Bishop v. United States Postal Service

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: July 14, 2025
• Docket: 3:24-cv-02266
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JAMES BISHOP, Case No.: 3:24-cv-02266-RBM-AHG

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 13 v. MOTION TO DISMISS

14 UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, [Doc. 2] 15 Defendant. 16

17 This action was removed from the Superior Court of the State of California, County 18 of San Diego (“San Diego Superior Court”) to the United States District Court for the 19 Southern District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) on December 5, 2024. 20 (Doc. 1.) Pending before the Court is Defendant United States Postal Service’s 21 (“Defendant” or “USPS”) Motion to Dismiss, which was filed on December 19, 2024. 22 (Doc. 4.) Plaintiff James Bishop (“Plaintiff”) has not opposed Defendant’s Motion to 23 Dismiss. 24 The Court finds this matter suitable for determination without oral argument 25 pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons discussed below, Defendant’s 26 Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. 27 /// 28 /// 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 A. Plaintiff’s Complaint 3 On March 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for the “loss of property” in the San 4 Diego Superior Court. (Doc. 1-3 [“Compl.”] at 2.1) Plaintiff asserts causes of action for 5 “general negligence” and “intentional tort,” and seeks $900,000 in compensatory and 6 punitive damages. (Id. at 4.) 7 Plaintiff alleges that he mailed two parcels to the California Superior Court for the 8 County of Contra Costa (“Contra Costa Superior Court”) through USPS in March 2023. 9 (Id. at 8–9.) The first parcel contained Plaintiff’s Writ of Habeas Corpus, and the second 10 parcel allegedly contained evidence in support thereof. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff alleges the 11 Contra Costa Superior Court received the first parcel, but the second parcel was lost. (Id. 12 at 9, 24.) The Contra Costa Superior Court denied Plaintiff’s Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Id. 13 at 26–64.) 14 B. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 15 Defendant moves to dismiss this civil action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 16 and insufficient service of process under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 17 12(b)(5). (Doc. 4 at 2–4.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims fall within the postal 18 exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). (Id. at 2, 4–6 (citing 28 U.S.C. 19 § 2680(b)).) Defendant also argues that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative 20 remedies (id. at 2, 6–8 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a))), that USPS is not the proper defendant 21 under the FTCA (id. at 2, 8–9), and that Plaintiff failed to serve his Complaint in 22 compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 (id. at 2, 9–11).2 23 24

25 1 The Court cites the CM/ECF pagination unless otherwise noted. 26 2 Because the Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute, it need 27 not reach Defendant’s third and fourth arguments regarding the proper defendant and service. See Halousek v. USPS, No. 2:19-cv-0588-MCE-KJN PS, 2020 WL 2084818, at 28 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 A motion to dismiss brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) 3 challenges a court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 12(b)(1). Since “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction[,]” they may not hear a 5 case unless “authorized by Constitution or statute … .” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. 6 Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). “The party asserting federal 7 jurisdiction bears the burden of proving the case is properly in federal court.” In re Ford 8 Motor Co./Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 264 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing McNutt 9 v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936)). “The objection that a 10 federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(1), may be 11 raised by a party, or by a court on its own initiative, at any stage in the litigation … .” 12 Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006). Moreover, “subject-matter jurisdiction, 13 because it involves a court’s power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived.” 14 United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002). “[W]hen a federal court concludes that 15 it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the complaint in its entirety.” 16 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any 17 time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). 18 III. DISCUSSION 19 A. The Postal Exception 20 “Under the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., the Postal Service is 21 ‘an independent establishment of the executive branch of the Government of the United 22 States,’ § 201.” Dolan v. USPS, 546 U.S. 481, 483–84 (2006). “Consistent with this status, 23 the Postal Service enjoys federal sovereign immunity [from suit] absent a waiver.” Id. at 24 484 (citations omitted). 25 26

