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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 CAROL B., 8 Plaintiff, CASE NO. C19-858-BAT 9 v. ORDER REVERSING AND 10 REMANDING FOR FURTHER COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 11 Defendant. 12
13 Plaintiff Carol B. seeks review of the denial of her application for Disability Insurance 14 Benefits. She contends the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinion of her treating physician and her 15 subjective complaints and thereby erred in assessing her residual functional capacity. Dkt. 10. 16 The Court REVERSES the Commissioner’s final decision and REMANDS the matter for 17 further administrative proceedings under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 18 DISCUSSION 19 A. Dr. Kanjo’s opinion 20 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by rejecting the opinions of treating physician Zayan 21 Kanjo, M.D. Dkt. 10 at 3. In general, the ALJ must give specific and legitimate reasons for 22 rejecting a treating doctor’s opinion that is contradicted by another doctor, and clear and 23 1 convincing reasons for rejecting a treating doctor’s uncontradicted opinion. Lester v. Chater, 81 2 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996). 3 Dr. Kanjo completed a functional assessment in April 2012 in which he opined that 4 plaintiff could lift a maximum of 20 pounds and frequently lift 10 pounds. Tr. 547. He wrote in
5 April 2013 that plaintiff had severe arthritis and had applied for disability; it was his judgment 6 that she could not return to work. Tr. 559. In a March 2012 treatment note, he opined that she 7 could not return to her past work as a meat cutter, stating: “It is my judgment that she is 8 incapacitated for her duties as a meat-cutter in a cold environment.” Tr. 615. The ALJ gave these 9 opinions significant weight to the extent they supported the ALJ’s residual functional capacity 10 finding but stated that issues of disability are reserved to the Commissioner and the vocational 11 expert was able to identify jobs that plaintiff could perform at a restricted level of light work. Tr. 12 28. 13 Dr. Kanjo also completed a medical source statement in October 2013 in which he opined 14 that plaintiff could sit and stand or walk for less than 2 hours in an 8-hour workday, she could
15 occasionally lift 10 pounds, and she could occasionally reach, frequently handle, and rarely 16 finger; he opined she was “unable to work secondary to rheumatoid arthritis.”1 Tr. 681. The ALJ 17 gave this opinion little weight, finding that the physical examinations did not support the 18 assessment of standing and walking restrictions, particularly the findings where she 19 demonstrated an intact gait with normal motor strength and the more recent records that show 20 full weightbearing with no assistive device and no significant limp. Tr. 28. The ALJ also found 21 that Dr. Kanjo’s own treatment record noted that plaintiff had normal movement in all her 22
23 1 Rheumatoid arthritis is not one of plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments; she has the medically determinable severe impairment of generalized osteoarthritis. Tr. 23. 1 extremities, which the ALJ found to be inconsistent with such a restrictive residual functional 2 capacity. Id. 3 Plaintiff argues that the findings the ALJ cited to in rejecting Dr. Kanjo’s opinion that she 4 could perform less than sedentary work were measures of plaintiff’s performance on one-time
5 maneuvers in a clinical setting and gave no picture of her ability to sit, stand, or walk for 6 prolonged periods of time. Dkt. 10 at 5. She asserts that Dr. Kanjo based his opinion on his 7 observations of plaintiff over several years, her subjective reporting to him, and his 8 understanding of the disease process and the likelihood of any significant improvement. Id. 9 An ALJ may give less weight to an opinion that is inconsistent with other evidence in the 10 record. Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004). The ALJ 11 cited to records that included Dr. Kanjo’s treatment note from June 2013, where he noted 12 plaintiff’s musculoskeletal system had overall normal findings and she had normal gait and 13 stance, and his November 2015 treatment note, where he documented normal movement of all 14 extremities. Tr. 656. The ALJ could rationally conclude that Dr. Kanjo’s opinion was
15 inconsistent with these findings. And although plaintiff proposes reasons the ALJ could have 16 given weight to Dr. Kanjo’s opinion, the Court cannot accept her proposed interpretation over 17 the ALJ’s. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). The ALJ was not required to 18 discount the clinical findings because they were “one-time maneuvers” or to accept Dr. Kanjo’s 19 opinion for the reasons plaintiff proposes. 20 Plaintiff also notes that she had spinal fusion surgery three months after Dr. Kanjo gave 21 this opinion and argues that the ALJ erred by failing to consider the evidence in light of this 22 surgery. Dkt. 10 at 5. However, plaintiff does not cite to any records documenting functional 23 1 limitations from that surgery, and the Court finds no error in the ALJ’s failure to speculate on the 2 impact of the upcoming surgery on Dr. Kanjo’s opinion. 3 Finally, plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to explain why he rejected Dr. Kanjo’s 4 opinions on plaintiff’s reaching, handling, and fingering limitations. Dkt. 10 at 5. However, the
5 ALJ gave valid reasons for giving little weight to the opinion; he was thus not required to explain 6 the reasons for the weight he gave to each specific component. And the ALJ included some 7 limitations in these areas: occasional overhead reaching with the left arm, frequent bilateral 8 overhead reaching with the right arm, and frequent bilateral fingering. Tr. 25. The ALJ gave 9 specific and legitimate reasons, supported by substantial evidence, to discount Dr. Kanjo’s 10 October 2013 opinion, and included the limitations the ALJ found to be supported by substantial 11 evidence in the record. The Court finds no error in the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Kanjo’s opinion. 12 B. Plaintiff’s allegations 13 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in evaluating her subjective allegations about her 14 osteoarthritis and her back impairment. Dkt. 10 at 6. Specifically, plaintiff argues that the ALJ
15 failed to discuss her allegations about the impact of her osteoarthritis on her ability to use her 16 hands and failed to give valid reasons for rejecting her allegations about the impact of her back 17 impairment. Dkt. 10 at 8-9. 18 Where, as here, the ALJ did not find that plaintiff was malingering, the ALJ must provide 19 clear and convincing reasons to reject her testimony. See Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 20 1049 (9th Cir. 2001). An ALJ does this by making specific findings supported by substantial 21 evidence. “General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what testimony is not 22 credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 834. 23 Although the ALJ can consider whether the objective medical evidence supports the claimant’s 1 subjective allegations, a lack of such support cannot be the sole reason for discounting subjective 2 complaints. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005).
