IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
MARIUS BLACK,1 § § No. 339, 2019 Respondent Below, § Appellant, § § v. § Court Below–Family Court § of the State of Delaware DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES FOR § CHILDREN, YOUTH AND THEIR § File No. 19-02-06TN FAMILIES (DSCYF), § Petition No. 19-04579 § Petitioner Below, § Appellee. § § IN THE INTEREST OF: § Hayden Peters §
Submitted: January 28, 2020 Decided: April 8, 2020
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; TRAYNOR and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Justices.
ORDER
Upon consideration of the appellant’s brief filed under Supreme Court Rule
26.1(c), his attorney’s motion to withdraw, the appellee’s response and motion to
affirm, and the Child’s attorney’s response, it appears to the Court that:
1 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 7(d). (1) The Family Court terminated the parental rights of the appellant,
Marius Black (“the Father”), in his minor daughter (“the Child”) by order dated July
8, 2019. 2 The Father appeals.
(2) In April 2018, the Department of Services for Children, Youth and
Their Families (“DSCYF”) opened a treatment case involving the Child, born in
2017, and the Child’s mother (“the Mother”) after receiving a report that there were
concerns for the safety of the Child because of drug use in the home. DSCYF put a
safety plan in place, providing that the Child was not to have unsupervised contact
with the Mother. In May 2018, DSCYF received an urgent hotline report that the
Mother was under the influence of drugs and had thrown the Child to the ground
repeatedly. DSCYF petitioned the Family Court for an ex parte order for custody of
the Child. In its petition, DSCYF averred that it had been unable to locate the Father
in the course of its open treatment case to assess his appropriateness as a caregiver
for the Child. The court granted custody of the Child to DSCYF on May 4, 2018.
With the filing of DSCYF’s dependency and neglect petition, the mandated hearings
ensued.3
2 The Family Court’s order also terminated the parental rights of the Child’s mother, who is not a party to this appeal. We only recite the facts in the record as they relate to the Father’s appeal. 3 When a child is removed from home by DSCYF and placed in foster care, the Family Court is required to hold hearings at regular intervals under procedures and criteria detailed by statute and the court’s rules. 13 Del. C. § 2514; Del. Fam. Ct. R. 212-219.
2 (3) The Family Court held a preliminary protective hearing on May 9,
2018. The Child had been placed with her maternal grandmother (“the Maternal
Grandmother”). The Father was not present. DSCYF proffered that the Father had
been contacted and was planning to attend a team meeting the following day. The
Father arrived at the conclusion of the hearing and was given notice of the
adjudicatory hearing.
(4) The Family Court held an adjudicatory hearing on June 6, 2018. The
Father arrived twenty minutes late. DSCYF had concerns about the Father because,
although he had regular contact with the Child, he had been unaware of DSCYF’s
open treatment case concerning the Child. DSCYF also had misgivings about the
Father’s history of drug use and his lack of knowledge of the Mother’s substance
abuse history. The Father testified that he was receiving regular substance abuse
treatment and that he resided with his sister or, on occasion, with his mother. The
Father stipulated that the Child was dependent in his care to allow DSCYF the
opportunity to investigate whether his sister’s home was an appropriate placement
and to explore the Father’s ability to provide for the Child’s daycare needs.
Following the hearing, the Family Court appointed counsel to represent the Father.
The Family Court found that DSCYF had made reasonable efforts to prevent the
unnecessary removal of the Child from the home and had exercised due diligence in
3 identifying and notifying the Child’s family members of the dependency and neglect
proceedings.
(5) The Family Court held a dispositional hearing on July 3, 2018. The
Child had been removed from the Maternal Grandmother’s home and placed with a
foster family. The Father was living with his sister, with whom DSCYF had
concerns because she had a lengthy DSCYF history. The Father had lost his cell
phone, which made it difficult for him to receive services and to schedule visits with
the Child. The Father’s case plan was admitted into evidence. The case plan
required that he: (i) undergo a substance abuse evaluation and follow any
recommendations for treatment, (ii) complete parenting classes, and (iii) work with
a family interventionist to obtain suitable housing and stable employment. The
Child was doing well in foster care. The Family Court found that DSCYF was
making reasonable efforts toward reunification.