27 matter pursuant to § 2680(b), the court does not address the remaining issues raised in 28 1 “Although the Postal Reorganization Act generally waives the immunity of the 2 Postal Service from suit by giving it the power to sue and be sued in its official name, the 3 statute also provides that the FTCA shall apply to tort claims arising out of activities of the 4 Postal Service.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). “The FTCA, in turn, 5 waives sovereign immunity in two different sections of the United States Code.” Id. 6 However, “[t]he FTCA qualifies its waiver of sovereign immunity for certain categories of 7 claims (13 in all).” Id. at 485. “If one of the exceptions applies, the bar of sovereign 8 immunity remains.” Id. “The 13 categories of exempted claims are set forth in 28 U.S.C. 9 § 2680 … .” Id. One of the 13 categories of exempted claims is “[a]ny claim arising out 10 of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter.” 28 U.S.C. 11 § 2680(b). 12 Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant lost one of two parcels he sent to the Contra 13 Costa Superior Court. (Compl. at 9, 24.) Plaintiff’s allegations fall squarely within the 14 postal exception to the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity. See Anderson v. USPS, 15 761 F.2d 527, 528 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding the plaintiff’s “tort claim against the Postal 16 Service for loss of his package during the robbery was barred by sovereign immunity and 17 the district court properly dismissed it.”). The Court therefore lacks subject matter 18 jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims, and this case must be dismissed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the 20 court must dismiss the action.”); Halousek v. USPS, No. 2:19-cv-0588-MCE-KJN PS, 2020 21 WL 2084818, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2020) (finding “[t]he Court lacks subject-matter 22 jurisdiction over [the pro se] plaintiff’s claim against USPS for the loss of her mail.”). 23 B. Administrative Exhaustion 24 “The [FTCA] provides that an ‘action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the 25 United States for money damages’ unless the claimant has first exhausted his 26 administrative remedies.” McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 107 (1993) (quoting 28 27 U.S.C. § 2675(a)). A plaintiff must present “the claim to the appropriate Federal agency” 28 and either receive a final denial of the claim or wait six months without resolution. 28 1 U.S.C. § 2675(a). A plaintiff must strictly adhere to the exhaustion requirements of 28 2 U.S.C. § 2675(a) as this is a mandatory, jurisdictional prerequisite to filing suit. See Jerves 3 v. United States, 966 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1992) (reaffirming that “the administrative 4 claim requirements of § 2675(a) are jurisdictional in nature, and thus must be strictly 5 adhered to.”) (citing Meridian Int’l Logistics, Inc. v. United States, 939 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 6 Cir. 1991))). Because “[t]he timely filing of an administrative claim is a jurisdictional 7 prerequisite to the bringing of a suit under the FTCA,” it “should be affirmatively alleged 8 in the complaint.” Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 1980) (internal citation 9 omitted). 10 Here, Plaintiff does not allege that he submitted an administrative claim to 11 Defendant, the federal agency. Instead, Plaintiff submitted a grievance to the California 12 Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Office of Grievances at the RJ Donovan 13 Correctional Facility. (Doc. 1-3 at 16.) Submitting such a grievance is not sufficient to 14 satisfy the FTCA’s administrative exhaustion requirement as it was not directed to the 15 appropriate federal agency. See Jerves, 966 F2.d at 521 (affirming dismissal for lack of 16 subject matter jurisdiction where plaintiff did not comply with FTCA administrative claim 17 requirements); McNeil, 508 U.S. at 111 (holding pro se plaintiffs must fully comply with 18 § 2675(a) before invoking federal jurisdiction). Since Plaintiff failed to fulfill the 19 administrative exhaustion requirement, this defect provides a separate and independent 20 basis for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Vacek v. U.S. Postal Serv., 21 447 F.3d 1248, 1249–53 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal of a claim for lack of subject 22 matter jurisdiction when the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant 23 to 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)). 24 IV. CONCLUSION 25 Having established two independent bases for dismissal for lack of subject matter 26 jurisdiction, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and DISMISSES 27 WITHOUT PREJUDICE this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court 28 need not reach Defendant’s remaining, non-jurisdictional arguments. See Halousek, 2020 1 || WL 2084818, at *4. 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 || DATE: July 14, 2025 4 Barras, Mitty D 5 HON. RUTH BERMUBEZ MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28