Blackmon v. Myers

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Illinois
DecidedApril 6, 2020
Docket3:19-cv-01297
StatusUnknown

This text of Blackmon v. Myers (Blackmon v. Myers) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Blackmon v. Myers, (S.D. Ill. 2020).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

TYKARI BLACKMON, #Y22319, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) Case No. 19-cv-01297-JPG ) DR. P. MYERS, ) WEXFORD HEATH SOURCES, INC., ) and NURSE JANE DOE, ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER GILBERT, District Judge: Plaintiff Tykari Blackmon, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) who is currently incarcerated at Pinckneyville Correctional Center (“Pinckneyville”), brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims he was denied medical care for a painful facial tumor by Pinckneyville’s medical staff. (Doc. 12, pp. 1-20). As a result, Plaintiff suffered from facial pain, migraines, and blurred vision. (Id.). He seeks money damages against Dr. Myers, Nurse Jane Doe, and Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”). (Id. at p. 17). The First Amended Complaint (Doc. 12), which supersedes and replaces the original Complaint (Doc. 1), is subject to review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Section 1915A requires the Court to screen prisoner complaints and filter out non-meritorious claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of the Amended Complaint that is legally frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or requests money damages from an immune defendant must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual allegations are liberally construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009). The Amended Complaint Plaintiff makes the following allegations in the Amended Complaint: In April 2018, Plaintiff submitted written requests for treatment of a painful tumor that formed on his face adjacent to his eye socket. (Doc. 20, pp. 5-13, 15). The tumor caused headaches and blurry vision. (Id.). When Plaintiff described his symptoms to Nurse Doe on April 11, 2018, she refused to treat

the tumor or prescribe medication for his pain. (Id.). When Plaintiff complained of the same symptoms to Dr. Myers on April 21, 2018, the doctor sent him back to his cell without treatment or pain relievers. (Id.). Dr. Myers also denied Plaintiff’s request for treatment and pain medication on April 21, 2018. (Id.). On September 19, 2019, Nurse Bobby Blum1 “lance[d]” the tumor and provided Plaintiff with pain medication. (Doc. 12, pp. 5-13, 16). When Plaintiff reported persistent pain and oozing “stuff” from his wound on October 3, 2019, the sick call nurse2 took no action to address his complaints. (Id.). The sick call nurse also noted that Plaintiff was a “no show” at an appointment on October 5, 2019, despite Plaintiff’s lack of knowledge about the appointment. (Id.).

Based on the allegations, the Court finds it convenient to designate the following claim in the pro se Amended Complaint: Count 1: Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants for denying Plaintiff adequate medical care for his facial tumor at Pinckneyville beginning in April 2018.

Any claim that is mentioned in the Amended Complaint but not addressed herein is considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly.3

1 Bobby Blum is not named as a defendant, and Plaintiff asserts no claims against this individual. 2 Plaintiff does not identify the sick call nurse who denied him treatment on October 3 and October 5, 2019. It is unclear whether this person is “Nurse Jane Doe” or someone else. 3 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”). Discussion Eighth Amendment claims arising from the denial of medical care consist of an objective and a subjective component. Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 775 (7th Cir. 2008). The objective component is satisfied, if the plaintiff shows that he suffered from a sufficiently serious medical condition. Id. The subjective standard is satisfied where the plaintiff demonstrates

deliberate difference against each defendant. Id. Prison physicians and nurses violate the Eighth Amendment when they intentionally disregard an objectively serious medical condition that poses an excessive risk to an inmate’s health. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). This includes the decision to ignore medical conditions obviously in need of treatment. See, e.g., Dixon v. County of Cook, 819 F.3d 343, 350 (7th Cir. 2016) (allegations that doctor and nurse knew of prisoner’s chest tumor but offered only non-prescription pain medication and discharged him from the prison’s hospital stated a deliberate indifference claim against both). The decision to delay surgery may also amount to deliberate indifference, depending on the seriousness of the condition, ease of providing treatment,

and pain resulting from the delay. See, e.g., Smith v. Knox Cnty. Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Even a few days’ delay in addressing severely painful but readily treatable condition suffices to state a claim of deliberate indifference”); Burns v. Fenoglio, 525 F. App’x 512 (7th Cir. 2013) (eight-month delay in performing surgery to remove painful hip tumor supported claim of deliberate indifference at summary judgment). Defendant Myers’ and Doe’s outright denial of treatment for Plaintiff’s painful facial tumor supports a claim of deliberate indifference against both at screening. Count 1 shall be dismissed against Wexford. This defendant is not mentioned anywhere in the statement of claim, and Plaintiff cannot pursue a claim against the medical provider based solely on a theory of respondeat superior liability because it is not recognized under § 1983. Shields v. Illinois Dept. of Corr., 746 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Iskander v. Village of Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982)). This claim shall be dismissed without prejudice against Wexford. Identification of Nurse Jane Doe

Plaintiff shall be allowed to proceed with Count 1 against Nurse Jane Doe, after properly identifying her with particularity so that service of the Amended Complaint can be made on her. The plaintiff will have the opportunity to engage in limited discovery to ascertain the identity of this defendant. Rodriguez, 577 F.3d at 832. Dr. Myers will be responsible for responding to discovery aimed at identifying Nurse Jane Doe, who met with Plaintiff on April 11, 2018. Once her name is discovered, Plaintiff must file a motion to substitute the newly identified defendant in place of the generic designations in the caption and Amended Complaint. Disposition IT IS ORDERED that the Amended Complaint (Doc. 12) survives screening. COUNT 1 will receive further review against Defendants DR. P. MYERS and NURSE JANE DOE (once

identified).

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Anthony N. Smith v. Knox County Jail
666 F.3d 1037 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Donald F. Greeno v. George Daley
414 F.3d 645 (Seventh Circuit, 2005)
Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Service
577 F.3d 816 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Grieveson v. Anderson
538 F.3d 763 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)
Earnest D. Shields v. Illinois Department of Correct
746 F.3d 782 (Seventh Circuit, 2014)
Kevin Dixon v. Cook County, Illinois
819 F.3d 343 (Seventh Circuit, 2016)
Burns v. Fenoglio
525 F. App'x 512 (Seventh Circuit, 2013)

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Blackmon v. Myers, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/blackmon-v-myers-ilsd-2020.