(6) On September 25, 2018, the Family Court held a review hearing. The
Father was visiting with the Child, working for a temp agency, and had started
parenting classes. But the Father continued to reside with his sister, with whom,
according to DSCYF, it would not be appropriate for the Child to reside. The Father
tested positive for marijuana and PCP when he appeared for his drug and alcohol
evaluation. DSCYF was concerned that he was under the influence at his last visit
4 with the Child. The Child continued to do well in the foster home. The Family
Court found that DSCYF was making reasonable efforts toward reunification.
(7) The Family Court held another review hearing on December 17, 2018,
and the Father failed to appear. Although he was on target to complete parenting
classes at the end of that month, the Father had failed to follow up with substance
abuse treatment, had not been meeting with his family interventionist, had missed a
team meeting, was unemployed, and continued to reside with his sister. A number
of visits with the Child had to be cancelled after the Father failed to confirm them.
The Child continued to do well in the foster home. The Family Court found that
DSCYF had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family.
(8) On February 15, 2019, DSCYF filed a motion to change the goal from
reunification to termination of parental rights for the purpose of adoption. On March
12, 2019, the Family Court held another review hearing. Although the Father had
completed his parenting classes and semi-regularly attended visits with the Child, he
had been discharged from substance abuse treatment due to lack of contact. When
he returned for an intake assessment, he tested positive for marijuana and was
referred to treatment. The family interventionist had scheduled four meetings with
the Father and he did not attend any of them. He remained unemployed and
continued to reside with his sister. The Child continued to thrive in foster care. At
5 the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted DSCYF’s motion to change the goal
and scheduled a termination of parental rights (“TPR”) hearing.
(9) At the June 21, 2019 TPR hearing, the Family Court heard testimony
from the Father, the Mother, the DSCYF treatment and permanency workers, each
parent’s family interventionist, the Mother’s substance abuse counselor, and the
Child’s court-appointed special advocate. The testimony reflected that the Father’s
lack of a cellular phone hindered his ability to make progress on his case plan and
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
MARIUS BLACK,1 § § No. 339, 2019 Respondent Below, § Appellant, § § v. § Court Below–Family Court § of the State of Delaware DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES FOR § CHILDREN, YOUTH AND THEIR § File No. 19-02-06TN FAMILIES (DSCYF), § Petition No. 19-04579 § Petitioner Below, § Appellee. § § IN THE INTEREST OF: § Hayden Peters §
Submitted: January 28, 2020 Decided: April 8, 2020
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; TRAYNOR and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Justices.
ORDER
Upon consideration of the appellant’s brief filed under Supreme Court Rule
26.1(c), his attorney’s motion to withdraw, the appellee’s response and motion to
affirm, and the Child’s attorney’s response, it appears to the Court that:
1 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 7(d). (1) The Family Court terminated the parental rights of the appellant,
Marius Black (“the Father”), in his minor daughter (“the Child”) by order dated July
8, 2019. 2 The Father appeals.
(2) In April 2018, the Department of Services for Children, Youth and
Their Families (“DSCYF”) opened a treatment case involving the Child, born in
2017, and the Child’s mother (“the Mother”) after receiving a report that there were
concerns for the safety of the Child because of drug use in the home. DSCYF put a
safety plan in place, providing that the Child was not to have unsupervised contact
with the Mother. In May 2018, DSCYF received an urgent hotline report that the
Mother was under the influence of drugs and had thrown the Child to the ground
repeatedly. DSCYF petitioned the Family Court for an ex parte order for custody of
the Child. In its petition, DSCYF averred that it had been unable to locate the Father
in the course of its open treatment case to assess his appropriateness as a caregiver
for the Child. The court granted custody of the Child to DSCYF on May 4, 2018.
With the filing of DSCYF’s dependency and neglect petition, the mandated hearings
ensued.3
2 The Family Court’s order also terminated the parental rights of the Child’s mother, who is not a party to this appeal. We only recite the facts in the record as they relate to the Father’s appeal. 3 When a child is removed from home by DSCYF and placed in foster care, the Family Court is required to hold hearings at regular intervals under procedures and criteria detailed by statute and the court’s rules. 13 Del. C. § 2514; Del. Fam. Ct. R. 212-219.
2 (3) The Family Court held a preliminary protective hearing on May 9,
2018. The Child had been placed with her maternal grandmother (“the Maternal
Grandmother”). The Father was not present. DSCYF proffered that the Father had
been contacted and was planning to attend a team meeting the following day. The
Father arrived at the conclusion of the hearing and was given notice of the
adjudicatory hearing.
