BLAKE LEE MARCH v. STATE OF FLORIDA

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: April 19, 2023
• Docket: 21-2718
• Status: Published

Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FOURTH DISTRICT

BLAKE LEE MARCH, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.

No. 4D21-2718

[April 19, 2023]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Daliah H. Weiss, Judge; L.T. Case No. 502020CF001941AMB.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Logan T. Mohs, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melynda L. Melear, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

KUNTZ, J.

Blake Lee March appeals his conviction and sentence. We briefly write to address his argument that because “burglary with an assault or battery” is not an enumerated crime in the prison release reoffender statute, section 775.082(9)(a)1., Florida Statutes (2021), he could not be sentenced under the PRR statute. We disagree.

The PRR statute states that “‘prison release reoffender’ means any defendant who commits, or attempts to commit: . . . q. Burglary of a dwelling or burglary of an occupied structure[.]” § 775.082(9)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (2021). March was convicted of burglary of a dwelling with assault or battery, a greater degree of the included crime. We agree with the First District’s opinion in Campbell v. State, 29 So. 3d 1147, 1149 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (“giving [the PRR and burglary statutes] their plain meaning, reveals that burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery is punishable by a life sentence under the PRR statute.”). 1

As a result, we conclude March was eligible to be sentenced under the PRR statute and affirm his conviction and sentence.

Affirmed.

MAY and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

1The First District also concluded that “[i]t would be illogical to construe the PRR statute in a way that allows an enhanced sentence for simple burglary of a dwelling, but not for a greater degree of that same crime.” Campbell, 29 So. 3d at 1149-50.