Black v. Greenman

94 F.R.D. 273
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedApril 15, 1982
DocketNos. 81-708-A1-CIV-WMH, 81-708-A2-CIV-WMH, 81-1539-CIV-WMH, 811172-CIV-WMH to 81-1186-CIV-WMH, 81-1203-CIV-WMH to 81-1205-CIVWMH, 82-127-CIV-WMH, 82-330-CIV-WMH, 81-2743-CIV-WMH, 82-204-CIV-WMH and 82-62-CIV-WMH
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 94 F.R.D. 273 (Black v. Greenman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Black v. Greenman, 94 F.R.D. 273 (S.D. Fla. 1982).

Opinion

AMENDED ORDER

HOEVELER, District Judge.

On April 15, 1982 this Court issued a comprehensive order which certified this cause as a class action under Rule 23(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Pre-Trial Order 1.

In preparing said order for publication, this Court has discovered a number of minor errors which warrant correction. None of these corrections, however, has altered the substance of the Court’s original order. Therefore, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Court’s Pre-Trial Order 1, dated April 15, 1982, shall be amended to read as attached.

PRE-TRIAL ORDER I

On April 1, 1981, the Securities and Exchange Commission filed an enforcement action against Dennis Greenman and Barclay Financial Corp., concerning the operation of the Greenman “Special Arbitrage Program” or “Short Term Trading Program.” Since then, investigations into Mr. Greenman’s activities have spawned two ancillary complaints as well as twenty-four individual investor suits filed in the Southern District of Florida alone. These later actions essentially seek to recover lost investments from Mr. Greenman and several securities firms. Although most of the approximately 600 known investors have either filed actions with this Court or made claims with Barclay’s court-appointed receiver, a number of investors have not been heard from and many may presently be unrepresented.

Noting that all of the investor actions refer to the same fraud scheme and pose similar questions of law and fact, the Court has considered different procedural methods for minimizing duplication of legal efforts and providing prompt adjudication of disputed issues. While the Court recognizes the need to protect both investors’ and defendants’ rights to assert their claims and defenses, the Court also finds great advantage in considering all of these cases together — either by consolidating the actions' under Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or by ordering some form of class action under Rule 23, of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Receiver, agreed to by the parties to the initial action (S. E. C. v. Greenman, et al, 81-708-CIV-WMH), asserted that he had the legal authority to prosecute all actions necessary to make the investors whole and should be permitted to do so. Thus far, the Receiver has recovered and placed in his account in excess of twenty million dollars of an alleged fifty to sixty million in total losses. Attorneys for certain investors objected to the Receiver’s right to proceed with causes of action against third parties, not said to be “holding” investor funds but who may ultimately be liable for the acts of Mr. Greenman.

Consequently, on December 14, 1981, and February 18, 1982, this Court had an opportunity to hear argument from plaintiffs’ and defendants’ counsel on how the Green-man litigation should proceed. In addition, this Court has reviewed the many written proposals submitted by counsel of record. In light of all the information presented, the Court finds that the class action procedures outlined in the “Manual for Complex Litigation” (C. Wright & A. Miller, 1977) and Rule 23 of the Fed.R.Civ.P., provide the most efficient and manageable method for [276]*276adjudicating all actions relating to the “Greenman Short Term Trading Program.”

Certifying a class action involving a general class of plaintiff investors would allow the Greenman litigation to proceed in a . unified manner by allowing the Court to

1. identify and litigate issues of fact and law common to all investors;

2. identify and isolate various investor interests;

3. set the pace and scope of discovery;

4. control attorneys fees;

5. protect the interests of the unrepresented investors; and

6. render a final judgment that will bind all class members — including those presently unrepresented. See Manual for Complex Litigation.

Moreover, class action principles give the Court a high degree of control in structuring ongoing litigation for classes and subclasses can be certified or decertified at anytime — thus allowing the Court to consider each action and each class independently.

When viewed in their totality, all of the Greenman cases satisfy the general class action prerequisites outlined in Rule 23(a). That rule states:

“One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”

Since the Greenman litigation involves approximately 600 potential claimant-investors and there are twenty-six cases presently pending in the Southern District of Florida which present essentially similar claims as well as common questions of law and fact, the Greenman litigation clearly meets the first three requirements. In addition, the fourth prerequisite can be easily satisfied by designating any number of plaintiffs as a class representative.

The Court finds greater difficulty, however, in determining which subdivision of Rule 23(b) provides the strongest basis for class certification. The major difference between subdivisions 1, 2 and 3 is that only subdivision 3 allows members of a designated class to excuse themselves from participating in class litigation. See Van Gemert v. Boeing, 259 F.Supp. 125, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Existing class action law, however, indicates that these subdivisions serve special purposes when applied to securities cases. See 5 H.B. Newberg, Class Actions § 8822 at 875. For example, Courts have generally certified class actions under Rule 23(b)(1) and (2) in securities actions which present a claim for equitable relief, while Courts have usually relied on Rule 23(b)(3) to certify classes in securities actions which present a claim for money damages. See Fox v. Prudent Resources Trust, 69 F.R.D. 74 (E.D.Pa.1975). Although these general class action principles tend to support a plaintiff’s right to assert his own individual claims, courts are sometimes called upon to balance these rights against the practical consequences of allowing parties to opt out of a securities class action.

Class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(3) are generally based on a finding that an action presents questions of law and fact which predominate over questions affecting individual class members. Since many large securities fraud cases involve some type of large investment scheme or misleading statement, most securities fraud class actions are easily certifiable under the general provision of Rule 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(1) and (2), however, were created to address specific instances where allowing class plaintiffs to opt out of class litigation presents special problems. See Parish v. Boetel & Co., 60 F.R.D. 680 (D.Neb.1975); Cook Investment Co. v. Harvey, 20 F.R. Serv. 612 (N.D.Ohio 1975).

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Related

Namoff v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
829 F.2d 1539 (Eleventh Circuit, 1987)
In Re Dennis Greenman Securities Litigation
829 F.2d 1539 (Eleventh Circuit, 1987)
Alexander Grant & Co. v. McAlister
116 F.R.D. 583 (S.D. Ohio, 1987)
In re Grant
110 F.R.D. 528 (S.D. Florida, 1986)
Namoff v. Lynch
622 F. Supp. 1430 (S.D. Florida, 1985)
In Re Dennis Greenman Securities Litigation
622 F. Supp. 1430 (S.D. Florida, 1985)

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Bluebook (online)
94 F.R.D. 273, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/black-v-greenman-flsd-1982.