Blake v. New England Survey Service, Inc.

Connecticut Superior Court

Blake v. New England Survey Service, Inc.

17 Conn. Super. Ct. 48, 17 Conn. Supp. 48, 1950 Conn. Super. LEXIS 52

CourtConnecticut Superior Court

DecidedMarch 15, 1950

DocketFile 5627

StatusPublished

This text of 17 Conn. Super. Ct. 48 (Blake v. New England Survey Service, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Blake v. New England Survey Service, Inc., 17 Conn. Super. Ct. 48, 17 Conn. Supp. 48, 1950 Conn. Super. LEXIS 52 (Colo. Ct. App. 1950).

Pincite

Opinion

KING, J.

The plaintiffs sued -the defendant New England Survey Service, Inc., hereinafter referred to as Survey Service! as the owner, and the defendant Joseph- S. Ullian, as the opera' *49 tor, of an automobile which collided with one owned and oper' ated by another defendant, Arthur J. Ricker, in which the plaintiffs were riding as passengers.

The complaint contained no allegation that Ullian was the agent of the defendant Survey Service nor that he was then act' ing in the course and scope of any authority conferred on him by Survey Service. Indeed it alleged no legal relationship be' tween Ullian and Survey Service except the ownership of the automobile by Survey Service and its operation by Ullian.

The defendant Survey Service demurs because of the lack of any such allegation of legal relationship between itself and Ullian.

The effect of the statute (General Statutes § 7905) is vo make proof of ownership and operation sufficient, in the absence of explanatory evidence, to prove actionable agency at the time in question. Smith v. Furness, 117 Conn. 97, 102; Leitzes v. F. L. Caulkins Auto Co., 123 Conn. 459, 462. It therefore cannot be said that no cause of action against the defendant Survey Serf ice could be proven under the allegations made, since these suffice to bring the statutory presumption into the case. It follows that the demurrer must be, and is, overruled. Folwell v. Howell, 117 Conn. 565, 568.

It is true that allegations along the line of those omitted are essential to a properly drawn complaint. Leitzes v. F. L. Caulkins Auto Co., supra, 464. For instance, under the method of pleading adopted by the plaintiffs, there is no allegation of agency to be admitted or denied by the defendant Survey Serv' ice in its answer and consequently the plaintiffs are left without any knowledge from the pleadings as to whether agency is to be admitted or controverted. Thus the plaintiffs are required to go to the expense and inconvenience of having available all of their evidence on the issue of agency even though it may turn out to be uncontested.

The plaintiffs placed some reliance on Practice Book § 118; on Vincent v. Alexander’s Sons Co., 85 Conn. 512, 516, and on Banks v. Watrous, 134 Conn. 592, 597. These contain nothing which meets the situation here. It is obvious that a corporation can in its inherent nature act only through the instrumentality of human beings. The plaintiffs must prove that the car in ques' tion was being driven by the defendant Ullian as the then au' thorffied agent of Survey Service acting within the scope of his *50 authority. On this issue the risk of nonpersuasion is always on the plaintiff and never shifts. The statute merely provides that under certain circumstances a permissible inference of agency may be drawn, and must be drawn if no explanatory evidence is offered by the defendant. Under our system of pleading a complaint which states a cause of action is not demurrable, even though it may be subject to improvement. Burritt v. Lunny, 90 Conn. 491, 495.

The demurrer is overruled.

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KING, J.

The plaintiffs sued -the defendant New England Survey Service, Inc., hereinafter referred to as Survey Service! as the owner, and the defendant Joseph- S. Ullian, as the opera' *49 tor, of an automobile which collided with one owned and oper' ated by another defendant, Arthur J. Ricker, in which the plaintiffs were riding as passengers.

The complaint contained no allegation that Ullian was the agent of the defendant Survey Service nor that he was then act' ing in the course and scope of any authority conferred on him by Survey Service. Indeed it alleged no legal relationship be' tween Ullian and Survey Service except the ownership of the automobile by Survey Service and its operation by Ullian.

The defendant Survey Service demurs because of the lack of any such allegation of legal relationship between itself and Ullian.

The effect of the statute (General Statutes § 7905) is vo make proof of ownership and operation sufficient, in the absence of explanatory evidence, to prove actionable agency at the time in question. Smith v. Furness, 117 Conn. 97, 102; Leitzes v. F. L. Caulkins Auto Co., 123 Conn. 459, 462. It therefore cannot be said that no cause of action against the defendant Survey Serf ice could be proven under the allegations made, since these suffice to bring the statutory presumption into the case. It follows that the demurrer must be, and is, overruled. Folwell v. Howell, 117 Conn. 565, 568.

It is true that allegations along the line of those omitted are essential to a properly drawn complaint. Leitzes v. F. L. Caulkins Auto Co., supra, 464. For instance, under the method of pleading adopted by the plaintiffs, there is no allegation of agency to be admitted or denied by the defendant Survey Serv' ice in its answer and consequently the plaintiffs are left without any knowledge from the pleadings as to whether agency is to be admitted or controverted. Thus the plaintiffs are required to go to the expense and inconvenience of having available all of their evidence on the issue of agency even though it may turn out to be uncontested.

The plaintiffs placed some reliance on Practice Book § 118; on Vincent v. Alexander’s Sons Co., 85 Conn. 512, 516, and on Banks v. Watrous, 134 Conn. 592, 597. These contain nothing which meets the situation here. It is obvious that a corporation can in its inherent nature act only through the instrumentality of human beings. The plaintiffs must prove that the car in ques' tion was being driven by the defendant Ullian as the then au' thorffied agent of Survey Service acting within the scope of his *50 authority. On this issue the risk of nonpersuasion is always on the plaintiff and never shifts. The statute merely provides that under certain circumstances a permissible inference of agency may be drawn, and must be drawn if no explanatory evidence is offered by the defendant. Under our system of pleading a complaint which states a cause of action is not demurrable, even though it may be subject to improvement. Burritt v. Lunny, 90 Conn. 491, 495.

The demurrer is overruled.

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Bluebook (online)

17 Conn. Super. Ct. 48, 17 Conn. Supp. 48, 1950 Conn. Super. LEXIS 52, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/blake-v-new-england-survey-service-inc-connsuperct-1950.

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