Black v. Campbell

112 Ind. 122
CourtIndiana Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 15, 1887
DocketNo. 13,674
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 112 Ind. 122 (Black v. Campbell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Black v. Campbell, 112 Ind. 122 (Ind. 1887).

Opinion

Niblack, J.

This was an application to the board of •commissioners of the county of Carroll for the location and construction of a free gravel road in that county, under the provisions of the act of March 3d, 1877, R. S. 1881, section 5091, et seq. The petition was signed by Samuel W. Black and a large number of other resident freeholders of the county, claiming to be a majority of land-owners interested [123]*123in, and to represent a majority of the acres of land which would be benefited by, the proposed improvement.

The application was made at the June term, 1884, at which viewers and an engineer were appointed and ordered to meet and proceed to the discharge of their duties on the 6th day of the ensuing month of October. At the next regular session in September, 1884, no order of continuance, or other order of any kind in the cause, was made; but at a special session held in that month, it was ordered that the time for the meeting of the viewers and engineer should be postponed until the 6th day of the succeeding November. On that day the viewers and engineer met, and, after qualifying, proceeded to make an examination of the proposed line of road. On the 9th day of the following December they made a report favorable to the prayer of the petitioners. Erancis Thomson and others thereupon remonstrated against the construction of the road, and the matter was continued until the March term, 1885, during which the report was ■confirmed and the necessary order made to carry its recommendations into effect.

After the report of the viewers and engineer was filed, but before it was acted on by the board of commissioners, Albert 'Campbell and about twenty others, who had signed the petition, filed a written motion asking to have their names struck off and withdrawn from the petition for the alleged reason that the petition had been changed in a material respect after they had signed it, offering at the same time to pay their proportion of the costs which had already accrued, but their motion was overruled, and their names were taken into account by the board in estimating the number of persons who had signed the petition. Emma Campbell and perhaps nine or ten others, who had signed the petition, in like manner and for a similar reason asked to have their names struck off and withdrawn from the petition, but their motion was also •overruled, and their names were likewise counted at the hearing of the report as persons who had signed the petition. [124]*124The remonstrants, including Thomson, appealed to the circuit court, where they moved to dismiss the petition upon the ground that, by reason of the failure of the board of' commissioners to make any order in the cause at its September term, 1884, as stated, the jurisdiction of that tribunal over the subject-matter of the proceeding had lapsed, and that hence the circuit court had no jurisdiction to hear and determine the controversy sought to be continued by the appeal. That motion was sustained, and the judgment of dismissal which ensued was i’eversed by this court. See Black v. Thomson, 107 Ind. 162.

After the cause was remanded to the circuit court, Albert. Campbell and those who had joined with him, and Emma Campbell and those who had united with her, respectively renewed their motions for leave to have their names struck off and withdrawn from the petition, and, as preliminary to the decision of those motions, it was. agreed that if the motions should be sustained the remaining names would not constitute a majority of the resident land-owners of the county whose lands were to be benefited and assessed, and would not be the owners of a majority of the whole number of acres of land to be so benefited and assessed; but if the motions should be overruled, and the names of the dissatisfied persons should be counted, there would be found to be the requisite' majority of names to the petition, and hence enough to authorize the court to order the construction of the contemplated road in accordance with the provisions of section 5095, R. S. 1881.

Upon this agreed statement of facts, and upon a full consideration of the matters before it, the circuit court sustained the motions and permitted the names indicated to be struck off and withdrawn from the petition, and refused to order the construction of the road, as prayed for by the remaining petitioners.

A reversal of these proceedings is sought upon the claim that, under the circumstances, the circuit court had no power [125]*125to allow a part of the petitioners to withdraw their names, as it assumed to do, and that if it had the power its exercise, in the manner and at the time stated, was against right and justice, and consequently erroneous.

The petition of five land-holders whose lands will be assessed is sufficient to confer upon the board of commissioners .jurisdiction over the preliminary proceedings looking to the establishment and construction of a free gravel or turnpike road. R. S. 1881, section 5092.

The petition of that number of interested land-holders authorizes the appointment of viewers and a surveyor or engineer, an examination and survey of the proposed line of road, and a report upon the expediency and public utility of the enterprise. R. S. 1881, sections 5093, 5094.

It is not until after the viewers and surveyor or engineer have reported that the crucial and jurisdictional test arises as to whether the requisite majority have signed a petition praying that the improvement in question may be made.

Section 5095 confers upon the board authority, after the report has been submitted, to order the improvement to be made if, in its opinion, the work will be of public utility, but provides that “suchorder shall not be made until a majority of the resident land-holders of the county, whose lands are reported as benefited and ought to be assessed, and, also, the owners of a majority of the whole number of acres of all lands that are reported as benefited and ought to be assessed, shall have subscribed the petition mentioned ” in section 5092, above cited.

We construe this provision, when taken in connection with the context, to mean that the question as to whether the prescribed majority of land-holders have signed the petition for the improvement remains an open question until the board proceeds to consider and to act upon the report which has been submitted to it, and that until that time the names of persons may be added to the petition at their pleasure, and the names of persons who have signed it may be withdrawn [126]*126by leave of the board, which ought not to be refused on reasonable terms, except for good cause shown, in the nature of an estoppel. Hord v. Elliott, 33 Ind. 220.

It is not authoritatively known what lands will be benefited and ought to be assessed until the report of the viewers and surveyor or engineer has been submitted, and hence it can not be with certainty determined who are, and who are not,, competent petitioners until after the report has been made hence the petition ought to remain open to amendment and to readjustment until the time arrives for an ultimate decision upon its sufficiency to authorize the confirmation of the report.

In a case like this, the withdrawal of a part of the names attached to a petition, after it has been filed, is simply a dismissal of the proceeding as to them, and, therefore, such withdrawal must be made before a decision is announced upon the merits of the petition. R. S. 1881, section 333.

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Bluebook (online)
112 Ind. 122, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/black-v-campbell-ind-1887.