Blanchard v. Social Security Administration

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Arkansas
DecidedDecember 16, 2019
Docket4:19-cv-00068
StatusUnknown

This text of Blanchard v. Social Security Administration (Blanchard v. Social Security Administration) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Blanchard v. Social Security Administration, (E.D. Ark. 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS CENTRAL DIVISION

CASSANDRA DENISE BLANCHARD PLAINTIFF

V. NO. 4:19CV00068 LPR-JTR

ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security Administration1 DEFENDANT

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

The following Recommended Disposition (“Recommendation”) has been sent to United States District Judge Lee P. Rudofsky. You may file written objections to all or part of this Recommendation. If you do so, you must specifically explain the factual and/or legal basis for each of your objections, and your objections must be received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen (14) days of the date this Recommendation was filed. By not objecting, you may waive the right to appeal questions of fact. I. Introduction:

Plaintiff, Cassandra Denise Blanchard (“Blanchard”), applied for disability benefits on February 9, 2016, alleging disability beginning on October 18, 2015.2

1 On June 6, 2019, the United States Senate confirmed Mr. Saul’s nomination to lead the Social Security Administration. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), Mr. Saul is automatically substituted as the Defendant.

2 At the administrative hearing on November 21, 2017, the ALJ granted Blanchard’s motion to amend her onset date to March 30, 2016. (Tr. at 35). However, in the ALJ’s decision, she failed to use the new onset

1 (Tr. at 11). After conducting a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (AALJ@) denied her application for benefits. (Tr. at 24). Because the Appeals Council later

denied her request for review (Tr. at 1), the ALJ’s opinion now stands as the final decision of the Commissioner. For the reasons stated below, this Court should reverse the Commissioner’s

decision and remand the case for further proceedings. II. The Commissioner=s Decision: The ALJ found that Blanchard had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the original onset date of October 18, 2015. (Tr. at 14). At Step Two, the ALJ

found that Blanchard had the following severe impairments: postural orthostatic tachycardia syndromes (“POTS”), pseudo seizures, neurologic cardiac syncope, depression, and anxiety. Id.

After finding that Blanchard’s impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment (Tr. at 14-17), the ALJ determined that she had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform less than sedentary work, with additional limitations,3

date. (Tr. at 24).

3 Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567.

2 which included only occasionally climb stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; she could not climb ladders, work around hazards (unprotected heights and

moving mechanical parts), or work in extreme heat; she could perform simple, routine, and repetitive tasks; she could make simple work related decisions; she could concentrate, persist, and maintain pace with normal breaks; and she must have

only incidental interpersonal contact with supervision which is simple, direct, and concrete. (Tr. at 17). Based on this RFC, the ALJ concluded that Blanchard was unable to perform any of her past relevant work. (Tr. at 23). At Step Five, the ALJ relied upon the

testimony of a Vocational Expert (“VE”) to find that, based on Blanchard’s age, education, work experience and RFC, she could perform other jobs, such as food & beverage clerk and stuffer (one who fills pillows and toys). (Tr. at 24, 58).

Accordingly, the ALJ held that Blanchard was not disabled. Id. III. Discussion: A. Standard of Review The Court’s function on review is to determine whether the Commissioner’s

decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole and whether it is based on legal error. Miller v. Colvin, 784 F.3d 472, 477 (8th Cir. 2015); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). While “substantial evidence” is that which a reasonable

3 mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, “substantial evidence on the record as a whole” requires a court to engage in a more scrutinizing analysis:

“[O]ur review is more than an examination of the record for the existence of substantial evidence in support of the Commissioner’s decision; we also take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from that decision.” Reversal is not warranted, however, “merely because substantial evidence would have supported an opposite decision.”

Reed v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 917, 920 (8th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). It is not the task of this Court to review the evidence and make an independent decision. Neither is it to reverse the decision of the ALJ because there is evidence in the record which contradicts his findings. The test is whether there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole which supports the decision of the ALJ. Miller, 784 F.3d at 477. B. Blanchard=s Arguments on Appeal Blanchard contends that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ=s decision to deny benefits. She argues that the ALJ erred because: (1) her hypothetical question to the VE described the hypothetical claimant as being able to perform “no more than sedentary work” – not the “less than sedentary work,” the ALJ explicitly found was the most work Blanchard was capable of performing;4 (2) the VE’s

4 In the fifth finding of the ALJ’s decision, she explicitly found that Blanchard’s RFC only allowed her to perform work at the “less than sedentary” level. (Tr. at 17). In the ALJ’s erroneous hypothetical to the

4 testimony, which the ALJ relied on to find that Blanchard could perform work as a beverage clerk and stuffer, conflicts with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles

(“DOT”), which provides that there are no jobs available in the national economy for someone like Blanchard, who can only perform work at the level of “less than sedentary”; and (3) she did not give the proper weight to the medical opinions of

Blanchard’s treating physicians. For the reasons explained below, the Court concludes that the ALJ committed reversible error which requires the case to be remanded for further administrative proceedings. Blanchard had documented episodes of syncope, associated with dizziness,

nausea, trouble sleeping, confusion, and extreme fatigue. (Tr. at 389, 473, 315, 334, 332, 451, 356-361, 375) She occasionally blacked out and fell down at home. These medical problems were witnessed by her husband of 27 years, who lived with her.

(Tr. at 53-55, 332, 375). She would lose consciousness for 3-5 minutes and be unable to move or form sentences. Id. She had hypotension (low blood pressure), which caused blood to run into and pool in her legs when she was sitting or standing. (Tr. at 50). Blanchard has to elevate her legs for most of the day, and she requested that

she be allowed to change position during the hearing. (Tr. at 49-50).

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Related

Jones v. Astrue
619 F.3d 963 (Eighth Circuit, 2010)
Jean Dozier v. Margaret M. Heckler
754 F.2d 274 (Eighth Circuit, 1985)
Charles Miller v. Carolyn W. Colvin
784 F.3d 472 (Eighth Circuit, 2015)

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