Blandford v. Masco Industries, Inc.

799 F. Supp. 666, 25 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1074, 1992 WL 232394, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13100
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Texas
DecidedAugust 20, 1992
DocketCiv. A. 3:90-CV-2684-G
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 799 F. Supp. 666 (Blandford v. Masco Industries, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Blandford v. Masco Industries, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 666, 25 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1074, 1992 WL 232394, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13100 (N.D. Tex. 1992).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM ORDER

FISH, District Judge.

Before the court are the motions of plaintiffs, David M. Blandford and John H. Easter, for partial summary judgment on their claims for infringement of U.S. Patent No. 4,678,031 (“the Patent”) and for the priority, validity, and enforceability of the Patent. For the reasons stated below, the motions are granted.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 27, 1986, plaintiffs filed an application with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) for a patent on a device invented by plaintiffs identified as a “Rotatable Reciprocating Collar for Borehole Casing.” This device, which is used to assist in cementing casing string in a borehole in multiple stages, was the first to allow both rotation and reciprocation of the upper segment of casing after the lower segment of casing was cemented into place. As a result, the quality of the cement formation around the upper segment was enhanced. The USPTO issued the Patent to plaintiffs for the device on July 7, 1987.

On August 25, 1986, Jerry Allamon (“Allamon”) and Hiram Lindsey (“Lindsey”), employees of the defendants, filed an application for a patent on a similar device, and subsequently filed a claim with the Board of Patent Appeals and Interference (the “Board”) asserting priority of invention. In support of this claim, Allamon and Lindsey alleged that they had produced and installed their invention in November 1985, and that this prior use constituted a conception or reduction to practice of the subject matter of the device at issue prior to plaintiffs’ filing of their application for a patent. On July 24, 1990, the Board entered judgment for the plaintiffs, holding that Allamon and Lindsey failed to establish that the device installed in November 1985 had the same structure as the device invented by plaintiffs that was the subject of plaintiffs’ patent application. Conse *668 quently, the Board found that Allamon and Lindsey could not verify conception or reduction to practice prior to the filing of their patent application, which occurred subsequent to plaintiffs’ application, and awarded priority of invention to plaintiffs.

On November 21, 1990, plaintiffs filed the instant action, claiming that since the issuance of the Patent, defendants have knowingly made, used, or sold a device with like qualities to the device that is the subject of the Patent and that such activities constitute infringement of the Patent.

II. ANALYSIS

Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence on file show that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). “[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The movants make such a showing by informing the court of the basis of their motion and by identifying the portions of the record which reveal there are no genuine material fact issues. See Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the movants produce such evidence, the nonmovants must then direct the court’s attention to evidence in the record sufficient to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53. To carry this burden, the opponents must do more than simply show some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Instead, they must show that the evidence is sufficient to support a resolution of the factual issue in their favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. All of the evidence must be viewed, however, in a light most favorable to the nonmovants and all reasonable inferences drawn in their favor. Avia Group International, Inc. v. L.A. Gear California, Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1560 (Fed.Cir.1988).

A. Priority, Validity, and Enforceability

Under 35 U.S.C. § 282, a patent is presumed to be valid unless the party asserting invalidity can establish that the patent is invalid on some ground recognized in Title 35. Here, the defendants assert that the drawing of their device dated November 1985 constituted “prior art” that encompasses every limitation of plaintiffs’ claims, thus creating a prima facie case that the Patent is invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).

A patent is invalid under section 102(a) if the invention was “known or used by others in this country, ... or described in a printed publication” before its invention by the applicant for the patent. To show that a patent is invalid under section 102(a), therefore, the party attacking validity must show that the patented invention was available in finished form or as prior art. In Carella v. Starlight Archery and Pro Line Company, 804 F.2d 135, 139 (Fed.Cir.1986), the court held that the phrase “known or used by others in this country” is not satisfied unless the prior art was “known or used by, or was otherwise accessible to, the public.” The phrase “described in a printed publication” was also held by the court in In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1160-61 (Fed.Cir.1989) to mean “accessible to the public.”

Defendants have provided no evidence that the November 1985 drawing on which they rely was accessible to the public. In fact, their entire basis for concluding that the drawing constitutes prior art rests on the erroneous conclusion that plaintiffs have conceded this point by agreeing that the Board did not rule in the interference proceeding that defendants’ device was incapable of both reciprocating and rotating. However, the Board’s conclusion that it was unclear whether the November 1985 drawing was capable of rotating and reciprocating does not conclusively establish that the drawing either was, or was not, capable of both functions and is thus insufficient to establish that the *669 drawing was, in fact, prior art.

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799 F. Supp. 666, 25 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1074, 1992 WL 232394, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13100, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/blandford-v-masco-industries-inc-txnd-1992.