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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 CAROL B., 8 Plaintiff, CASE NO. C19-858-BAT 9 v. ORDER REVERSING AND 10 REMANDING FOR FURTHER COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 11 Defendant. 12
13 Plaintiff Carol B. seeks review of the denial of her application for Disability Insurance 14 Benefits. She contends the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinion of her treating physician and her 15 subjective complaints and thereby erred in assessing her residual functional capacity. Dkt. 10. 16 The Court REVERSES the Commissioner’s final decision and REMANDS the matter for 17 further administrative proceedings under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 18 DISCUSSION 19 A. Dr. Kanjo’s opinion 20 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by rejecting the opinions of treating physician Zayan 21 Kanjo, M.D. Dkt. 10 at 3. In general, the ALJ must give specific and legitimate reasons for 22 rejecting a treating doctor’s opinion that is contradicted by another doctor, and clear and 23 1 convincing reasons for rejecting a treating doctor’s uncontradicted opinion. Lester v. Chater, 81 2 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996). 3 Dr. Kanjo completed a functional assessment in April 2012 in which he opined that 4 plaintiff could lift a maximum of 20 pounds and frequently lift 10 pounds. Tr. 547. He wrote in
5 April 2013 that plaintiff had severe arthritis and had applied for disability; it was his judgment 6 that she could not return to work. Tr. 559. In a March 2012 treatment note, he opined that she 7 could not return to her past work as a meat cutter, stating: “It is my judgment that she is 8 incapacitated for her duties as a meat-cutter in a cold environment.” Tr. 615. The ALJ gave these 9 opinions significant weight to the extent they supported the ALJ’s residual functional capacity 10 finding but stated that issues of disability are reserved to the Commissioner and the vocational 11 expert was able to identify jobs that plaintiff could perform at a restricted level of light work. Tr. 12 28. 13 Dr. Kanjo also completed a medical source statement in October 2013 in which he opined 14 that plaintiff could sit and stand or walk for less than 2 hours in an 8-hour workday, she could
15 occasionally lift 10 pounds, and she could occasionally reach, frequently handle, and rarely 16 finger; he opined she was “unable to work secondary to rheumatoid arthritis.”1 Tr. 681. The ALJ 17 gave this opinion little weight, finding that the physical examinations did not support the 18 assessment of standing and walking restrictions, particularly the findings where she 19 demonstrated an intact gait with normal motor strength and the more recent records that show 20 full weightbearing with no assistive device and no significant limp. Tr. 28. The ALJ also found 21 that Dr. Kanjo’s own treatment record noted that plaintiff had normal movement in all her 22
23 1 Rheumatoid arthritis is not one of plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments; she has the medically determinable severe impairment of generalized osteoarthritis. Tr. 23. 1 extremities, which the ALJ found to be inconsistent with such a restrictive residual functional 2 capacity. Id. 3 Plaintiff argues that the findings the ALJ cited to in rejecting Dr. Kanjo’s opinion that she 4 could perform less than sedentary work were measures of plaintiff’s performance on one-time
5 maneuvers in a clinical setting and gave no picture of her ability to sit, stand, or walk for 6 prolonged periods of time. Dkt. 10 at 5. She asserts that Dr. Kanjo based his opinion on his 7 observations of plaintiff over several years, her subjective reporting to him, and his 8 understanding of the disease process and the likelihood of any significant improvement. Id. 9 An ALJ may give less weight to an opinion that is inconsistent with other evidence in the 10 record. Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004). The ALJ 11 cited to records that included Dr. Kanjo’s treatment note from June 2013, where he noted 12 plaintiff’s musculoskeletal system had overall normal findings and she had normal gait and 13 stance, and his November 2015 treatment note, where he documented normal movement of all 14 extremities. Tr. 656. The ALJ could rationally conclude that Dr. Kanjo’s opinion was
15 inconsistent with these findings. And although plaintiff proposes reasons the ALJ could have 16 given weight to Dr. Kanjo’s opinion, the Court cannot accept her proposed interpretation over 17 the ALJ’s. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). The ALJ was not required to 18 discount the clinical findings because they were “one-time maneuvers” or to accept Dr. Kanjo’s 19 opinion for the reasons plaintiff proposes. 20 Plaintiff also notes that she had spinal fusion surgery three months after Dr. Kanjo gave 21 this opinion and argues that the ALJ erred by failing to consider the evidence in light of this 22 surgery. Dkt. 10 at 5. However, plaintiff does not cite to any records documenting functional 23 1 limitations from that surgery, and the Court finds no error in the ALJ’s failure to speculate on the 2 impact of the upcoming surgery on Dr. Kanjo’s opinion. 3 Finally, plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to explain why he rejected Dr. Kanjo’s 4 opinions on plaintiff’s reaching, handling, and fingering limitations. Dkt. 10 at 5. However, the
