Blakes v. Kentrell

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedOctober 29, 2020
Docket2:19-cv-00109
StatusUnknown

This text of Blakes v. Kentrell (Blakes v. Kentrell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Blakes v. Kentrell, (E.D. Wis. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ DEMETRIUS BLAKES,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 19-cv-109-pp

MILWAUKEE COUNTY SHERIFF OFFICE,

Defendant. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 2), DENYING AS MOOT SECOND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 7) AND SCREENING COMPLAINT UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1915A ______________________________________________________________________________

Demetrius Blakes, an inmate at Dodge Correctional Institution who is representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that his rights were violated when an officer used force against him while the plaintiff an inmate at the Milwaukee County Jail. Dkt. No. 1. This decision resolves the plaintiff’s motions for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, dkt. nos. 2, 7, screens his complaint, dkt. no. 1, and substitutes Officer Kentrell for the Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Office. I. Motions for Leave to Proceed without Prepaying the Filing Fee (Dkt. Nos. 2, 7)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because the plaintiff was a prisoner when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(h). The PLRA allows the court to let a prisoner plaintiff proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the prisoner must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). He then must pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. When the plaintiff filed his complaint, he also filed a motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. Dkt. No. 2. On January 18, 2019, Magistrate Judge Nancy Joseph, then presiding over the case, ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $22.15. Dkt. No. 4. After the case was reassigned to Judge Pepper, the plaintiff filed another motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. Dkt. No. 7. This second motion was unnecessary, but nonetheless, Judge Pepper gave the plaintiff an extension of time to pay the fee. Dkt. No. 9. The plaintiff then asked to waive the fee, dkt. no. 10, but the court denied that request and again extended his deadline to pay, dkt. no. 11. The court received the $22.15 initial partial filing fee on August 21, 2019. The court will grant the plaintiff’s first motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, dkt. no. 2, and deny as moot the plaintiff’s second (and unnecessary) motion to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, dkt. no. 7. The court will require the plaintiff to pay the remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. II. Screening the Complaint A. Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the court must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that it applies when considering whether to dismiss a case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The court liberally construes complaints filed by plaintiffs who are representing themselves and holds such complaints to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). B. The Plaintiff’s Allegations The plaintiff alleges that on October 7, 2018, he was an inmate at the Milwaukee County Jail.1 Dkt. No. 1 at 2. He says that around 12:00 a.m., C.E.R.T. (Correctional Emergency Response Team) Officer Kentrell approached the plaintiff’s cell with others and asked the plaintiff to step out and to face the wall. Id. The plaintiff says that he followed orders as directed, but that as he was faced against the wall, Kentrell slammed the plaintiff’s face into the wall, causing a laceration above the plaintiff’s right eye, which required medical treatment. Id. at 2-3. The plaintiff went to Froedtert Hospital and received six stitches. Id. at 3. He is seeking both compensatory and punitive damages based on the incident. Id. at 4. C. Analysis The plaintiff named one defendant—the “Milwaukee County Sheriff Office.” Id. at 1. But the plaintiff cannot sue the sheriff’s department under §1983. Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to sue a “person” who, acting under color of law, violates his constitutional rights. The Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Office is not a person, or an independent legal entity—it is an organization, not an individual subject to suit under §1983. Johnson v. Racine Cty. Jail, No. 15-CV- 1291-pp, 2016 WL 482031, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 5, 2016); see also Powell v. Cook Cty.

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Booker-El v. Superintendent, Indiana State Prison
668 F.3d 896 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
James T. Donald v. Cook County Sheriff's Department
95 F.3d 548 (Seventh Circuit, 1996)
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee
570 F.3d 824 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Powell v. Cook County Jail
814 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Illinois, 1993)
Abraham v. Piechowski
13 F. Supp. 2d 870 (E.D. Wisconsin, 1998)
Kingsley v. Hendrickson
576 U.S. 389 (Supreme Court, 2015)
Miguel Perez v. James Fenoglio
792 F.3d 768 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
D. S. v. East Porter County School Corp
799 F.3d 793 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Cesal v. Moats
851 F.3d 714 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)

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Bluebook (online)
Blakes v. Kentrell, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/blakes-v-kentrell-wied-2020.