Blackfeather v. United States

190 U.S. 368, 23 S. Ct. 772, 47 L. Ed. 1099, 1903 U.S. LEXIS 1553
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedJune 1, 1903
Docket276
StatusPublished
Cited by39 cases

This text of 190 U.S. 368 (Blackfeather v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Blackfeather v. United States, 190 U.S. 368, 23 S. Ct. 772, 47 L. Ed. 1099, 1903 U.S. LEXIS 1553 (1903).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Peckham,

after making the foregoing statement of facts, delivered the opinion of the court.

The duty of this court is simply to construe the acts of Congress of 1890 and 1892. The Court of Claims has no jurisdiction of the subject matter of this petition, unless it is conferred by one or the other of the above acts. The moral obligations of the Government toward the Indians, whatever they may be, are for Congress alone to recognize, and the courts can exercise only such jurisdiction over the subject as Congress may confer upon them.

Upon examination of the act of 1890, it appears that jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court of Claims to hear and determine what are the just rights in law or in equity of the Shawnee and Delaware Indians, who are settled and incorporated into the Cherokee Nation, under the provisions of article 15 of the treaty of 1866, between the United States and the Cherokee Nation, and also' under articles of agreement between the Cherokee Nation and the Shawnee Indians, made June 7,1869, and articles of agreement made with the Delaware Indians, April 8, 1867, and also of the Cherokee 'freedmen settled, etc., under provisions of article 9 of the treaty of 1866.

*374 The language of the first section, in our opinion, confers jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims to hear and determine the rights in law or equity of the tribes of the Shawnee or Delaware Indians, arising out of the subject matter provided for in the subsequent parts of the act, and there is no grant of jurisdiction to hear or determine the rights of individual members of those tribes. It is true the statute speaks of the Shawnee and Delaware Indians, but the words Shawnee and Delaware Indians mean the tribes and not individual members of those tribes of Indians. The rights must be those which arise out of the subject matter which is referred to in sections 2, 3 and 4'of the act. This is stated in terms in the first section. The subsequent sections of the act show, as we think, that Indian tribes and not individual members thereof are intended. And no jurisdiction is granted to hear claims such as are included in this case, whether they are made by tribes or by individual members of a tribe.

The second section permits a suit against, the Cherokee Nation and the United States Government to recover from the Cherokee Nation moneys due and, unpaid to the Shawnees, etc., which the Cherokee Nation have before paid out, or may hereafter pay per capita in the Cherokee Nation and which the Cherokee Nation had refused or neglected to pay to the other Indians. The suits are in reality against the Cherokee Nation, and the recovery is from that nation. The separate or joint suit mentioned in this section is a separate or joint suit of the tribes and of the freedmen, and not of the individual members thereof. In eithér event it does not include such a case as this.

Section 3 permits the bringing of “ the said suit or suits ” in the name of the principal chief or chiefs of the'said Shawnee and Delaware Indians, and for the freedmen in their behalf and for- their use, in the name of some person as their trustee, to be selected by them with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. The exercise of this jurisdiction is not to be barred by any lapse of time heretofore, nor are the rights of the Indians to be impaired by any acts passed and approved by the Cherokee National Council. The right given by the third section is to commence a suit or suits which had already *375 been spoken of in the second section of the act. The second section gave no right to commence this suit, as we have seen. Neither section includes the rights of individual Indians. ■

A perusal of section. 4 shows that the right to bring a suit against the United States, therein provided for, was limited to the purpose of collecting from the United States Government any amount of money that in law or equity may be due from the United States “ to said tribes in reimbursement for Their tribal fund for money wrongfully diverted therefrom.” We think that individual Indians had no right to commence such an action as this under the act of 1890, even though it be assumed that the tribe had such right under that act for the recovery of the value of property taken from the tribe. Such a suit, as the one before us, is plainly not included in the grant of jurisdiction in this section.

By the act of 1892, it is provided that “ the Shawnee tribe or band of Indians, whose claims and demands against the Cherokee Nation and the United States were • referred to the United States Court of Claims for adjudication,” (under the act of 1890,) “ shall present to the said court all their claims against the United States and the Cherokee Nation,” etc.

The result is that this act does not grant jurisdiction to the Court of Claims to hear and decide the questions arising under this petition. The grant of jurisdiction is to hear and determine all the claims of the Shawnee tribe or band of Indians.

The claims are those of a tribe or band, and not those of the individual members of Shawnee tribe or band. The reference in the act of 1S92 shows that Congress assumed that whatever their nature, it was the-claims of the Shawnee tribe or band that had been referred to the Court of Claims for adjudication by the act of 1890, and not claims of the individual members thereof. The act of 1892 enlarges the scope of the act of 1890 so as to include all claims of the tribe or band, instead of claims of the nature provided for in sections 2, 3 and 4 of the act of 1890, but the claims must be claims of a band and not of an individual.

These acts have been before this court, on a previous occasion.

*376 In United States v. Blackfeather, 155 U. S. 180, 194, Mr. Justice Brown, speaking for the court, said:

“ While there may be a. moral obligation on the part of the Government to reimburse the money embezzled by the Indian superintendent, and in fact an appropriation appears to have been made'for that purpose, act of July 7, 1884, c. 334, 23 Stat. 236, 247, it is by no means clear that, under the acts of 1890 and 1892, the Shawnees were authorized to recover and collect from the Government any other moneys than those which they claimed in their tribal relation or capacity. The money in question is not due the tribe as such, but to certain individual orphans, who claim to have been defrauded. But whether this be so or not, there is nothing in the record to indicate how much of this money was embezzled by the guardians created by the Indian council, and how much by the Indian superintendent, so that there is in reality no basis for a decree in their favor.”

While the question in issue here was, as is seen, not decided in the above case, yet the expression contained in the opinion shows the court was not prepared to hold that the acts embraced claims of individual Indians.

As these statutes extend the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims and permit the Government to be sued for causes of action therein referred.to, the grant of jurisdiction must be shown clearly to cover the case before us, and if it do riot, it will not be implied. Statutes of this nature extending the right to sue the Government will generally be strictly construed.

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Bluebook (online)
190 U.S. 368, 23 S. Ct. 772, 47 L. Ed. 1099, 1903 U.S. LEXIS 1553, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/blackfeather-v-united-states-scotus-1903.