Black Sea & Baltic General Insurance v. SS Hellenic Destiny

500 F. Supp. 677, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17191
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedOctober 28, 1980
Docket73 Civ. 4341
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 500 F. Supp. 677 (Black Sea & Baltic General Insurance v. SS Hellenic Destiny) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Black Sea & Baltic General Insurance v. SS Hellenic Destiny, 500 F. Supp. 677, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17191 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).

Opinion

LASKER, District Judge.

Plaintiffs are underwriters of various cargo shipments that were allegedly short-landed, damaged on delivery, or both. The cargo was delivered by defendants (collectively the “carrier”) to Saudi Arabian ports. Plaintiffs move for partial summary judgment that the Certificates of Imported Goods (the “Certificates,” Exhibits 3 through 10, Appendix to Donegan deposition) issued by Saudi Arabian Customs officials, together with the ships’ Bills of Lading, establish the carrier’s prima facie liability for the missing and damaged goods noted by the Certificates. 1

*678 The rights of the parties are governed by the Harter Act, 46 U.S.C. § 190, which provides that the carrier’s liability does not end until “proper delivery” of the cargo has been made. 2 A prima facie case of liability for damaged or missing cargo is made by showing that the carrier issued a clean bill of lading and that the cargo was damaged or missing upon proper delivery. Cf. Demsey and Associates v. S/S Sea Star, 461 F.2d 1009, 1014 (2d Cir. 1972) (decided under Carriage of Goods by Sea Act). 3

There is no dispute here that clean bills of lading were issued for all the cargo in question. The critical issue is whether the Certificates which note damage and shortage reflect the condition of the goods at the time of “proper delivery.” While the term “proper delivery” is not statutorily defined, the parties do not dispute that under the Harter Act it is to be determined according to “port customs and regulations.” David Crystal, Inc. v. Cunard Steam-Ship Company, 223 F.Supp. 273, 282 (D.C.N.Y.), aff’d, 339 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 976, 85 S.Ct. 1339, 14 L.Ed.2d 271 (1965); Tan Hi v. United States, 94 F.Supp. 432, 433 (N.D.Cal.1950). Thus, this case turns on the interpretation to be given to Saudi Arabian Customs regulations 4 as to when, within the meaning of the Harter Act, “proper delivery” occurred at the Saudi Arabian ports.

The parties agree that Article 124 of the “Customs Regulations and Rules for Implementation” of Saudi Arabia (Exhibit 1. Appendix to Donegan deposition) sets out the relevant law. It provides that:

“Actual receipt of the goods by Customs takes place only when the goods arrive at the gates of [Customs] warehouses or at the places assigned for storage, and when a careful inspection of the external condition of the package has been made. Consequently, goods that have been unloaded remain under the control and responsibility of the shipping companies until they are actually received by the Customs warehouseman.”

Thus, “proper delivery” occurs only when “a careful inspection” is made. The parties *679 disagree as to when this inspection occurs and whether the Certificates reflect this inspection. The carrier, argues that the “careful inspection” which would constitute “proper delivery” takes place as the first act in the handling of the goods after the landing at the dock. It maintains that the Certificates which the plaintiffs have presented in this case do not reflect this inspection. The plaintiffs contend that the inspection made at the time referred to by the carrier is preliminary only and that proper delivery does not occur until a later inspection which is more thorough and which is reflected in the Certificates when issued.

Plaintiffs rely on the deposition testimony of Anthony Donegan, who became familiar with the Customs regulations and their practical application as a Lloyd’s Agent in the relevant Saudi Arabian ports from 1965-1970. 5 In summary, Donegan testified that the inspection under Article 124 does not take place until the customs clearance procedures begin. Upon physical delivery only a quick examination is conducted to segregate damaged packages, not the “careful inspection” contemplated by Article 124. Furthermore, he testified that the Certificates reflect the “careful inspection” conducted in accordance with the clearance procedures.

The carrier relies on the affidavit of J. Edward Richardson, who has become familiar with the Customs regulations as a ship’s agent employee and Line Representative in Saudi Arabia since 1973. 6 Richardson indicated that two inspections of the goods occur at the relevant Saudi Arabian ports. The first inspection is conducted soon after the cargo is physically delivered; at that time damaged cargo is segregated. This is the “inspection of the external condition of the packages” which ends carrier liability under Article 124, the carrier argues. A period of time follows that inspection before the clearance procedures begin during which the owner is liable according to Article 131, which provides that “while they [the goods] are in Customs, whether in the warehouse or the yards, the goods remain there on the responsibility of the owner.” At clearance, a more rigorous inspection is conducted and, according to Richardson, this later inspection is the inspection reflected in the Certificate.

The expert evidence submitted by the parties is inconclusive; not only do Donegan and Richardson disagree on the major points in issue, but they rely in large part on hearsay information in reaching their conclusions. If it were necessary to depend solely on this evidence, the issue could not be disposed of on a motion for summary judgment. However, in addition to the deposition of Donegan and the affidavit of Richardson, the record contains the Saudi Arabian Customs regulations themselves and the Certificates issued by Saudi Arabian Customs officials. Careful scrutiny of this evidence is convincing that the Certificates reflect the condition of the cargo at the time of the careful inspection referred to in Article 124, as plaintiffs contend.

We begin with the fact that, under Article 124, proper delivery by the carrier to Customs cannot occur until a “careful inspection of the external condition” of the cargo has been made. Article 131, however, contemplates a period while the goods are “in Customs” and the owner is liable. The carrier argues with some force that, under Donegan’s view of the procedures, the goods would never be “in Customs” because they would be properly delivered to Customs (by virtue of the careful inspection done during clearance) at the very same time as they were being cleared out of Customs. Be that as it may, the view *680 presented by the carrier is itself not compatible with the regulations as we read them; under its scenario, the “careful inspection” of Article 124 would consist merely of a segregation of damaged goods with no inventory of the quantity of packages.

Defendants rely on Article 127 to show that, upon physical delivery to the warehouse, some inspection is made.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
500 F. Supp. 677, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17191, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/black-sea-baltic-general-insurance-v-ss-hellenic-destiny-nysd-1980.