(4) The Family Court held an adjudicatory hearing on June 6, 2018. The
Father arrived twenty minutes late. DSCYF had concerns about the Father because,
although he had regular contact with the Child, he had been unaware of DSCYF’s
open treatment case concerning the Child. DSCYF also had misgivings about the
Father’s history of drug use and his lack of knowledge of the Mother’s substance
abuse history. The Father testified that he was receiving regular substance abuse
treatment and that he resided with his sister or, on occasion, with his mother. The
Father stipulated that the Child was dependent in his care to allow DSCYF the
opportunity to investigate whether his sister’s home was an appropriate placement
and to explore the Father’s ability to provide for the Child’s daycare needs.
Following the hearing, the Family Court appointed counsel to represent the Father.
The Family Court found that DSCYF had made reasonable efforts to prevent the
unnecessary removal of the Child from the home and had exercised due diligence in
3 identifying and notifying the Child’s family members of the dependency and neglect
proceedings.
(5) The Family Court held a dispositional hearing on July 3, 2018. The
Child had been removed from the Maternal Grandmother’s home and placed with a
foster family. The Father was living with his sister, with whom DSCYF had
concerns because she had a lengthy DSCYF history. The Father had lost his cell
phone, which made it difficult for him to receive services and to schedule visits with
the Child. The Father’s case plan was admitted into evidence. The case plan
required that he: (i) undergo a substance abuse evaluation and follow any
recommendations for treatment, (ii) complete parenting classes, and (iii) work with
a family interventionist to obtain suitable housing and stable employment. The
Child was doing well in foster care. The Family Court found that DSCYF was
making reasonable efforts toward reunification.
(6) On September 25, 2018, the Family Court held a review hearing. The
Father was visiting with the Child, working for a temp agency, and had started
parenting classes. But the Father continued to reside with his sister, with whom,
according to DSCYF, it would not be appropriate for the Child to reside. The Father
tested positive for marijuana and PCP when he appeared for his drug and alcohol
evaluation. DSCYF was concerned that he was under the influence at his last visit
4 with the Child. The Child continued to do well in the foster home. The Family
Court found that DSCYF was making reasonable efforts toward reunification.
(7) The Family Court held another review hearing on December 17, 2018,
and the Father failed to appear. Although he was on target to complete parenting
classes at the end of that month, the Father had failed to follow up with substance
abuse treatment, had not been meeting with his family interventionist, had missed a
team meeting, was unemployed, and continued to reside with his sister. A number
of visits with the Child had to be cancelled after the Father failed to confirm them.
The Child continued to do well in the foster home. The Family Court found that
DSCYF had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family.
(8) On February 15, 2019, DSCYF filed a motion to change the goal from
reunification to termination of parental rights for the purpose of adoption. On March
12, 2019, the Family Court held another review hearing. Although the Father had
completed his parenting classes and semi-regularly attended visits with the Child, he
had been discharged from substance abuse treatment due to lack of contact. When
he returned for an intake assessment, he tested positive for marijuana and was
referred to treatment. The family interventionist had scheduled four meetings with
the Father and he did not attend any of them. He remained unemployed and
continued to reside with his sister. The Child continued to thrive in foster care. At
5 the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted DSCYF’s motion to change the goal
and scheduled a termination of parental rights (“TPR”) hearing.
(9) At the June 21, 2019 TPR hearing, the Family Court heard testimony
from the Father, the Mother, the DSCYF treatment and permanency workers, each
parent’s family interventionist, the Mother’s substance abuse counselor, and the
Child’s court-appointed special advocate. The testimony reflected that the Father’s
lack of a cellular phone hindered his ability to make progress on his case plan and
complicated scheduling visits with the Child. Although the Father was appropriate
during visits and the Child was bonded to him, the Father’s attendance at visits had
been inconsistent. The Father had attended twenty-nine of a possible forty-two visits
with the Child. Of the visits he missed, he failed to confirm eleven of the visits and
was a no-show for two visits. In April 2019, it appeared that the Father was under
the influence of drugs at one visit—he appeared dazed and spent a portion of the
visit coloring by himself.
(10) The Father testified that he continued to live with his sister and that he
considered her home to be an appropriate living environment for the Child. DSCYF
maintained, however, that the sister’s criminal background and history with DSCYF
weighed against placement of the Child in her home. The Father admitted that he
was still using marijuana but stated that he was now seeking help for his substance
abuse problem. The Father claimed he was working under the table for an unnamed
6 employer and earning approximately $150.00 per week. The Family Court also
heard testimony regarding DSCYF’s unsuccessful efforts to find another relative
placement for the Child.
