Blanchard's Gun-Stock Turning Factory v. Warner

3 F. Cas. 653, 1 Blatchf. 258
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Connecticut
DecidedApril 15, 1846
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 3 F. Cas. 653 (Blanchard's Gun-Stock Turning Factory v. Warner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Blanchard's Gun-Stock Turning Factory v. Warner, 3 F. Cas. 653, 1 Blatchf. 258 (circtdct 1846).

Opinion

NELSON, Circuit Justice.

The motion for a new trial in this case was held over for advisement to enable the court to give further consideration to one of the questions presented — that in relation to the right of the assignees under their assignment from Thomas Blanchard, made prior to the extension of the patent by the acts of congress passed in 1834 [6 Stat. 589] and 1839 [6 Stat. 748]. It was insisted by the counsel for the defendant, that they took no interest thereby in tile extended term; and the chief ground relied on was, that an act passed for the benefit of the assignees would be unconstitutional, inasmuch as the constitution only authorizes congress to secure, for limited times, to inventors, the exclusive right to their discoveries. The construction claimed by the plaintiffs, it was said, instead of rendering the act of congress extending the patent, beneficial to the inventor, who had been inadequately rewarded by the price which he had received from the assignees for his invention, would be directly injurious to him by depriving him of the right to use his invention during the extended term for which the exclusive privilege was conferred on the original assignee. But the proviso for the benefit of the assignees in the act of 1839, is too explicit in its language to leave any doubt as to its true meaning and intent. After extending the patent for a further term of fourteen years, it is provided “that all rights and privileges heretofore sold or granted by said patentee, to make, construct, use or vend the said invention, and not forfeited by the purchasers or grantees, shall •enure to and be enjoyed by such purchasers or grantees respectively, as fully and upon the same conditions during the period hereby granted, as for the term that did exist when such sale or grant was made.” It is clear that congress intended to give to assignees of the old patent an equally exclusive privilege in the extended term. We do not think the clause can be construed in any other way consistently with the fair import of the language. And undoubtedly, inasmuch as the constitution confers on congress the power to grant the exclusive privilege only to the inventor, there would seem to be force in the objection, that the grant to assignees does not come within the scope of their authority.

The direct question was not involved in the four cases that were so elaborately argued at the last term of the supreme court. See [Wilson v. Rousseau; Simpson v. Wilson; Wilson v. Turner; Woodworth v. Wilson] 4 How. [43 U. S.] 646-716. But it was very much discussed, and became the subject of consideration, not as necessarily involved, but as connected with the matters-in controversy in those cases. The power of congress to reserve these rights and privileges to assignees seemed to be conceded, according to my recollection, as incidental to the general power conferred by the constitution on congress to promote the progress of the useful arts by securing to inventors, for limited times, the exclusive right to their discoveries. The assignees of the original pat-entee are frequently most instrumental in putting the invention into general use, and bringing it successfully before the public, by the expenditure of their time and money. More than half, probably, of the useful patented inventions have been thus brought into general public use, the successful results operating, directly or indirectly, for the benefit and interest of patentees. Considerations of this kind may well be taken into account by congress, and weight be given to them in granting extensions. Congress save the respective interests of the patentee and his assignees, by qualifying the new grant, believing that in truth the assignees have expended time and money to a much greater extent than they have received remuneration; and, although this would not authorize them to renew the grant to assignees, as no such power exists in the constitution, still, in exercising the power in favor of the inventor, it would perhaps be going too far to say that they have no right to regard incidentally the interests of the meritorious assignee.. Without the power of thus qualifying their grant, congress would be under the necessity, oftentimes, of denying altogether any extension. A just view of the rights of air parties may require that assignees should be-protected in their interests, if the patent be renewed.

A question was presented by the counsel for the defendant, as to the charter of incorporation of the plaintiffs. The power of the company under their charter, to purchase any interest in patent rights, is founded on the language of the act of incorporation, namely, “that Isaac Scott and others-be and they are hereby incorporated by the-name of ‘Blanchard’s Gun-Stock Turning Factory,’ with all the powers and rights vested by law in manufacturing corporations in this commonwealth.” So far as regards the right of this corporation to hold personal estate, including the interest in this patent, it is urged that the power is conferred by a general reference to the law regarding manufacturing corporations. We have endeavored to find the law of Massachusetts, that existed at the time of the incorporation of the plaintiffs, and to which the charter has reference for the extent of its powers, but have not been successful. There is some embarrassment in this part of the case, on account of the omission to give this act in evi[658]*658dence. ' But, on the whole, as the corporation is made a body politic by the name of “Blanchard’s Gun-Stock Turning Factory,” perhaps it is not going too far to say, independently of the production of the act referred to, that inasmuch as the company seems to have been incorporated for the very purpose of carrying on manufactures by means of this invention of turning irregular forms, as its very name imports, it had, at least, power enough to purchase this particular patent. Indeed, by the common law, corporations have a right to purchase and hold property so far as may be necessary to carry into execution the purposes and objects for which they are created. It would seem to be necessary, in order to carry out the purposes of “Blanchard’s Gun-Stock Turning Factory,” that it should have power to purchase and hold an interest in the patent.

The other objections were mainly questions of fact, which were submitted to the jury under what the court regard as proper instructions.

One was, that the lateral motion in the plaintiff’s machine is produced by a screw, and in the defendant's by a wheel and axle. This we consider no part of the invention. It -was a mechanical contrivance to operate the machine. The ■ inventor, having struck out his idea, goes to a mechanic to get the mechanical power to put in operation his combination. The mechanic has at his command various modes of producing power. These mere contrivances, such as any mechanic can supply, are no part of the invention.

It was further said that in the defendant’s machine, there are three motions given to the pattern and rough material, namely, the rotary, the vibratory, and the lateral or longitudinal, all of which three compound motions are applied to the frame; whereas, in the plaintiffs’ machine, the cutter and friction wheels have the lateral motion, and not the pattern and rough material in the frame. The question was put to the jury whether this varied materially or substantially from the plaintiffs’ arrangement; whether so materially as to distinguish the defendant’s machine from the plaintiffs’; whether, on the contrary, it was not a merely formal alteration; and the jury have passed upon it. The court were bound to submit that question to the jury.

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Bluebook (online)
3 F. Cas. 653, 1 Blatchf. 258, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/blanchards-gun-stock-turning-factory-v-warner-circtdct-1846.