permit or appealed to the ZBA for a variance from the STR Law’s requirements (because he never did). This Court can take notice that, in May 2025, a state court held in a related action that the subject restrictive covenant “clearly prohibits” short-term rentals on the Property. Nevertheless, public information shows Plaintiff continues to rent the Property short-term, even as recently as one-month ago.”
' Defense counsel spoke with chambers which advised that, due to the nature of this motion, Defendants could submit this application as a letter motion rather than as a joint submission setting forth each party’s position. 2 See https://www.vrbo.com/2878622; https://www.rhinebrookestate.com/. LONGISLAND = HUDSON VALLEY
SHOoKnOoLraObFleF JSeTsEsRicNa LGL.P L . Clarke November 26, 2025 Page 2 of 3 Courts have discretion to stay discovery pending a motion to dismiss upon a showing of “good cause.” Concern for Indep. Living, Inc. v. Town of Southampton, NY, 2025 WL 327983, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2025); Al Thani v. Hanke, 2021 WL 23312, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2021). In determining whether it is appropriate to stay discovery pending a motion to dismiss, courts consider: “(1) whether the defendant has made a strong showing that the plaintiff’s claim is unmeritorious; (2) the breadth of discovery and the burden of responding to it; and (3) the risk of unfair prejudice to the party opposing the stay.” Concern for Indep. Living, Inc., 2025 WL 327983, at *2. Additionally, courts consider the nature and complexity of the action and posture of the litigation. Id. Defendants have met the first prong by showing “substantial arguments for dismissal.” Lawson v. Rubin, 2018 WL 4211446, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2018). This is “perhaps the most important consideration in determining whether a stay should be granted.” Concern for Indep. Living, Inc., 2025 WL 327983, at *4. In sum, and as fully set forth in Defendants’ brief, Defendants contend the Court lacks jurisdiction over this action because Plaintiff has never received a final decision prohibiting him from using the Property for short-term rentals. In fact, Plaintiff never even applied for a rental permit or sought a ZBA variance from zoning requirements. Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985). This defect bars all of Plaintiff’s federal and state law claims and is fully dispositive of this action. Congregation Rabbinical Coll. of Tartikov, Inc. v. Vill. of Pomona, 915 F. Supp. 2d 574, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Easton LLC v. Inc. Vill. of Muttontown, 2013 WL 1149149, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2013). Defendants’ motion also amply demonstrates Plaintiff’s failure to state any plausible claim. Defendants argue, among other things: Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim is barred because it challenges legislative activity, Interport Pilots Agency, Inc. v. Sammis, 14 F.3d 133, 142 (2d Cir. 1994); Plaintiff failed to allege a protected property right supporting takings and due process claims because public record shows short-term rentals were never permitted on the Property, Martinez v. Town of Clarkstown, 2025 WL 2731038, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2025); Plaintiff failed to plausibly plead differential treatment as compared to others similarly situated to support an equal protection claim, Ruston v Town Bd. for Town of Skaneateles, 610 F3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 2010); Plaintiff failed to plausibly allege sufficient loss of value or economic impact as required for a regulatory taking, Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Plaintiff failed to plausibly allege the local zoning law discriminates against interstate commerce in favor of intrastate commerce to state a Dormant Commerce Clause claim, Town of Southold v. Town of East Hampton, 477 F.3d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 2007); and Plaintiff’s state constitutional claims are redundant and dismissible for the same reasons as the federal claims, Sullivan v. MTA Police Dep’t, 2017 WL 4326058, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2017). This Court also lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Article 78 claim, which must be commenced in state court. Mai v. N.Y. State Office of Temp. & Disability Assistance, 2023 WL 5978032, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2023); S&R Dev. Ests., LLC v. Bass, 588 F. Supp. 2d 452, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). These substantial arguments have strong potential for at least partial, if not complete, dismissal of this action. See Honorable Jessica G. L. Clarke November 26, 2025 Page 3 of 3
Concem for Indep. Living, Inc., 2025 WL 327983, at *4 (finding ripeness arguments, among others, “made a strong showing that the Complaint may be unmeritorious” and staying discovery). The breadth of discovery will also be significant. As the subject matter of this action involves land use issues, zoning amendments, and public hearings, Defendants expect discovery will include voluminous, time-consuming, and expensive document production and involve a number of depositions. Considering the lack of ripeness and plausibility of Plaintiff's claims, engaging in such extensive discovery pending a decision on Defendants’ motion will likely prove wasteful. Staying discovery pending resolution of the motion is appropriate to avoid potentially unnecessary expenditure of party, municipal, and judicial resources. Id. (finding stay “is appropriate to avoid the potentially unnecessary expenditure of party, municipal, and judicial resources”). Finally, staying discovery pending resolution of a potentially fully dispositive motion will not prejudice any party. This is a complex land use dispute, and this litigation is in its infancy as no answer has yet been filed. Indeed, Plaintiff will suffer no prejudice as it continues to flout the STR Law and zoning/restrictive covenant by continuing to rent the Property. Rather, a stay will benefit all parties by preventing likely unnecessary and costly discovery. Id. (“there would be little or no prejudice if discovery were stayed pending the decision on the motion to dismiss”). That Plaintiff does not consent is not dispositive. Id. at *2. GRANTED. The Court has reviewed the parties’ with respect to a stay of discovery set forth in ECF Nos. Based on the parties’ submissions, the Court stays until resolution of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. The ors set forth in the parties’ letters weigh in favor of a stay. Respectfully submitted, have moved to dismiss this case, and it remains SOKOLOFF STERN LLP that this action will be resolved in its entirety at the to dismiss stage. Although the Court declines to address merits of this motion now, the Court finds, after an initial M bs that the motion “is potentially dispositive, and appears to unfounded in the law.” Negrete v. Citibank, N.A., No. 15 MaRK A. RADI 7250 (RWS), 2015 WL 8207466, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 5) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs also fail to articulate any CC: viable prejudice they will suffer as a result of the stay. it appears from Defendants’ letter, which Plaintiff did not All counsel of record (via □□ that Plaintiff continues to rent out the property at issue. these reasons, the court GRANTS Defendants’ requested The conference in this matter, previously scheduled for 16, 2025, at 3:00 p.m., is ADJOURNED sine die. -\ Plaintiff's opposition to Defendants’ Motion to C HEAHca Ce aA Ke was due on December 10, 2025. Plaintiff has yet to file ( F Plaintiff must file his opposition by December 16, JESSIC AG_L. CLARKE 5, or Defendants’ motion will be deemed unopposed, which United States District Judge result in dismissal of the case for abandonment or failure to Dated: December 12, 2025 pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Nace Val Mer Vael