Blanca Alvillar Mamlouk v. Schneider Logistics Transload

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: March 16, 2020
• Docket: 5:19-cv-00613
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

O 1

7 United States District Court 8 Central District of California

11 BLANCA ALVILLAR MAMLOUK, Case №. 5:19-cv-00613-ODW (SHKx)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 13 v. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS [24] 14 SCHNEIDER LOGISTICS TRANSLOADING AND 15 DISTRIBUTION, INC.

16 Defendant. 17 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 20 (“Motion”). (ECF No. 24.) On February 21, 2019, Plaintiff Blanca Alvillar Mamlouk 21 initiated this action against Defendant Schneider Logistics Transloading and 22 Distribution, Inc in San Bernardino County Superior Court. (Notice of Removal, Ex. 23 A, ECF No. 1.) Schneider, erroneously sued as Schneider Logistics Transload, removed 24 this case to federal court on April 5, 2019. (Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1.) On June 25 13, 2019, Mamlouk filed its first amended complaint (“FAC”). (First Am. Compl. 26 (“FAC”), ECF No. 17.) On November 11, 2019, Schneider filed a Motion for Judgment 27 28 1 on the Pleadings, which the parties have fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 24–26.) For the 2 following reasons, Schneider’s Motion is GRANTED.1 3 II. REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 4 Schneider requests the Court take judicial notice of various documents. (See 5 Schneider’s Req. for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), ECF No. 24; see also Schneider’s 6 Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice, ECF No. 26.) Schneider requests the Court 7 take judicial notice of documents from Mamlouk’s bankruptcy case’s docket, attached 8 as Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F, G to Schneider’s Motion. (Mot. Ex. A–G (“Bankruptcy 9 Docs.”), ECF No. 24.) Additionally, Schneider requests the Court take judicial notice 10 of Mamlouk’s complaint with the California Department of Fair Employment and 11 Housing (“DFEH”) and documents related to Mamlouk’s workers’ compensation 12 claims. (Mot. Ex. H (“FEHA Compl.”); Reply Ex. I–L (“WC Docs”), ECF No. 26.) 13 The Court may take judicial notice of “fact[s] . . . not subject to reasonable 14 dispute” because they are “generally known within the trial court’s territorial 15 jurisdiction” or “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy 16 cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201. The Court may take judicial 17 notice of “matters of public record” that are not “subject to reasonable dispute.” Lee v. 18 City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001). Schneider’s requests are 19 unopposed. However, Mamlouk’s workers’ compensation documents are not pertinent 20 to the Court’s disposition of this matter and, thus that request is DENIED. 21 The documents from Mamlouk’s Bankruptcy Documents and FEHA Complaint, 22 are publicly available, readily verifiable, and are not subject to reasonable dispute, thus, 23 Schneider’s RJN for these documents is GRANTED. 24 III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 25 Mamlouk began her employment with Schneider on November 23, 2006 and 26 worked both administrative and warehouse jobs. (Opp’n 3, ECF No. 25.) Mamlouk 27

