Bishop v. Bishop

480 S.W.2d 145, 252 Ark. 573, 1972 Ark. LEXIS 1645
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
DecidedMay 15, 1972
Docket5-5872
StatusPublished

This text of 480 S.W.2d 145 (Bishop v. Bishop) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bishop v. Bishop, 480 S.W.2d 145, 252 Ark. 573, 1972 Ark. LEXIS 1645 (Ark. 1972).

Opinion

J. Fred Jones, Justice.

This is an appeal by Wilma A. Bishop from a divorce decree rendered in favor of Charles G. Bishop upon his complaint against her in the Pulaski County Chancery Court.

According to the pleadings and evidence of record, the parties were married in 1951 following their courtship while married to their former spouses, and on the same day, or in the day following, Mr. Bishop’s divorce from his former spouse. The serenity of Mr. and Mrs. Bishop’s marriage to each other was interrupted by turbulent episodes which increased in number and severity until finally on May 1, 1968, they separated and have not lived together since that date. The Bishops had three children, a daughter 18 years of age and married; a daughter 17 years of age and in college, and a son 15 years of age. The children continued to live with their father following the separation and the two younger children were living with him at the time the present suit was instituted.

Mrs. Bishop filed suit for divorce in July, 1968, and Mr. Bishop apparently filed a counterclaim. The counterclaim is not in the record but the complaint simply alleged general indignities, not specifically set out. The chancellor denied a divorce to either party in that case under a finding that the evidence as to the alleged grounds for divorce did not preponderate in favor of either party. In that case the chancellor awarded a continuance of $300 per month maintenance money previously awarded to Mrs. Bishop.

The present action was filed by Mr. Bishop on August 31, 1970, alleging indignities occurring both prior and subsequent to May 1, 1968, and also alleging that Mrs. Bishop had not lived with him since deserting him without cause on May 1, 1968. Mrs. Bishop filed an answer and counterclaim in which she denied the allegations contained in the complaint and in which she alleged indignities on the part of Mr. Bishop. She prayed for continuation and increase in separate maintenance. On July 9, 1971, she amended her complaint and in addition to separate maintenance she prayed in the alternative, that should a divorce be granted, it be granted to her together with an award of her property rights. On August 3, 1971, Mr. Bishop, by leave of the court, amended his complaint specifically alleging three years’ separation.

The chancellor found that Mr. and Mrs. Bishop had intentionally lived separate and apart without cohabitation for three years. He found that in addition to the three years’ separation as ground for a divorce to either party, Mr. Bishop had also established additional grounds for divorce but he awarded the decree to Mr. Bishop because he in effect found, that Mr. Bishop was the injured party and Mrs. Bishop was not entitled to the statutory property award to which she would have been entitled had the divorce been granted to her and Mr. Bishop had not been the injured party. The chancellor found, however, that Mr. Bishop had withdrawn the sum of $12,000 from a joint checking account in a bank and he ordered Mr. Bishop to restore to Mrs. Bishop one-half of this amount in the sum of $6,000. The chancellor directed that Mr. Bishop continue to manage and collect rents on certain rental property held by the parties as an estate by the entirety and to remit to Mrs. Bishop one-half of the net rental income from the property. The chancellor also awarded $200 per month to be paid as alimony to Mrs. Bishop, said payments to continue during her life or until her remarriage or further orders of the court.

On appeal to this court Mrs. Bishop designated the points she relies on for reversal as follows:

“1
Where in a previous hearing for divorce the Court finds neither party is entitled to a divorce, and enters a decree for separate maintenance, subsequent trial of divorce for purposes of finding fault should consider only issues occurring subsequent to the decree of separate maintenance as all previous issues as to fault are res judicata.
2
The Court’s failure to award the wife the divorce and an equitable property settlement was against the preponderance of the evidence and an abuse of discretion.
3
Plaintiff’s testimony about a majority of the issues was uncorroborated except for the testimony of two of the three children who were obviously biased and prejudiced against their mother.
4
Failure of the Court to order a master to determine the value of the husband’s property previous to decreeing a property settlement where extensive commercial property is involved and the wife is not financially able to hire appraisers, constitutes an abuse of discretion.
5
Causing á warrant for arrest to be issued as the only new grounds for divorce, where the Court in a previous decree had found neither party entitled to a divorce, is not sufficient to deprive the wife, who has raised three children to near maturity, of a reasonable and equitable property settlement.”

The conclusion we reach on the first point also disposes of the last two.

Point 1

When both parties were denied a divorce in 1968, they had only been separated approximately two months and the three years’ separation was not a ground alleged or relied on by either party. The fifth statutory ground for divorce as set out in Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1202 (Supp. 1971) provides that a divorce may be granted where either party “shall offer such indignities to the person of the other as shall render his or her condition intolerable.” This was the ground alleged in the 1968 action and it was on this alleged ground that the chancellor found the evidence did not preponderate in favor of either party. The question before the chancellor in that case was which of the parties, if either, offered such indignities to the person of the other as to render his or her condition intolerable. The chancellor in that case, unlike the chancellor in the case at bar, was not concerned with the question of who was the injured party, under the seventh statutory ground for divorce in § 34-1202 which is as follows:

“Where either husband or wife have lived separate and apart from the other for three (3) consecutive years, without cohabitation, the court shall grant an absolute decree of divorce at the suit of either party, whether such separation was the voluntary act or by the mutual consent of the parties and the question of who is the injured party shall be considered only in cases wherein by the pleadings the wife seeks either alimony under Section 34-1211, Arkansas Statutes 1947, or a division of property under Section 34-1214, Arkansas Statutes 1947, as hereby amended, or both.”

The case of Narisi v. Narisi, 233 Ark. 525, 345 S.W. 2d 620, contained facts almost on all fours with those in the case at bar and our decision in that case was adverse to Mrs. Bishop’s contentions under her first point here.

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Related

Narisi v. Narisi
345 S.W.2d 620 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1961)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
480 S.W.2d 145, 252 Ark. 573, 1972 Ark. LEXIS 1645, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bishop-v-bishop-ark-1972.