Black v. Talon Inc.

CourtNorth Carolina Industrial Commission
DecidedMay 30, 1996
DocketI.C. No. 167984
StatusPublished

This text of Black v. Talon Inc. (Black v. Talon Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Carolina Industrial Commission primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Black v. Talon Inc., (N.C. Super. Ct. 1996).

Opinion

The undersigned have reviewed the prior Opinion and award based upon the record of the proceedings before Deputy Commissioner Shuping. The appealing party has not shown good ground to reconsider the evidence; receive further evidence; rehear the parties or their representatives; or amend the Opinion and Award.

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

The Full Commission finds as fact and concludes as matters of law the following, which were entered into by the parties at the hearing as:

STIPULATIONS

1. A Pre-Trial Agreement, which is hereby incorporated by reference as if fully set-out herein, where the parties agreed to a number of jurisdictional and other factual stipulations.

2. Depositions of Drs. Ward and Greenhoot are hereby made a part of the evidentiary record.

The Full Commission adopts the findings of fact found by the Deputy Commissioner as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Plaintiff is a 59 year-old married female with a high school education. Her other prior work experience has been as a machine operator at Wicks for nine months packing waste into cans, a zipper inspector at defendant-employer for seven and a half years, a teacher's aide and school bus driver for six years for Gaston County and a substitute teacher there for fourteen years immediately prior to returning to work for defendant-employer. It was because of stress and a resulting desire to get away from that type of work that plaintiff left teaching and returned to work for defendant-employer.

2. Upon returning to work for defendant-employer plaintiff ran a gapper putting the gap and bottom stop on zippers; but at the time of developing the admittedly compensable occupational disease giving rise hereto she was operating a slider machine, which involved the type of repetitive motion responsible for the same disease and to which position plaintiff can no longer return because of her permanent hand injury; but rather, is only capable of lighter non-repetitive work with limited lifting.

3. Although she was unemployed when the case was initially heard in September of 1994 and had not looked for any work since the Industrial Commission approved defendant-employer's form application to stop payments of benefits in June of 1993 other than returning to the local Board of Education on one occasion in August of that year to determine whether it would be willing to waive the more than two years of full-time college work required before she would be able to return to work again as a substitute teacher; by the time Dr. Ward last saw her on October 20, 1994 plaintiff had obtained a new job at Wendy's, which was assumedly within the limitations of her permanent hand injuries and was the type of suitable available work plaintiff could have obtained had she made a reasonable effort to find it in the some fifteen-month period when she did not look for work.

4. Plaintiff initially experienced problems with her hands in 1989 when she developed admittedly compensable bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome requiring a left carpal tunnel release in February of 1990 and a right carpal tunnel release in June of 1991, which was performed by Dr. Jerry Greenhoot, a Charlotte neurosurgeon. After undergoing the bilateral carpal tunnel releases, plaintiff attempted to return to the same type of repetitive work assembling zippers, but developed the admittedly compensable bilateral Flexor Tenosynovitis that was subject of the prior Industrial Commission Award herein resulting in her again becoming totally disabled by the same condition on August 13, 1991 when she began receiving benefits under that Award and those benefits continued until the Industrial Commission approved a defendant-employer's Form 24 application to stop payment in June of 1993.

5. In August of 1991, because she was not doing well, Dr. Greenhoot referred plaintiff to a hand surgeon, Dr. Alan Ward, for treatment of her bilateral Flexor Tenosynovitis, and he initially attempted a conservative course of treatment involving medication, splinting and injections, but ultimately in November of that year performed a Flexor Tenosynovectomy releasing her left carpal tunnel and Guyons canal as well as a release of the saddle deformity of her left middle and ring fingers.

6. By May 3, 1993, plaintiff had reached maximum medical improvement and/or the end of the healing period from and following the disabling occupational disease giving rise hereto, at which time she retained a 10 percent permanent partial disability of the left hand and a 5 percent permanent partial disability of the right hand and because of her permanent hand injuries was unable to return to her regular job for defendant-employer; but rather, only to lighter non-repetitive type work not requiring her to lift more than ten pounds on a frequent basis with either hand or twenty-five pounds with both.

7. In the interim because of her continuing hand problems Dr. Ward referred plaintiff to a neurologist, Dr. Barry Passini, for evaluation, including nerve conduction studies, and deferred further treatment and consideration of her problems until Dr. Passini's evaluation was completed.

Plaintiff is a diabetic and as indicated by the EMG and nerve conduction testing she underwent was suffering from an underlying diabetic polyneuropathy, which contributed to her symptoms. Although Dr. Passini suggested that she take Pamelor for the same symptoms; plaintiff did not feel her pain was sufficient to warrant doing so, which is inconsistent with the severe level of pain claimed at hearing or the fact that she was able to return to work less than two months later at Wendy's.

8. By the time she was seen by Dr. Ward on May 3, 1993, plaintiff was no longer in need of further surgery or therapeutic intervention for her bilateral Flexor Tenosynovitis and her condition has not substantially changed since.

9. The bilateral thumb problems plaintiff was experiencing when she returned to Dr. Ward sixteen months later in September of 1994 were not the result of her occupational disease; but rather, due to unrelated joint arthritis, which resolved with the thumb splint and anti-inflammatory medication he provided enabling her to obtain a job at Wendy's by the time she returned to Dr. Ward a month later.

10. In January of 1993 because she was not going to be able to return to her regular repetitive work job for defendant-employer and because there was not any suitable alternate non-repetitive work available for her with defendant-employer, defendant-carrier engaged the services of a vocational rehabilitation specialist to assist in ultimately enabling plaintiff to return to work. At the time of her initial evaluation in January of that year, the involved vocational rehabilitation counselor specifically asked plaintiff about her job interest and any type of work she would like to get into; however, plaintiff did not identify any type of work that she wanted to do and in particular did not then indicate a desire to return to work as a substitute teacher; but rather, indicated that she had left teaching because of stress and the resulting desire to get away from that field.

11. Due to the very limited number of jobs available for individuals having limited use of their hands, the involved vocational rehabilitation counselor looked for jobs as a hostess or in sales or in customer service.

In April of that year, the same vocational rehabilitation specialist attempted to find that type of work in earnest and plaintiff did apply for eight to ten jobs located by the vocational rehabilitation counselor. The same vocational rehabilitation counselor was able to find plaintiff available sales jobs at Belk's and Lane Bryant, which were within her physical limitations, were approved by Dr.

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Related

Russell v. Lowes Product Distribution
425 S.E.2d 454 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1993)

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Black v. Talon Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/black-v-talon-inc-ncworkcompcom-1996.