Bland v. State

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Bland v. State

402 S.E.2d 782, 198 Ga. App. 671, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 240

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedFebruary 22, 1991

DocketA90A2085

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 402 S.E.2d 782 (Bland v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Bland v. State, 402 S.E.2d 782, 198 Ga. App. 671, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 240 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991).

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Opinion

McMurray, Presiding Judge.

Defendant Bland appeals his conviction of a violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, selling cocaine. The sole enumeration of error complains of the admission into evidence, for purposes of impeachment, of a prior conviction of defendant for possession of cocaine. Held:

On direct examination defendant was relating his contacts with an undercover agent when he testified as to stating to a third party that “I don’t fool with no crack cocaine.” On cross-examination defendant repeatedly testified, in the absence of any objection, as to *672 stating to a third party in reference to cocaine that “I don’t fool with that” and “I don’t fool with no — don’t fool with no crack.”

Decided February 22, 1991. Reginald L. Bellury, for appellant. Joseph H. Briley, District Attorney, Al C. Martinez, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

Subsequently, the State was permitted over objection to introduce evidence of defendant’s conviction for possession of cocaine for purposes of impeachment only. Under this Court’s decision in Mitchell v. State, 158 Ga. App. 628, 629 (2), 630 (281 SE2d 260), defendant’s testimony in the case sub judice that he did not “fool with” cocaine “could be construed as a denial by defendant that he had ever been involved in any offenses involving [cocaine],” so as to render admissible for purposes of impeachment (by disproving the facts testified to by defendant) evidence that he had previously been convicted of possession of cocaine.

Defendant’s reliance on Seabrooks v. State, 164 Ga. App. 747, 748 (2), 750 (297 SE2d 745) is misplaced. Seabrooks may be distinguished on the facts. In Seabrooks, this Court held that evidence of that defendant’s possession of marijuana, pills and capsules did not contradict his assertion that he did not deal in cocaine, thus “was not admissible as impeachment evidence, disproving facts testified to by [that] defendant.”

Judgment affirmed.

Sognier, C. J., and Carley, J., concur.

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McMurray, Presiding Judge.

Defendant Bland appeals his conviction of a violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, selling cocaine. The sole enumeration of error complains of the admission into evidence, for purposes of impeachment, of a prior conviction of defendant for possession of cocaine. Held:

On direct examination defendant was relating his contacts with an undercover agent when he testified as to stating to a third party that “I don’t fool with no crack cocaine.” On cross-examination defendant repeatedly testified, in the absence of any objection, as to *672 stating to a third party in reference to cocaine that “I don’t fool with that” and “I don’t fool with no — don’t fool with no crack.”

Decided February 22, 1991. Reginald L. Bellury, for appellant. Joseph H. Briley, District Attorney, Al C. Martinez, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

Subsequently, the State was permitted over objection to introduce evidence of defendant’s conviction for possession of cocaine for purposes of impeachment only. Under this Court’s decision in Mitchell v. State, 158 Ga. App. 628, 629 (2), 630 (281 SE2d 260), defendant’s testimony in the case sub judice that he did not “fool with” cocaine “could be construed as a denial by defendant that he had ever been involved in any offenses involving [cocaine],” so as to render admissible for purposes of impeachment (by disproving the facts testified to by defendant) evidence that he had previously been convicted of possession of cocaine.

Defendant’s reliance on Seabrooks v. State, 164 Ga. App. 747, 748 (2), 750 (297 SE2d 745) is misplaced. Seabrooks may be distinguished on the facts. In Seabrooks, this Court held that evidence of that defendant’s possession of marijuana, pills and capsules did not contradict his assertion that he did not deal in cocaine, thus “was not admissible as impeachment evidence, disproving facts testified to by [that] defendant.”

Judgment affirmed.

Sognier, C. J., and Carley, J., concur.

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402 S.E.2d 782, 198 Ga. App. 671, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 240, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bland-v-state-gactapp-1991.

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