28 1After carefully considering the papers filed in support of, and against, the Motion, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 1 worked as a warehouse associate from 2013 until her termination in 2017. (Opp’n 3.) 2 While in this role, Mamlouk reported an injury to her right thumb and hand that included 3 a ruptured tendon and was subsequently placed on medical leave from January 16, 2015 4 to May 18, 2015. (Opp’n 3.) When Mamlouk returned to work, she resumed her regular 5 position without medical workplace restrictions. (Opp’n 3.) The following year, 6 Mamlouk sought and took eight-weeks of family medical leave starting October 2, 2016 7 to November 26, 2016. (Opp’n 3.) Mamlouk’s leave was extended to December 1, 8 2016, but Schneider determined that Mamlouk was unable to perform the essential 9 functions of her job and began a reassignment process. (Opp’n 3–4.) During this 10 process, Mamlouk was placed on unpaid leave through February 2, 2017 as a 11 “temporary accommodation.” (Opp’n 4.) 12 While on medical leave, on November 26, 2016, Mamlouk and her spouse filed a 13 Voluntary Chapter 7 Petition in bankruptcy court. (Opp’n 5.) On the petition, Mamlouk 14 listed workers’ compensation claims and stated she did not have other claims— 15 contingent, unliquidated, or counterclaims—against third parties. (Mot. 3; Opp’n 5.) 16 Thereafter, Mamlouk applied for positions but was unable to secure another 17 employment position with Schneider. (Opp’n 5.) As a result, Schneider terminated 18 Mamlouk’s employment on March 2, 2017. (Opp’n 6.) After her employment 19 termination, the bankruptcy court discharged Mamlouk’s debt on May 8, 2017 and 20 terminated her bankruptcy case on December 11, 2017. (Mot. 4, Ex. D, Ex. G; Opp’n 21 6.) Throughout the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings, Mamlouk did not amend 22 her schedules or disclosures to declare any pending, known, or suspected claims—other 23 than the workers’ compensation claims—against Schneider. (Mot. 4; Ex. A (“BK 24 Petition”); Ex. G (“BK Docket”).) 25 Months after her bankruptcy case closed, Mamlouk filed a FEHA complaint in 26 which she alleged Schneider engaged in discriminatory and retaliatory conduct on or 27 about March 2, 2017. (Mot. 4, FEHA Compl.) Nearly a year after that, on February 28 21, 2019, Mamlouk filed this action in San Bernardino County Superior Court. (Mot. 1 2.) The case was removed to this Court, and Mamlouk filed a FAC. (Mot. 2.) Because 2 the causes of action asserted in the FAC are premised on the series of events that 3 transpired between November 14, 2016 and March 2, 2017, Schneider moves for a 4 judgment on the pleadings. (Mot. 2.) 5 IV. LEGAL STANDARD 6 After the pleadings are closed, but within such time as to not delay the trial, any 7 party may move for judgment on the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ P. 12(c). The standard 8 applied to a Rule 12(c) motion is essentially the same as that applied to Rule 12(b)(6) 9 motions; a judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when, even if all the allegations in 10 the complaint are true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bell 11 Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (“[f]actual allegations must be enough 12 to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the 13 allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”) (citations omitted); 14 Milne ex rel. Coyne v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., 430 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2005). 15 When ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court should construe 16 the facts in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and the movant 17 must clearly establish that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved. McGlinchy 18 v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 810 (9th Cir. 1988). However, “conclusory 19 allegations without more are insufficient to defeat a motion [for judgment on the 20 pleadings].” Id. If judgment on the pleadings is appropriate, a court has discretion to 21 grant the non-moving party leave to amend, grant dismissal, or enter a judgment. See 22 Lonberg v. City of Riverside, 300 F. Supp. 2d 942, 945 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 23 V. DISCUSSION 24 Mamlouk alleges seven cause of actions all premised on Defendant’s alleged 25 conduct that occurred between November 14, 2016 and March 2, 2017. (FAC ¶¶ 15— 26 58.) Schneider asserts that judicial estoppel bars Mamlouk from bringing these claims 27 because she failed to list them in her bankruptcy petition and did not amend her 28 1 disclosure statements or schedules during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings. 2 (Mot. 6–7.) On that basis, Schneider moves for a judgment on the pleadings. 3 The Supreme Court outlined factors a court may consider in its determination of 4 whether the doctrine of judicial estoppel applies.2 However, the factual scenario here 5 is not unique to Mamlouk, and binding precedent makes it clear that the Court need not 6 engage in that analysis. The Ninth Circuit clearly established that “[i]n the bankruptcy 7 context, a party is judicially estopped from asserting a cause of action not raised in a 8 reorganization plan or otherwise mentioned in the debtor’s schedules or disclosure 9 statements.” Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 2001) 10 (citing Hay v. First Interstate Bank of Kalispell, N.A., 978 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir.1992)). 11 The bankruptcy code imposes a duty of disclosure on debtors that obligates them 12 to amend disclosure statements and schedules to provide requisite notice to creditors 13 and the bankruptcy court. See id. at 784. Thus, a debtor who fails to disclose a pending 14 claim as an asset in a bankruptcy proceeding that discharges debt is estopped from 15 pursuing that claim in a subsequent proceeding. Id. 16 Here, Mamlouk concedes that her causes of action against Schneider arose at the 17 time of her termination on March 2, 2017 but denies being aware of them at the time 18 she filed her bankruptcy petition.3 (Opp’n 14, 17.) Contrary to Mamlouk’s assertions, 19 a debtor’s duty to disclose potential claims as assets does not end when the debtor files 20 21

