Blake v. United American Insurance

37 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20892, 1998 WL 996068
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Ohio
DecidedDecember 30, 1998
DocketC-2-97-791
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 37 F. Supp. 2d 997 (Blake v. United American Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Blake v. United American Insurance, 37 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20892, 1998 WL 996068 (S.D. Ohio 1998).

Opinion

OPINION & ORDER

MARBLEY, District Judge.

This cause comes before this Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff Steven Blake brought this case, claiming he was demoted and fired as an insurance agent at Defendant United American Insurance Company (“United”) in retaliation for his repeated whistleblow-ing activities. Defendants United, Globe Life and Accident Insurance Company, and Torchmark Corporation (collectively “Defendants”) claim both actions were motivated by Blake’s professional inadequacies, not retaliation. For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

I. UNDISPUTED FACTS

Blake joined United as a agent in Dayton in November of 1986. He was promoted to Unit Manager in February of 1987. From that point forward, Blake made several reports to the company of conduct by United and other insurance company agents which he felt was unethical or illegal. He was promoted to Branch Manager of the Fort Wayne office in January of 1989, and in June of 1989 was transferred to the same position in Columbus. He wanted the transfer to Ohio to be close to his family. Blake had high production that season, and was selected as a candidate for Rookie Manager of the Year. In 1991, Blake began reporting directly to the Home Office, as opposed to the “Director of Agencies,” which is the normal chain of command. Defendants characterize this as a beneficial change for Blake, making his reporting more convenient. Blake admitted in his deposition that this was a positive move, reflecting his good performance. In 1994, production at the Colum *999 bus office declined. In June of 1994, a supervisor, Kevin Dunn, met with Blake and told him his production had to improve. When production did not quickly increase, United demoted Blake, and transferred him back to the Dayton branch as a Unit Manager in September of 1994. However, United continued to pay Blake his “Branch Manager renewals,” a bonus that Unit Managers typically do not receive at United. In December of 1996, United terminated Blake, ostensibly for an underwriting violation. Blake brought this suit in June of 1997, claiming that his termination violated the Ohio Whistleblower Statute, Ohio Rev.Code § 4113.52.

From 1987 until 1994, Blake made several reports to United regarding what he considered unethical, possibly illegal actions by agents. In his answers to United’s interrogatories, Blake has listed thirty-seven different instances of whist-leblowing. 1 Blake confirmed in his deposition and at oral argument with this Court that this list is an exhaustive catalog of the violations he reported during his tenure at United. Defendants admit that each of these instances occurred. Each paragraph contains one instance of whistleblowing, and for organizational purposes, each paragraph has been numbered sequentially. These instances are the crux of this lawsuit, as Blake must be able to demonstrate that his termination was in retaliation for at least one of them. Defendants move for summary judgment, contending the Ohio Whistle-blower Statute, as a matter of law, does not. provide Blake with a cause of action based on the undisputed facts.

II. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) provides that summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The movant has the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact, which may be accomplished by demonstrating that the nonmoving party lacks evidence to support an essential element of its case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Barnhart v. Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling Co., L.P.A., 12 F.3d 1382, 1388-89 (6th Cir.1993). The nonmoving party must then present “significant probative evidence” to show that “there is [more than] some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Moore v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 339-40 (6th Cir.1993). “[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute is about a material fact that is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (summary judgment appropriate when the evidence could not lead a trier of fact to find. for the non-moving party).

In evaluating such a motion, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 479 (6th Cir.1995).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Blake Did Not Follow the Procedures Required by the Whistleblower Statute

The Ohio Whistleblower Statute, Ohio Rev.Code § 4113.52, specifies the proce *1000 dures an employee must follow to receive protection under the statute:

(A)(1)(a) If an employee becomes aware in the course of the employee’s employment of a violation of any state or federal statute or any ordinance or regulation of a political subdivision that the employee’s employer has authority to correct and if the employee reasonably believes that the violation either is a criminal offense that is likely to cause an imminent risk of physical harm to persons or a hazard to public health or safety or is a felony, the employee orally shall notify the employee’s supervisor or other responsible officer of the employee’s employer of the violation and subsequently shall file with that supervisor or officer a written report that provides sufficient detail to identify and describe the violation.

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Bluebook (online)
37 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20892, 1998 WL 996068, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/blake-v-united-american-insurance-ohsd-1998.