(11) Following the hearing, the Family Court issued a written decision,
finding that the Father had failed to plan adequately for the Child’s physical and
emotional needs.4 The Family Court also found that the Child had entered DSCYF’s
care and had been in care for more than one year,5 the Father was not able or willing
to assume promptly legal and physical custody of the Child and to pay for the Child’s
support,6 and failure to terminate the Father’s rights over the Child would result in
continued emotional instability or physical risk to her because of the Father’s on-
going inability to provide consistently for her care.7 The Family Court next found
that DSCYF had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family. Finally, the Family
Court considered the best interests factors under 13 Del. C. § 722 and found that
termination of parental rights was in the Child’s best interests.8
(12) On appeal, the Father’s counsel filed an opening brief and a motion to
withdraw under Supreme Court Rule 26.1(c). The Father’s counsel asserts that she
has reviewed the record and has determined that no arguable claim for appeal exists.
4 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5). 5 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5)a.1. 6 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5)a.4. 7 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5)a.5. 8 13 Del. C. § 1103(a).
7 The Father’s counsel informed the Father of the provisions of Rule 26.1(c), and
provided her with a draft of the 26.1(c) brief and a copy of her motion to withdraw.
The Father provided one point for the Court’s consideration, which counsel
incorporated in her Rule 26.1(c) brief. The Father asks this Court to consider the
following point: he is able to provide for the Child and get the Child the things she
needs. DSCYF and the Child’s Attorney have responded to the Rule 26.1(c) brief
and have moved to affirm the Family Court’s judgment.
(13) On appeal, this Court is required to consider the facts and the law as
well as the inferences and deductions made by the Family Court. 9 We review legal
rulings de novo.10 We conduct a limited review of the factual findings of the trial
court to assure that they are sufficiently supported by the record and are not clearly
erroneous.11 If the trial judge has correctly applied the law, then our standard of
review is abuse of discretion. 12 On issues of witness credibility, we will not
substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact.13
(14) The statutory framework under which the Family Court may terminate
parental rights requires two separate inquiries.14 First, the court must determine
9 Wilson v. Division of Family Servs., 988 A.2d 435, 439-40 (Del. 2010). 10 Id. at 440. 11 Id. 12 Id. 13 Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979). 14 Shepherd v. Clemens, 752 A.2d 533, 536-37 (Del. 2000).
8 whether the evidence presented meets one of the statutory grounds for termination.15
If the Family Court finds a statutory basis for termination of parental rights, the court
must determine whether, under 13 Del. C. § 722, severing parental rights is in the
best interests of the child.16 Both of these requirements must be established by clear
and convincing evidence.17
(15) After careful consideration of the parties’ respective positions on
appeal and a thorough review of the record, the Court has determined that this appeal
should be affirmed on the basis of the Family Court’s thorough and well-reasoned
July 8, 2019 decision. We find no error in the Family Court’s application of the law
to the facts. The Family Court found that the evidence was clear and convincing
that the Father had failed to plan adequately for the Child’s needs, that the Child had
been in DSCYF custody in excess of one year, that the Father was unable to assume
prompt legal and physical custody of the Child and to pay for the Child’s support,
that failure to terminate the Father’s rights would result in the Child’s continued
emotional instability or physical risk, and that termination of the Father’s rights was
in the best interests of the Child. Those conclusions are well-supported by the
record. To the extent that the Father argues that he is now capable of caring for the
15 Id. at 537. See also 13 Del. C. § 1103(a) (enumerating the grounds for termination of parental rights). 16 Shepherd, 752 A.2d at 537. 17 Powell v. DSCYF, 963 A.2d 724, 731-32 (Del. 2008).
9 Child, an appeal is heard on the evidence submitted to the trial court, and we cannot
consider any new claim of financial stability.18
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family
Court is AFFIRMED. Counsel’s motion to withdraw is moot.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Gary F. Traynor Justice
18 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8 (“Only questions fairly presented to the trial court may be presented for review; provided, however, that when the interests of justice so require, the Court may consider and determine any question not so presented.”); Delaware Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Duphily, 703 A.2d 1202, 1206 (Del. 1997) (“It is a basic tenet of appellate practice that an appellate court reviews only matters considered in the first instance by a trial court. Parties are not free to advance arguments for the first time on appeal.”).