22 2 The United States Supreme Court identified a few, non-exhaustive, factors for courts to consider in their judicial estoppel analysis: (1) a party’s later position is clearly inconsistent with its earlier 23 position; (2) whether the party succeeded in persuading a court to accept the first position; (3) whether 24 the party seeking to assert the inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 749, 752 (2001). 25 3 Mamlouk’s own record reflects her knowledge of the possibility of termination if she was 26 unsuccessful in her job search with Schneider. Though not dispositive to the Court’s handling of this 27 matter, it is worth noting that attached as Exhibit D to Mamlouk’s Opposition is the November 15, 2016 letter informing Mamlouk about reassignment. (Opp’n, Ex. D.) It unequivocally states that 28 Mamlouk would be terminated if her job search was unsuccessful. (Id.) 1 for bankruptcy, but instead continues for the duration of the bankruptcy proceeding. 2 See Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 785. 3 Mamlouk attempts to distinguish her circumstances from relevant caselaw and 4 argues that in other cases judicial estoppel barred plaintiffs who were actively pursuing 5 their claims prior to filing their bankruptcy petitions. (Opp’n 15.) She further argues 6 that at the time she filed her bankruptcy petition, she was employed and attempting to 7 return to work with Schneider, so filing a claim or lawsuit prior to her termination would 8 have been premature. (Opp’n 15–17.) 9 That argument is not persuasive. The duty on the debtor simply requires them to 10 list any potential claims as contingent assets. See Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 784. Here, it 11 is undisputed that by March 2, 2017 she was aware of the claim against Schneider. (See 12 FEHA Compl. at 2.) Despite knowing this, Mamlouk did not amend her disclosures 13 statements to list the claim during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding. (See BK 14 Petition; BK Docket.) Her duty to disclose did not end at the time of the bankruptcy 15 filing but continued until the termination of the bankruptcy case, which was after 16 Mamlouk’s causes of action arose. See Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 785. 17 Schneider argues that the bankruptcy court discharged Mamlouk’s debts and 18 terminated her bankruptcy proceedings based on Mamlouk’s representations, namely 19 not listing the claims against Schneider as contingent assets. (Mot. 1, 7.) Therefore, 20 the doctrine of judicial estoppel bars Mamlouk from taking a contrary position and 21 asserting her claims against Schneider now. See Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 783. 22 Accordingly, because Mamlouk’s claims against Schneider arose prior to the 23 termination of her bankruptcy proceedings, judicial estoppel bars Mamlouk from now 24 pursuing those claims. Schneider’s Motion is GRANTED. 25 A. Leave to Amend 26 Generally, a court should liberally allow a party leave to amend its pleading. See 27 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); see also Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 28 712 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A district court shall grant leave to amend freely when justice so 1 || requires,” and “this policy is to be applied with extreme liberality.”) However, the 2 || Court may deny leave to amend where amendment would be futile. Gardner v. Martino, 3 || 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009). “When a proposed amendment would be futile, there 4] is no need to prolong the litigation by permitting further amendment.” Chaset v. 5 || Fleer/Skybox Int’l, LP, 300 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming the trial court’s 6 || denial of leave to amend where plaintiffs could not cure a basic flaw—ainability to 7 || demonstrate standing—in their pleading). 8 Here, Mamlouk’s own concession that her causes of action arose prior to the 9 || termination of her bankruptcy proceedings permits the application of judicial estoppel. 10 | Amendment will not cure Mamlouk’s legally deficient pleading because she did not 11 | adhere to the duty of disclosure imposed on her during the pendency of her bankruptcy 12 || proceedings. See Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 784. Accordingly, amendment is futile and 13 || leave to amend is inappropriate. Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1088. 14 VI. CONCLUSION 15 For the foregoing reasons, Schneider’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is 16 | GRANTED without leave to amend. (ECF No. 24.) Judgment shall issue concurrently 17 || with this order. 18 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 21 March 16, 2020 22 Las

4 OTIS D-’WRIGHT, II 0s UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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