5 ALJ gave valid reasons for giving little weight to the opinion; he was thus not required to explain 6 the reasons for the weight he gave to each specific component. And the ALJ included some 7 limitations in these areas: occasional overhead reaching with the left arm, frequent bilateral 8 overhead reaching with the right arm, and frequent bilateral fingering. Tr. 25. The ALJ gave 9 specific and legitimate reasons, supported by substantial evidence, to discount Dr. Kanjo’s 10 October 2013 opinion, and included the limitations the ALJ found to be supported by substantial 11 evidence in the record. The Court finds no error in the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Kanjo’s opinion. 12 B. Plaintiff’s allegations 13 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in evaluating her subjective allegations about her 14 osteoarthritis and her back impairment. Dkt. 10 at 6. Specifically, plaintiff argues that the ALJ
15 failed to discuss her allegations about the impact of her osteoarthritis on her ability to use her 16 hands and failed to give valid reasons for rejecting her allegations about the impact of her back 17 impairment. Dkt. 10 at 8-9. 18 Where, as here, the ALJ did not find that plaintiff was malingering, the ALJ must provide 19 clear and convincing reasons to reject her testimony. See Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 20 1049 (9th Cir. 2001). An ALJ does this by making specific findings supported by substantial 21 evidence. “General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what testimony is not 22 credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 834. 23 Although the ALJ can consider whether the objective medical evidence supports the claimant’s 1 subjective allegations, a lack of such support cannot be the sole reason for discounting subjective 2 complaints. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005). 3 The ALJ found that the objective medical evidence did not support limitations greater 4 than in the residual functional capacity finding. Tr. 26. The ALJ discussed imaging results,
5 examination findings, surgical procedures, and other treatment records, finding that “the 6 longitudinal medical evidence suggests that the residual functional capacity adequately accounts 7 for the claimant’s limitations due to her impairments.” Tr. 26-27. The ALJ further found that 8 plaintiff’s “subjective reported history cannot substitute for the objective medical evidence 9 contained in the record, which provides a more accurate longitudinal history of the claimant’s 10 conditions.” Tr. 27-28. The ALJ did not give any other reasons for discounting plaintiff’s 11 subjective allegations. Without any other reason given, the ALJ’s assessment of the objective 12 medical evidence is insufficient to reject plaintiff’s testimony. Accordingly, this case must be 13 remanded for reevaluation of plaintiff’s subjective allegations. 14 As noted above, plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to address her allegations about the
15 impact of her osteoarthritis on her ability to use her hands, arguing that the ALJ cited to only one 16 irrelevant treatment note in addressing her hand limitations. Dkt. 10 at 8. Plaintiff also argues 17 that the ALJ cherry-picked from the evidence related to her back impairment, citing to only 18 evidence with mild findings while ignoring evidence with more significant findings. Dkt. 10 at 19 13. Plaintiff takes issue with the way the ALJ interpreted the evidence. But the Court cannot 20 direct the ALJ on remand to interpret the evidence in the manner plaintiff proposes, or in any 21 particular manner. Rather, the Court directs the ALJ to conduct a thorough assessment of the 22 objective evidence as part to the reevaluation of plaintiff’s subjective allegations. The ALJ must 23 provide clear and convincing reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for any decision to 1 discount plaintiff’s subjective allegations, and may not rely solely on the objective medical 2 evidence for any such decision. 3 CONCLUSION 4 For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s decision is REVERSED and this case is
5 REMANDED for further administrative proceedings under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 6 On remand, the ALJ shall reevaluate plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, including a 7 reassessment of plaintiff’s subjective allegations and redo the remainder of the five-step 8 disability evaluation process. The ALJ shall further develop the record as the ALJ deems 9 necessary and appropriate to make a new decision in this case. 10 DATED this 13th day of January, 2020. 11 A 12 BRIAN A. TSUCHIDA Chief United States Magistrate Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23