Bjornson v. Alaska S. S. Co.

193 F.2d 433, 1951 U.S. App. LEXIS 2912, 1952 A.M.C. 477
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedDecember 17, 1951
Docket13019_1
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 193 F.2d 433 (Bjornson v. Alaska S. S. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bjornson v. Alaska S. S. Co., 193 F.2d 433, 1951 U.S. App. LEXIS 2912, 1952 A.M.C. 477 (9th Cir. 1951).

Opinion

DRIVER, District Judge.

Appellant, who is a seaman, recovered judgment against his employer for personal injuries sustained in the performance of his duties on shipboard. The action was tried toi the court without a jury. The court found appellant’s damages for loss of wages and pain and suffering to be $1500 but reduced the amount awarded to $750 on account of contributory negligence of appellant. The sole question presented by the appeal is whether the court erred in finding that appellant suffered no permanent disability.

The civil rules direct that “Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.” Fed. Rules 'Civ.Proc. rule 52(a), 28 U.S.C.A. By the quoted provision the civil rules adopted the then prevailing equity practice. The provision as construed 'by the courts, does not mean that even when supported by substantial evidence and based upon oral testimony the findings of the trial court shall be conclusive. And it does not mean that the reviewing court shall determine from the record where the weight of the evidence lies. 'It is not clearly erroneous for the trial court to choose between two permissible but conflicting views as to the weight of the evidence. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338, 342, 70 S.Ct. 177, 94 L.Ed. 150. A finding supported by substantial evidence may be said to be “clearly erroneous” if the reviewing court, after consideration of all of the pertinent evidence, has a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. United States *434 Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746. 1

In the present case then we must examine all of the evidence bearing on the point in order to determine whether or not we can say with firmness and assurance that the trial court erred in finding that appellant suffered no permanent disability.

Appellant was injured on January 14, 1949, when a ladder which he was using slipped and 'he fell fifteen feet to the deck of the ship. He put out his right hand to break the fall and his injury (except a bruise on his right hip from which he fully recovered) was in the area of the right wrist joint. Appellant’s ship was then on a voyage to Japan and upon its arrival there his wrist was placed in a cast by an army physician. The cast was removed and a metal splint substituted therefor at the United States Marine Hospital in Seattle where appellant was admitted to the outpatient department on February 21, 1949. After receiving outpatient physiotherapy treatment appellant was discharged as “improved, fit for duty” on April 20, 1949. The hospital record shows “Diagnosis Fracture, distal end of right radius” with “Prognosis Good”.

At the trial, which commenced on February 27, 1951, appellant testified that his wrist was still stiff and pained him shainply when he bent it back in doing his work. As to the “grip” of his right hand, he did not “trust it as much” as before the accident. On cross examination he said that he had gone to sea again upon his discharge from the Marine Hospital and had worked steadily as a seaman with the exception of the summer of 1950 when 'he was “on the beach” because his ship was laid up. He had earned large amounts of extra wages — sometimes two or three times the amount of his base pay — for overtime and cargo or longshore pay. He had never lost any wages or overtime pay because of the condition of his wrist and had received no medical treatment for his wrist since leaving the hospital.

Appellant’s medical witness, Dr. Burgess, a specialist in orthopedic surgery, testified, ‘from one examination of appellant made on June 10, 1950, that he found a definite limitation of motion of the right wrist compared with the left wrist. He found the limitation on dorsiflexion or extension to be eighty degrees of the left wrist and sixty degrees of the right wrist, or a twenty degree limitation. On frontal flexion or bending the wrist forward he found a limitation of seventy degrees of the left wrist and sixty degrees of the right wrist. “Deviation of the wrist to the radial and ulnar aspects, that is shifting of the wrist from side to side, corresponded on the two sides, as did rotation — that is pronation and supination' — of the wrist.”

Dr. Burgess also testified that there was definite tenderness “over the radial carpal joint,” both its dorsal and radial aspects, that is to say, over the back and over the thumb side. The wrist was thicker than normal “at this point”, a “bony thickening” or thickening of the bone and its “covering”. There was also definite crepitus or grating or cracking of the cartilage of right wrist on passive movement and twenty-five per cent loss of strength in grip of the right hand as compared with the left.

Dr. 'Burgess further testified that X-rays of appellant’s right wrist taken at the time of the examination and admitted in evidence at the trial showed changes in the bones comprising the wrist joint in the nature of a localized loss of lime substance, that is demineralization, in the carpal scaphoid bone and "an irregularity between the two carpal bones which articulate with the radius, that is the forearm component of the wrist joint * * Those, he said, were all the significant things in the X-rays. It was his opinion that the disability present on examination and the “changes in the X-ray” were the result of appellant’s injury, that the condition was “essentially fixed” and that it gave appellant permanent partial *435 disability equal to twenty per cent of the “amputation rate at the right elbow.”

Appellee’s medical expert, also an orthopedic surgery specialist, Dr. Buckner, testified that he had examined appellant on one occasion, July 31, 1950. Appellant then complained that he still had an ache in his right wrist and that his hand had a tendency to go numb occasionally. Dr. Buckner found, however, that appellant had full function, normal extension and flexion of the wrist, the rotation of the forearm was normal and no sensory disturbance was noted. Appellant did not complain to Dr. Buckner that he had any stiffness in his wrist. X-rays taken by Dr. Buckner at the time of the examination were admitted in evidence. He pointed out, in the film, a line across the lower end of the radius having the appearance of a fissure fracture “which is now completely healed and hardly visible, the very faintest line.” He could find no evidence of any injury to. the carpal bones adjoining the radius bone and observed no evidence of “decalcification” of them. He also examined the X-ray films taken by Dr. Burgess and while he could see the line representing the fissure fracture of the radius in one of them he observed no evidence of trauma to the carpal bones immediately adjoining the radius bone. Dr. Buckner thought appellant “had made a complete recovery.” He could see no substantial difference between the X-ray pictures which he had taken and those taken by Dr. Burgess.

Dr. Exner, a physician who specialized in radiology and X-ray diagnosis, called as a witness by appellant, examined the X-ray films taken by Dr. Burgess.

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193 F.2d 433, 1951 U.S. App. LEXIS 2912, 1952 A.M.C. 477, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bjornson-v-alaska-s-s-co-ca9-1951.