Blankenship v. . English

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Blankenship v. . English

21 S.E.2d 891, 222 N.C. 91, 1942 N.C. LEXIS 33

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedSeptember 30, 1942

StatusPublished

Cited by11 cases

This text of 21 S.E.2d 891 (Blankenship v. . English) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Blankenship v. . English, 21 S.E.2d 891, 222 N.C. 91, 1942 N.C. LEXIS 33 (N.C. 1942).

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Opinion

Stacy, C. J.

Is the plaintiffs’ cause of action, grounded on fraud, barred by the three-year statute of limitations ? The trial court answered in the affirmative, and we cannot say there was error in the ruling.

It is provided by C. S., 441, subsection 9, that in an action to avoid an instrument on the ground of fraud the suit shall be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues, i.e., within three years after the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting fraud, or when such facts, in the exercise of proper diligence, should have been discovered. Hargett v. Lee, 206 N. C., 536, 174 S. E., 498.

It clearly appears that plaintiffs had information of the facts constituting the alleged fraud as early as “within a week after July 22, 1937,” certainly enough to put them on inquiry; and the rule is that such notice carries with it a presumption of knowledge of all a reasonable investigation would have disclosed. Wynn v. Grant, 166 N. C., 39, 81 S. E., 949; Collins v. Davis, 132 N. C., 106, 43 S. E., 579. A party having notice must exercise ordinary care to ascertain the facts, and if he fail to investigate when put upon inquiry, he is chargeable with all the knowledge he would have acquired, had he made the necessary effort to learn the truth of the matters affecting his interests. Austin v. George, 201 N. C., 380, 160 S. E., 364; Wynn v. Grant, supra; Divbank v. Lyman, 170 N. C., 505, 87 S. E., 348; Sanderlin v. Cross, 172 N. C., 234, 90 S. E., 213.

The action, therefore, was barred at the time of its institution; and judgment of nonsuit was properly entered in favor of the defendants pleading the statute of limitations and demurring to the evidence. Drinkwater v. Tel. Co., 204 N. C., 224, 168 S. E., 410; Tillery v. Lumber Co., 172 N. C., 296, 90 S. E., 196.

Affirmed.

WiNBORNE, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

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Stacy, C. J.

Is the plaintiffs’ cause of action, grounded on fraud, barred by the three-year statute of limitations ? The trial court answered in the affirmative, and we cannot say there was error in the ruling.

It is provided by C. S., 441, subsection 9, that in an action to avoid an instrument on the ground of fraud the suit shall be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues, i.e., within three years after the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting fraud, or when such facts, in the exercise of proper diligence, should have been discovered. Hargett v. Lee, 206 N. C., 536, 174 S. E., 498.

It clearly appears that plaintiffs had information of the facts constituting the alleged fraud as early as “within a week after July 22, 1937,” certainly enough to put them on inquiry; and the rule is that such notice carries with it a presumption of knowledge of all a reasonable investigation would have disclosed. Wynn v. Grant, 166 N. C., 39, 81 S. E., 949; Collins v. Davis, 132 N. C., 106, 43 S. E., 579. A party having notice must exercise ordinary care to ascertain the facts, and if he fail to investigate when put upon inquiry, he is chargeable with all the knowledge he would have acquired, had he made the necessary effort to learn the truth of the matters affecting his interests. Austin v. George, 201 N. C., 380, 160 S. E., 364; Wynn v. Grant, supra; Divbank v. Lyman, 170 N. C., 505, 87 S. E., 348; Sanderlin v. Cross, 172 N. C., 234, 90 S. E., 213.

The action, therefore, was barred at the time of its institution; and judgment of nonsuit was properly entered in favor of the defendants pleading the statute of limitations and demurring to the evidence. Drinkwater v. Tel. Co., 204 N. C., 224, 168 S. E., 410; Tillery v. Lumber Co., 172 N. C., 296, 90 S. E., 196.

Affirmed.

WiNBORNE, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Alfred J. Ferris v. Dean Haymore Lucille Inman, Western Surety Company, & Third Party and Carl Edward Simmons, D/B/A Simmons Auto Sales, Individually Clarence B. Inman, "Bill," T/a Inman Motors Myrtle Inman Dorothy M. Simmons, Alfred J. Ferris v. Western Surety Company, & Third Party and Dean Haymore Lucille Inman Carl Edward Simmons, D/B/A Simmons Auto Sales, Individually Clarence B. Inman, "Bill," T/a Inman Motors Myrtle Inman v. Dorothy M. Simmons, Third Party

967 F.2d 946 (Third Circuit, 1992)

Ferris v. Haymore

967 F.2d 946 (Fourth Circuit, 1992)

Shepherd v. Shepherd

292 S.E.2d 169 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1982)

Cowart v. Whitley

251 S.E.2d 627 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1979)

Morehead v. Harris

137 S.E.2d 174 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1964)

Monteith v. Welch

94 S.E.2d 345 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1956)

United States v. Norman Lumber Co.

127 F. Supp. 518 (M.D. North Carolina, 1955)

Muse v. Muse

72 S.E.2d 431 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1952)

Vail v. Vail

63 S.E.2d 202 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1951)

Jones v. Bankers Life Co.

131 F.2d 989 (Fourth Circuit, 1942)

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Bluebook (online)

21 S.E.2d 891, 222 N.C. 91, 1942 N.C. LEXIS 33, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/blankenship-v-english-nc-1942.

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