Blake v. Thornton

914 N.E.2d 1102, 182 Ohio App. 3d 716
Ohio Court of Appeals·Decided May 28, 2009·No. No. 91938·Published·Cited by 6 cases

Opinion

Sean C. Gallagher, Presiding Judge.

{¶ 1} Appellant, National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA (“National Union”), appeals the judgment of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas that (1) granted the motion for partial summary judgment of appellees Nicole Johnson1 and Janet Parker2 (collectively “plaintiffs”), (2) denied [718] the motion for partial summary judgment of National Union, and (3) declared that the National Union commercial umbrella liability policy provides excess underinsured-motorist coverage to plaintiffs through a “follow-form” endorsement. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the decision of the trial court.

{¶ 2} This appeal involves a dispute over underinsured-motorist (“UIM”) coverage arising from an automobile accident involving plaintiffs’ decedents, Delores Johnson and Lorraine Blake. In September 2006, Johnson and Blake were residents of the Owl’s Nest, a senior living facility in Cleveland Heights. They, along with three other Owl’s Nest residents, were traveling in a minibus that was struck by an oncoming truck driven by Eddie Thornton. Johnson died at the scene, Thornton died from his injuries four months later, and Blake died from an unrelated condition seven months later.

{¶ 3} Associated Estates Realty Corporation (“Associated Estates”) managed the Owl’s Nest facility and employed the driver of the minibus, Dian Lassiter. Owl’s Nest, Ltd., now known as KB Portfolio, LLC, owned the facility. KB Portfolio is affiliated with GH Capital, LLC, a developer and acquisition company.

{¶ 4} Plaintiffs, who are the administrators of Johnson’s and Blake’s estates, each sued Thornton, Lassiter, Associated Estates, Owl’s Nest, Ltd., KB Portfolio, LLC, and certain John Doe defendants for negligence and intentional conduct.3 The trial court consolidated the actions.4

{¶ 5} The claims against Thornton were resolved upon the payment of policy limits by his automobile liability insurer, State Farm Insurance. However, this did not fully compensate the claimants’ losses. Through amended complaints, plaintiffs asserted UIM claims against several insurance companies, including National Union and Progressive Preferred Insurance Company (“Progressive”). Plaintiffs also alleged that all insurer defendants had acted in bad faith in denying their claims for UIM benefits.

{¶ 6} Progressive had issued a commercial auto policy under which the minibus was a covered auto and the plaintiffs’ decedents were considered insureds. The Progressive auto policy provided for both liability and UIM coverage. Progressive tendered the UIM coverage limits under the policy to the various claimants involved in the accident.

[719] {¶ 7} Plaintiffs sought excess UIM coverage under a commercial umbrella liability policy issued by National Union. At the time of the accident, National Union insured GH Capital under the National Union umbrella policy. GH Capital was the named insured under the National Union umbrella policy, and KB Portfolio was added as a named insured by endorsement. The policy defines “insured” to include “any person or organization * * * included as an additional insured under Scheduled Underlying Insurance.” The Progressive auto policy was among the scheduled underlying insurance.

{¶ 8} The National Union umbrella policy does not explicitly provide UIM coverage and specifically excludes uninsured-motorist/underinsured-motorist (“UM/UIM”) coverage implied by law. However, plaintiffs claimed that excess UIM coverage was provided through an exception to the automobile liability exclusion in the policy’s follow-form endorsement. They asserted that the provision incorporated the underlying Progressive policy, which contains UIM coverage, and that the National Union umbrella policy followed the terms of the underlying insurance.

{¶ 9} Plaintiffs ultimately dismissed their claims against all tortfeasor defendants and all insurer defendants except National Union. Plaintiffs and National Union filed motions for partial summary judgment on the UIM coverage issue under the National Union umbrella policy. The trial court granted plaintiffs’ motion and denied National Union’s motion.

{¶ 10} Following the trial court’s ruling on the motions for partial summary judgment, the parties stipulated to plaintiffs’ compensatory damages under confidential high-low agreements.5 Plaintiffs then dismissed their bad-faith claims. The parties filed consent judgment entries, preserving their right to appeal the ruling on UIM coverage, and the trial court dismissed the consolidated action.

{¶ 11} National Union timely filed this appeal, challenging the trial court’s ruling regarding UIM coverage under its policy. However, the trial court’s ruling was not sufficient to create a final, appealable order, because it merely ruled on the motions for partial summary judgment without declaring the rights of the parties. This court issued a limited remand in order for the trial court to comply with the requirements for a declaratory judgment.

{¶ 12} Upon limited remand, the trial court entered an order that declared that the National Union umbrella policy provides excess UIM coverage to plaintiffs [720] through the policy’s follow-form endorsement. The matter is now properly before us for review.

{¶ 13} National Union raises one assignment of error that argues that “the [trial] court erred in holding that an excess liability insurance policy provides underinsured motorist (‘UIM’) coverage.”

{¶ 14} An appellate court reviews a trial court’s granting of summary judgment de novo. Ohio Government Risk Mgt. Plan v. Harrison, 115 Ohio St.3d 241, 242, 2007-Ohio-4948, 874 N.E.2d 1155. Before summary judgment may be granted, a court must determine that “(1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party.” State ex rel. Dussell v. Lakewood Police Dept., 99 Ohio St.3d 299, 300-301, 2003-Ohio-3652, 791 N.E.2d 456, citing State ex rel. Duganitz v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 190, 191, 672 N.E.2d 654.

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Blake v. Thornton, 914 N.E.2d 1102, 182 Ohio App. 3d 716 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009).

914 N.E.2d 1102 (Blake v. Thornton) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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