Blassingame v. Lone Star Gas Co.

236 S.W.2d 526, 1950 Tex. App. LEXIS 2457
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedDecember 22, 1950
DocketNo. 14289
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 236 S.W.2d 526 (Blassingame v. Lone Star Gas Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Blassingame v. Lone Star Gas Co., 236 S.W.2d 526, 1950 Tex. App. LEXIS 2457 (Tex. Ct. App. 1950).

Opinions

BOND, Chief Justice.

This suit is for damages resulting from a gas explosion. The appellants, Mary Edna Landers (joined by her husband Buford Thomas Blassingame, whom she wedded since the institution of this suit) and Alice Veal, joined herein by her husband James Veal, will hereinafter be designated as plaintiffs; and Lone Star Gas Company, a corporation, as the defendant.

The house in which the explosion occurred, all household and kitchen furniture, and wearing apparel owned by Mrs. Blas-singame, were destroyed by fire, and Mrs. Veal was severely burned as a result of such explosion. The Lone Star Gas Company, was the distributor of natural gas in the City of McKinney, Texas, and at the time o-f the explosion was servicing the Landers (Blassingame) house. The gas facilities were installed in the house two or three weeks before the explosion. Prior thereto, Miss Landers had been using butane gas at the home. The butane gas was conducted through pipes from a storage tank located some distance from the house. After the installation of natural gas facilities, Mrs. Blassingame ceased to use the butane except in her cook stove; the butane pipes'were capped, storage stop-valves or cut-offs to the tank were closed, and the usual tests made for leaks in all connections. There is no affirmation or defense pleaded that the butane gas had any potent connection with the explosion, — only a small quantity of such gas being present in the tank. The defendant, however, contends that the butane gas was the cause of the explosion and fire; or, at any rate, that the explosion was not caused by the natural gas.

Briefly, the plaintiffs allege that the explosion which caused the fire and damage was the proximate result of the negligence of the defendant: (1) In the installatiqn of the meter and its component parts or connections; (2) in the carelessness and default of the defendant in failing to inspect the meter and its component- parts for gas-leaks after installation; (3) in failing to-repair the meter, after having been warned some time prior to the explosion that the [529]*529meter and parts thereof were leaking gas, as to prevent the gas escaping therefrom. In' answer to plaintiffs’ petition, the defendant alleged general and special denials, contributory negligence of the plaintiff Mary Edna Landers in using the gas and in failing to notify the defendant that the gas was escaping from its meter, if any was escaping prior to the fire; and that the explosion and fire were the result of an unavoidable accident.

The case was tried to a jury and at the conclusion of all the testimony and before the court had read or submitted special issues to the jury, the defendant moved for peremptory instructed verdict, alleging therein that there was no competent evidence showing that gas was leaking from defendant’s meter or its component parts prior to, or at the time of, the commencement of the fire which destroyed the plaintiffs’ property; that if such gas was escaping, there was no competent evidence that it was of sufficient quantity to cause a fire; that if any gas was escaping from defendant’s appliances before the fire, same was not a proximate or contributing cause of the fire and damage; and forewarned that if the jury should answer any special issues that might be submitted, finding the defendant guilty of negligence proximately causing the fire, same would be without competent evidence, — merely the result of indulgence in presumptions.

While there is no record of the trial court’s overruling the defendant’s motion for instructed verdict, yet, in' view of the court having submitted the case to the jury on special issues, it may well be assumed that the motion was overruled. At. any rate, the trial court submitted the casé.to the jury without further objections or rer-quest by the defendant for submission of other issues. The jury found in- effect, pertinent to the issues raised in the pleadings: (1) That the gas meter in' question, after it had been installed by the defendant, became defective before the fire occurred, —thus permitting gas to escape therefrom; (2) that the defendant -permitted the meter and its component parts to become defective before the fire in question, — thus allowing gas to escape therefrom, which was negligence and a proximate cause of the explosion and fire; (3) that the defendant failed to inspect the gas meter after same was installed, which failure was negligence and -a proximate cause of the explosion and fire; (4) • that the plaintiff Mary Edna Blassingame notified the gas company of the presence of escaping gas at her house before the fire, and the gas company, after receiving such notice, failed to inspect its gas meter to ascertain if same was leaking, ■which failure was negligence and a proximate cause of the explosion and fire; (5) that the explosion' and fire was not an unavoidable accident; and (6) that because of the explosion and fire, Mary Edna Blas-singame’s house was totally destroyed to her loss of $1,000; her furniture and household effects $700; her clothing and that of her minor children $300; and that the plaintiffs James Veal and his wife were damaged for personal injuries suffered by Mrs. Veal $225, and for medical expenses and doctor bills $25. It will be observed that the trial court did not submit any issue on the defendant’s plea of contributory negligence, or any issue on new and independent cause of the explosion and fire, and no special issues were requested by the defendant.

The findings of the jury on the issues ■thus submitted were received by the, court and entered of record in the court minutes. Thereafter, over plaintiffs’ objections, the court sustained the.defendant’s motion non obstante veredicto and accordingly entered judgment .in favor of the defendant on specific findings (as r.ecited in the judgment) that the. answers of the jury to special issues Nos. 7, 14, and 18 were without competent evidence to-support such .findings; —special. issue No. 7 and its ancillary issues (Nos¡ 5 and 6) being to the effect that the defendant was negligent in permitting the gas meter, after it was installed, to become defective before the fire, thus permitting gas to escape, and that same , was a proximate. cause of the explosion' and fire; special issue No. 14 and its ancillary issues (Nos. 12 and 13) to the effect that the defendant was negligent in failing to inspect the gas meter within a reasonable time -after it was installed, and same was [530]*530a proximate cause of the explosion and fire; and special issue No. 18 and its ancillary issues (Nos. 16 and 17) being in effect that defendant was negligent in failing to inspect the meter, after being notified by Mrs. Blassingame of odor of escaping gas -at her home, in order to ascertain whether same was leaking gas, and such negligence was a proximate cause of the explosion and fire. The court did not otherwise challenge the findings of the jury; thus entered judgment in favor of the defendant.

In the absence of objections to the court’s charge and the judgment, we may well adopt the findings of the jury on all issues of negligence, leaving for our determination only the question as to whether or not the leakage of gas, emanating from defendant’s meter and its component parts, was the proximate cause of plaintiffs’ damages. We adhere to the verdict of the jury. There was evidence warranting the trial court’s submission of the issues making inquiry whether the various acts, as alleged by plaintiffs, were negligence, — thus causing gas to escape, enter beneath the floor of the house, aiid seep through ■ the floor into the kitchen, where the explosion occurred.

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Bluebook (online)
236 S.W.2d 526, 1950 Tex. App. LEXIS 2457, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/blassingame-v-lone-star-gas-co-texapp-1950.