Bissell v. Merrill Lynch & Co.

Second Circuit

Bissell v. Merrill Lynch & Co.

157 F.3d 138, 1998 WL 665798

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit

DecidedSeptember 29, 1998

DocketDocket 96-9137

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 157 F.3d 138 (Bissell v. Merrill Lynch & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Bissell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 157 F.3d 138, 1998 WL 665798 (2d Cir. 1998).

Pincite

Opinion

RALPH K. WINTER, Chief Judge:

Louis Bissell, Jr. appeals from Judge Schwartz’s order denying his motion for class certification and dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim. See Bissell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 937 F.Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y.1996).

The facts here are identical to those in Levitin v. Painewebber, Inc., 159 F.3d 698, No. 96-7994, 1998 WL 665039 (2d Cir.1998) but for two matters. The first difference is that instead of posting as collateral cash or securities other than those being sold short, Bissell traded “against the box.” In trading “against the box,” the customer posts as collateral shares he owns that are identical to or convertible into those being sold short. The second difference from Levitin is that Bissell was a large trader who was able to negotiate a remittance of the earnings real[139]*139ized by appellees on the shares he posted as collateral. He alleges, however, that only a portion of those earnings were remitted.

Neither difference is material, and we affirm for the reasons stated in Levitin.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

RALPH K. WINTER, Chief Judge:

Louis Bissell, Jr. appeals from Judge Schwartz’s order denying his motion for class certification and dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim. See Bissell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 937 F.Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y.1996).

The facts here are identical to those in Levitin v. Painewebber, Inc., 159 F.3d 698, No. 96-7994, 1998 WL 665039 (2d Cir.1998) but for two matters. The first difference is that instead of posting as collateral cash or securities other than those being sold short, Bissell traded “against the box.” In trading “against the box,” the customer posts as collateral shares he owns that are identical to or convertible into those being sold short. The second difference from Levitin is that Bissell was a large trader who was able to negotiate a remittance of the earnings real[139]*139ized by appellees on the shares he posted as collateral. He alleges, however, that only a portion of those earnings were remitted.

Neither difference is material, and we affirm for the reasons stated in Levitin.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

157 F.3d 138, 1998 WL 665798, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bissell-v-merrill-lynch-co-ca2-1998.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack