NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 24 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BLAIR ODEL HAYS, No. 23-55330
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:21-cv-04227-DOC-JEM v.
J. BONNIFIELD, Community Resource MEMORANDUM* Manager, in individual capacity; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 24, 2025** San Francisco, California
Before: FRIEDLAND, BENNETT, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
Pro se Plaintiff-Appellant Blair Hays, while incarcerated at the California
Men’s Colony (“CMC”) in San Luis Obispo, California, sued CMC Community
Resource Manager J. Bonnifield, Chaplain D. Gottesfeld, and Warden J. Gastelo
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). over lapses in Islamic religious services following Imam E. Rasheed’s departure
from CMC. Hays alleges that Defendants repeatedly failed to make prison staff
available to supervise Friday Jumu’ah prayer services and Tuesday and Thursday
Ta’leem study groups at the CMC-East Interfaith Chapel, depriving Hays of
opportunities to practice “essential Tenets of the Islamic Faith” for a period from
2019 to 2020.1 Although Defendant Gottesfeld sometimes stepped in to supervise
Jumu’ah prayer services during this period, Hays alleges that Defendants denied his
requests for regular staff supervision of inmate-led services at the chapel until a new
imam was hired. Hays brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his First
Amendment free exercise and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights. The
district court dismissed the action without leave to amend. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).2 Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125,
1 Hays alleges that before resigning in or around August 2019, Imam Rasheed established the weekly services “to ensure that all Muslim inmates were receiving and learning the essential Tenets of the Islamic Faith.” To the extent that Hays bases his claims on services that he missed before Imam Rasheed’s departure, Hays fails to allege any conduct by Defendants that could serve as predicate for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 854 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that a predicate for liability under § 1983 is that the defendant caused the alleged injury). Hays does not challenge the suspension of all religious services starting in March 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic. 2 We do not decide whether Hays’s complaint states a free exercise claim because we conclude that the law governing any such claim was not clearly established, so Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on that claim.
2 1131 (9th Cir. 2015). “We review the denial of leave to amend for an abuse of
discretion, but we review the question of futility of amendment de novo.” United
States v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 848 F.3d 1161, 1172 (9th Cir. 2016) (citations
omitted). We affirm.3
1. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to Hays’s First
Amendment free exercise claim. “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects
government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). To clearly establish the
law, a case need not be “directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed
the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563
U.S. 731, 741 (2011).
Here, even if Hays’s complaint states a claim that Defendants violated his
right to free exercise by not enabling his attending Ta’leem study services and
Jumu’ah prayer services every week while the prison was trying to hire a
replacement for an imam who had resigned, that right was not “beyond debate.” Id.
3 We deny as unnecessary Defendants’ motion to strike two of the seven documents that Hays filed with his reply brief. Dkt. No. 21. We do not rely on the documents to which Defendants object, which are already reflected in the complaint’s allegations that we accept as true.
3 Although inmates are entitled to a “reasonable opportunity to freely exercise their
faith,” Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir.
2013) (quotation marks omitted), no caselaw clearly established at the time of the
alleged misconduct that inmates are deprived of a reasonable opportunity to freely
exercise their faith when, as alleged here, prison officials facilitated inmates’ access
to religious services on some occasions and were attempting to obtain the staffing to
facilitate more services in a manner that would be consistent with legitimate
penological interests. Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity as to
Hays’s free exercise claim.4
2. The complaint fails to state a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
claim. To allege an equal protection violation, “a plaintiff must show that the
defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based
upon membership in a protected class,” as compared to “similarly situated” groups.
Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (first quoting Barren v.
4 To the extent that Hays seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, he lacks standing. Hays seeks relief only for injuries occurring in 2019 and 2020, and he does not allege any facts demonstrating that he likely will be wronged again in a similar way or that the threat of repeated injury is real and immediate. See Fellowship of Christian Athletes v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 82 F.4th 664, 723 (9th Cir. 2023) (en banc) (discussing the standing requirements for prospective injunctive relief); see also Sample v. Johnson, 771 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 24 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BLAIR ODEL HAYS, No. 23-55330
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:21-cv-04227-DOC-JEM v.
