Blackburn v. City of Miamisburg

23 N.E.2d 959, 62 Ohio App. 327, 29 Ohio Law. Abs. 494, 16 Ohio Op. 25, 1939 Ohio App. LEXIS 355
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedMay 26, 1939
DocketNo 1569
StatusPublished

This text of 23 N.E.2d 959 (Blackburn v. City of Miamisburg) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Blackburn v. City of Miamisburg, 23 N.E.2d 959, 62 Ohio App. 327, 29 Ohio Law. Abs. 494, 16 Ohio Op. 25, 1939 Ohio App. LEXIS 355 (Ohio Ct. App. 1939).

Opinion

OPINION.

By HORNBECK,. PJ..

This is an appeal on questions of law from á judgment in behalf of the defendant entered upon an instructed verdict of the jury. .

The action, was for damages for personal injuries suffered by plaintiff by reason of a nuisance, which it was claimed defendant had permitted to exist in a sidewalk of vhe defendant city and of which it had actual and con-, structive notice.

Specifically it was alleged that, on the south side of East Pearl Street, and immediately east of Sixth Street in the City of Miamisburg, said defendant constructed and maintained a catch, basin, in .said sidewalk at the curb, which catch basin was so constructed *495 that an iron circular lid on the top thereof was used as cart of said sidewalk and said lid was removable so that the catch basin could be cleaned from within; that plaintiff between 9:30 and 9:45 A. M. on July 26, 1937, suffered an accident whereby her left leg went into the ca^cn basin which had no metal cover on top. The negligence charged against the defendant was that having had knowledge by its proper officers and agents of the dangerous condition of said catch basin and the existence of said catch basin without a cover lid, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that said cover of said catch basin was not thereon; that said defendant was negligent and careless in the construction of said catch basin in not fastening the lid on said catch basin; that defendant permitted said catch basin to be maintained and so situated on said public sidewalk without a cover thereon and without a cover having been duly fastened thereto; failed to keep said walk open to the use of the general public and free from nuisance, and failed and neglected to inspect said catch basin in ~aid sidewalk to see if the lid thereon was in position and securely fastened 'or the safety of pedestrians using said public walk and failed to remedy the condition in the sidewalk by placing said cover on said catch basin and securely fastening the same and in failing to place some guard, railing or barricade to warn pedestrians of the dangerous condition of said catch basin ar.d that the same was open on said sidewalk.

The answer of the c>ty was a general denial of all the affirmative averments of negligence against it.

Upon the conclusion of plaintiff’s case, on motion of defendant, the. trial judge instructed, the jury to return a verdict for the defendant, which was returned. After motion for new trial was overruled, judgment was entered on the verdict. From -his judgment the appeal is prosecuted.

There are. three errors assigned, (1) Ip the rejection of.-certain testimony proffered by piaintiff, appellant (2/ Directing the jury to return verdict for the defendant (3) In overruling plaintiff’s motion for new triar and rendering judgment against her.

The facts developed were that plaintiff, between 9:30 and 9:45 o’clock in the morning of July 26, 1937, went to a grocery store of Lester E. Burns at 601 East Pearl Street to buy some food stuffs. She made a number of purchases, left the store and had gone across the street or to the south side of Pearl Street when Mr. Burns, the grocer, observing that she had quite a load and knowing that she had theretofore been ill, suggested that he would deliver her groceries and that she might ride with him. She then crossed the street to the north side thereof and moved with the grocer to his truck which was parked at the curb some ten or twelve feet west of a manhole in the sidewalk to the north of Pearl Street. The grocer discovered that he had nó extra -seat in the truck upon which Mrs. Blackburn could ride. She suggested that she would walk. As she stepped backward from the grocery truck she fell .into the manhole, the grocer says up to her armpits. She was painfully and severely injured.

At about 7 or 7:30 o’clock in the morning of the same day that the plaintiff was-injured, Mrs. Mary E. Hill observed that the -lid was off the manhole in front of the Burns’ grocery and sometime later in the morning another witness saw that the cover was off the manhole.

The place where the accident occurred was on Pearl Street which was a thoroughfare some ten to twelve squares in length. It was built up with residences and was paved on both sides. The place where the accident occurred was about one mile from the City Building and but a few blocks from the city limits. The City of Miamisburg has a population of five to six thousand. At the time of che -accident it had but one motor patrolman • whose duty it was to police the whole city and, among other things, to check manholes of the sewage system, especially with reference to overflow or stoppage. Each man *496 hole in the city was checked once a day but on the day in question inspection had not been made and no officer of the city was in the vicinity of the accident until a very few minutes after it occurred.

There is no proof of actual notice to the city of the condition in the street and if knowledge is established at all it must be upon the basis of constructive notice.

It will be observed that the greatest period of time which could have elapsed between the observance of the open condition of the manhole and the time when plaintiff was injured was two and one-half hours. The trial judge held that, as a matter of law. this time was insufficient to permit the jury to say that the defendant was chargeable with constructive notice of the nuisance in the street.

Under the case of Hamden Lodge v Gas Co., 127 Oh St 469, the court was required to say whether or not, under the evidence, reasonable minds could determine that the condition' complained of had existed for a sufficient length of time as that the city, in the exercise of ordinary care, should have known of it and' could nave taken steps to correct it. Further, this court to reverse must hold that the action of the trial judge in directing the verdict was manifestly erroneous and prejudicial. We cannot so find upon a careful consideration of the evidence.

Under all the facts and circumstances appearing, some of which we have heretofore stated and all of which we have considered, we are of the opinion that two and one-half hours was too short a time to form a basis for determination that the city should have known of the dangerous condition in the sidewalk.

We have examined 11 cases cited and find that in none of them did the nuisance exist for so short a time as ■ in the instant case. In the case of Herriman v City of Boston, 114 Mass., 241, cited by appellant, the condition obtained from early morning until n.oon. The.nuisance was a coal hole in a sidewalk on a much travelled street of the city, and upon the regular beat of the police. The distinguishing differences between the cited case and our case are apparent;

In Village of Orrville v Coyle, 33 Oh Ap 366, the action was predicated upon injuries suffered by plaintiff falling over a fire hose which had been left across a sidewalk upon one of the streets of the village. The jury found, upon aii answer to a special interrogatory, that the fire hose had been on the sidewalk! for three days prior to the time of the accident. The pronouncement of the court in the syllabus must be taken in the light of the facts developed in the case.

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Bluebook (online)
23 N.E.2d 959, 62 Ohio App. 327, 29 Ohio Law. Abs. 494, 16 Ohio Op. 25, 1939 Ohio App. LEXIS 355, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/blackburn-v-city-of-miamisburg-ohioctapp-1939.