Blanding v. Sayles

Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Blanding v. Sayles

45 A. 148, 21 R.I. 512, 1900 R.I. LEXIS 6

DecidedJanuary 10, 1900

StatusPublished

This text of 45 A. 148 (Blanding v. Sayles) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Blanding v. Sayles, 45 A. 148, 21 R.I. 512, 1900 R.I. LEXIS 6 (R.I. 1900).

Pincite

Opinion

Matteson, C. J.

(1) A majority of the court thinks the plaintiff’s petition is premature. Unless the decision of the Common Pleas Division of June 18, 1898, was a final one, which the com’t did not decide in its former opinion (21 R. I. 211), as the plaintiff assumes, the orders of the Common Pleas Division vacating that decision and assigning the case for hearing on the defendant’s exceptions to the auditor’s report were merely interlocutory, and a petition for new trial cannot be properly filed until a final decision has been reached in that Division. Taylor v. Loomis, 21 R. I. 277.

Should the court be of the opinion, on consideration of the present petition, that the Common Pleas Division had authority to vacate its decision of June 18, 1898, then its decision on the present petition would be a mere dictum, the petition not being properly before it.

It may be that when the Common Pleas Division has heard the exceptions, it will overrule them ; in which event there will be no occasion to pass on the questions raised by the present petition. If, on the other hand, that Division sustains the exceptions in whole or in part, the plaintiff, having excepted to the ruling vacating the decision of June 18, 1898, ■ will then have his remedy by petition for new trial to have the questions presented by this petition determined.

Petition denied, and case remitted to the Common Pleas Division for further proceedings.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Matteson, C. J.

(1) A majority of the court thinks the plaintiff’s petition is premature. Unless the decision of the Common Pleas Division of June 18, 1898, was a final one, which the com’t did not decide in its former opinion (21 R. I. 211), as the plaintiff assumes, the orders of the Common Pleas Division vacating that decision and assigning the case for hearing on the defendant’s exceptions to the auditor’s report were merely interlocutory, and a petition for new trial cannot be properly filed until a final decision has been reached in that Division. Taylor v. Loomis, 21 R. I. 277.

Should the court be of the opinion, on consideration of the present petition, that the Common Pleas Division had authority to vacate its decision of June 18, 1898, then its decision on the present petition would be a mere dictum, the petition not being properly before it.

It may be that when the Common Pleas Division has heard the exceptions, it will overrule them ; in which event there will be no occasion to pass on the questions raised by the present petition. If, on the other hand, that Division sustains the exceptions in whole or in part, the plaintiff, having excepted to the ruling vacating the decision of June 18, 1898, ■ will then have his remedy by petition for new trial to have the questions presented by this petition determined.

Petition denied, and case remitted to the Common Pleas Division for further proceedings.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

45 A. 148, 21 R.I. 512, 1900 R.I. LEXIS 6, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/blanding-v-sayles-ri-1900.