J. BONNIFIELD, Community Resource MEMORANDUM* Manager, in individual capacity; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 24, 2025** San Francisco, California
Before: FRIEDLAND, BENNETT, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
Pro se Plaintiff-Appellant Blair Hays, while incarcerated at the California
Men’s Colony (“CMC”) in San Luis Obispo, California, sued CMC Community
Resource Manager J. Bonnifield, Chaplain D. Gottesfeld, and Warden J. Gastelo
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). over lapses in Islamic religious services following Imam E. Rasheed’s departure
from CMC. Hays alleges that Defendants repeatedly failed to make prison staff
available to supervise Friday Jumu’ah prayer services and Tuesday and Thursday
Ta’leem study groups at the CMC-East Interfaith Chapel, depriving Hays of
opportunities to practice “essential Tenets of the Islamic Faith” for a period from
2019 to 2020.1 Although Defendant Gottesfeld sometimes stepped in to supervise
Jumu’ah prayer services during this period, Hays alleges that Defendants denied his
requests for regular staff supervision of inmate-led services at the chapel until a new
imam was hired. Hays brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his First
Amendment free exercise and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights. The
district court dismissed the action without leave to amend. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).2 Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125,
1 Hays alleges that before resigning in or around August 2019, Imam Rasheed established the weekly services “to ensure that all Muslim inmates were receiving and learning the essential Tenets of the Islamic Faith.” To the extent that Hays bases his claims on services that he missed before Imam Rasheed’s departure, Hays fails to allege any conduct by Defendants that could serve as predicate for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 854 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that a predicate for liability under § 1983 is that the defendant caused the alleged injury). Hays does not challenge the suspension of all religious services starting in March 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic. 2 We do not decide whether Hays’s complaint states a free exercise claim because we conclude that the law governing any such claim was not clearly established, so Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on that claim.
2 1131 (9th Cir. 2015). “We review the denial of leave to amend for an abuse of
discretion, but we review the question of futility of amendment de novo.” United
States v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 848 F.3d 1161, 1172 (9th Cir. 2016) (citations
omitted). We affirm.3
1. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to Hays’s First
Amendment free exercise claim. “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects
government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). To clearly establish the
law, a case need not be “directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed
the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563
U.S. 731, 741 (2011).
Here, even if Hays’s complaint states a claim that Defendants violated his
right to free exercise by not enabling his attending Ta’leem study services and
Jumu’ah prayer services every week while the prison was trying to hire a
replacement for an imam who had resigned, that right was not “beyond debate.” Id.
3 We deny as unnecessary Defendants’ motion to strike two of the seven documents that Hays filed with his reply brief. Dkt. No. 21. We do not rely on the documents to which Defendants object, which are already reflected in the complaint’s allegations that we accept as true.
3 Although inmates are entitled to a “reasonable opportunity to freely exercise their
faith,” Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir.
2013) (quotation marks omitted), no caselaw clearly established at the time of the
alleged misconduct that inmates are deprived of a reasonable opportunity to freely
exercise their faith when, as alleged here, prison officials facilitated inmates’ access
to religious services on some occasions and were attempting to obtain the staffing to
facilitate more services in a manner that would be consistent with legitimate
penological interests. Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity as to
Hays’s free exercise claim.4
2. The complaint fails to state a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
claim. To allege an equal protection violation, “a plaintiff must show that the
defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based
upon membership in a protected class,” as compared to “similarly situated” groups.
Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (first quoting Barren v.
4 To the extent that Hays seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, he lacks standing. Hays seeks relief only for injuries occurring in 2019 and 2020, and he does not allege any facts demonstrating that he likely will be wronged again in a similar way or that the threat of repeated injury is real and immediate. See Fellowship of Christian Athletes v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 82 F.4th 664, 723 (9th Cir. 2023) (en banc) (discussing the standing requirements for prospective injunctive relief); see also Sample v. Johnson, 771 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that, to establish standing, “plaintiffs must demonstrate that a ‘credible threat’ exists that they will again be subject to the specific injury for which they seek injunctive or declaratory relief” (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 355 n.3 (1983))).
4 Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); and then quoting Thornton v. City
of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005)). Hays seeks to establish
Defendants’ discriminatory animus toward Muslims by alleging that “the religious
services for the Christians, Jewish Faith, Catholics, Native Americans, and all others
were being justly held on their scheduled days” at the chapel. Even given that Imam
Rasheed had “supervise[d] other religious services . . . when there were Chaplains
that were on sick call / leave or just unassigned Chaplain positions,” Hays does not
allege that these other groups enjoyed uninterrupted religious services throughout
the absence of their assigned chaplain. And the facts in the complaint about
Defendants’ continuation, though intermittent, of Jumu’ah prayer services at the
chapel under the supervision of Defendant Gottesfeld during their search for a new
imam undermine Hays’s conclusory assertions of animus. See Hartmann, 707 F.3d
at 1124 (holding that evidence of prison officials’ providing Plaintiffs with access to
a volunteer Wiccan chaplain when one was available belied the claim of animus).
3. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hays leave to
amend the complaint. A pro se litigant is not entitled to leave to amend if “it is
absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by
amendment.” Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). And leave
to amend is warranted only “if deficiencies can be cured with additional allegations
that are ‘consistent with the challenged pleading’ and that do not contradict the
5 allegations in the original complaint.” United States v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d
984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296–97
(9th Cir. 1990)). Given Hays’s allegations about Defendants’ efforts to continue
chapel services during the vacancy of the imam position, we conclude that Hays
cannot allege any facts consistent with his original complaint that would suffice to
plead a clearly established violation of his free exercise rights or state an equal
protection claim. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to
amend after concluding the same.
AFFIRMED.