Black v. State

222 S.W.2d 816, 215 Ark. 618, 1949 Ark. LEXIS 798
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
DecidedJune 20, 1949
Docket4562
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 222 S.W.2d 816 (Black v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Black v. State, 222 S.W.2d 816, 215 Ark. 618, 1949 Ark. LEXIS 798 (Ark. 1949).

Opinion

Frank G. Smith, J.

Appellant was put to trial upon an information charging him with the crime of murder in the first degree, alleged to have been committed in the perpetration of the crime of rape upon the person of Betty Jane McCall. He was found guilty of the offense charged and was given a death sentence, from which judgment is this appeal.

Appellant moved to quash the jury panel upon the ground that no female was on the jury. It was shown that although the number of women who were qualified electors eligible for jury service in Pulaski County, where the case was tried, was nearly as large as the number of male persons eligible for jury service, no woman bad been selected for jury service in tbe criminal division of tbe circuit court for a long number of years and none had served as jurors in tbat division of the circuit court. An exception was saved to tbe action of tbe court in overruling tbe motion to quash tbe panel.

Tbe identical question bere raised was presented in tbe case of Bailey v. State, ante, p. 53, 219 S. W. 2d 424, which like the instant case came up from tbe Pulaski Circuit Court, and what was said there is controlling bere. After a review of tbe authorities, which we do not repeat, it was there said:

“We think the inference deducible from the Fay case (332 U. S. 261, 61 S. Ct. 1613, 91 L. Ed. 2043), is tbat where a State does not impose upon women as a class tbe inescapable duty of jury service, a defendant who complains tbat due process was denied, or tbat be was not afforded tbe equal protection contemplated by tbe Fourteenth Amendment, must show something more than continuing failure of jury commissioners to call women for services in a division of tbe Court where tbe innate refinement peculiar to women would be assailed with verbal expressions, gestures, conversations and demonstrations from wbicb most would recoil.”

Miss McCall, an unmarried woman, was killed on the night of the 23rd of September, 1948, at some hour between 1:30 a. m., and 4:00 a. m. The undisputed testimony shows tbat Miss McCall, who was employed as acting director of nursing education at tbe Veterans Hospital at Ft. Roots, near Little Rock, drove her car to a filling station where appellant was employed in tbe city of Little Rock, for battery service, and while tbe service was being rendered an engagement was made for appellant to escort Miss McCall to a night club where they might engage in dancing. They bad never met before. Miss McCall gave appellant her address and telephone number, and on tbe following Wednesday be called her on tbe phone and she agreed to come for him at his place of business in her car. She did so, and upon her arrival appellant took tbe wheel and thereafter did all the driving.

They started to a suburban night club. On the way appellant bought a bottle of whiskey. When arrested he told the officer who arrested him that he had bought a pint of whiskey. At the trial he testified that he bought a bottle containing l/5th of a gallon.

They were accompanied to the night club by appellant’s roommate, a young man named Jimmy Wells, and his companion, a young lady named Miss Mills. Appellant introduced this couple to Miss McCall as they had never met before. The four drove to the night club where appellant secured ice and prepared drinks, but only he and Miss McCall drank. The other couple did not drink. There is some question as to whether Miss McCall drank, but we think the fair implication is that she. did.

After drinking and dancing for a time, Miss McCall broke the strap on one of her shoes, and the party returned to town, leaving Wells and Miss Mills at a service station where Wells was employed. Appellant and Miss McCall drove to Miss McCall’s apartment. Her roommate testified that Miss McCall arrived there about 11:15 and'after changing her shoes she and appellant returned to the night club. The last person testifying in the case who saw deceased alive was the band leader at the night club, who knew appellant and spoke to him and the band leader testified that appellant and deceased left the night club about 1:30 a. m. No other person testifying in the case, except appellant, thereafter saw her alive.

The next person who saw deceased at all was appellant’s roommate, Jimmy Wells, who testified that he was awakened by appellant about 4:00 a. m., who told him that Miss McCall was in the ear and he thought she was dead. Appellant asked Wells if he should drive to a hospital, but when Wells saw that Miss McCall was dead, he told appellant to drive to the police station, which appellant did.

Upon reaching the police station the police saw the dead body of Miss McCall lying with her head in the window of the car. The police arrested appellant and called the Prosecuting Attorney, and the deputy prosecuting attorney came, with a young lady stenographer who reported stenographically all that was said after her arrival. The deputy prosecuting attorney asked appellant if he wished to make a statement, and advised him that anything he said might be used against him. He was not asked if he wanted to see an attorney before making his statement.

The undisputed testimony is that appellant’s statements were made freely and voluntarily and without duress, threats or promises of any kind. The statement was not in the nature of a confession, but was a narrative of what had occurred between appellant and deceased. He admitted that he had sexual intercourse with deceased, but said it was with her assistance, and he denied any intention of killing deceased. Asked if deceased resisted him, he stated that she did for a time, but that he ‘ ‘ got it. ”

The stenographer had transcribed her notés, and the deputy prosecuting attorney had the transcription thereof in his hand while cross-examining appellant. Objection was made and overruled to the use of these notes. Had a confession been shown, it would have been improper to introduce any part thereof without introducing the whole statement; however, the deputy prosecuting attorney in his examination of appellant offered to submit the transcription to appellant’s attorney, which offer was declined. The principal use of the transcription was to ask appellant if he had made certain statements disclosed by the transcription, some of which he admitted, while others were denied. The testimony on the part of the state was to the effect that appellant had made at the police station certain statements which he denied having made while testifying as a witness at the trial. We think this- cross-examination was entirely proper and permissible.

Objection was made to the introduction in evidence of a pair of trousers which appellant admitted were his, on which blood was found. Appellant admitted that when he went to his room to advise with his roommate he had changed his trousers, and that the trousers which he had changed and which were found on his bed were his.

When appellant first drove up to the police station a picture of deceased in the car was taken. The body was then carried to the undertaker where other pictures were made.

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Ingle v. Roy Stone Transfer Corporation
156 S.E.2d 265 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1967)
Decker v. State
353 S.W.2d 168 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1962)
Brown v. State
329 S.W.2d 521 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1959)
Bailey v. State
302 S.W.2d 796 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1957)
Rutledge v. State
262 S.W.2d 650 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1953)
Hays v. State
241 S.W.2d 266 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1951)
Smith v. State
223 S.W.2d 1011 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1949)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
222 S.W.2d 816, 215 Ark. 618, 1949 Ark. LEXIS 798, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/black-v-state-ark-1949.