Birnbeck v. Commissioner of Social Security

District Court, S.D. Illinois·Decided June 22, 2022·No. 3:21-cv-01481·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

GEORGE B.1, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) Case No. 20-cv-1272-SMY ) KILOLO KIJAKAZI, ) COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL ) SECURITY, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YANDLE, District Judge:

In accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff George B. seeks judicial review of the final agency decision denying his application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 423. Procedural History Plaintiff applied for DIB on March 4, 2020, alleging a disability onset date of July 21, 2016 that was later amended (Tr. 150). His claims were denied initially on July 10, 2020, and again on reconsideration on September 28, 2020 (Tr. 99, 109). Plaintiff requested an evidentiary hearing which took place on March 25, 2021 (Tr. 31). The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denied Plaintiff’s application on May 6, 2021 (Tr. 25). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making the ALJ’s decision the final agency decision subject to judicial review (Tr. 1). Plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies and filed a timely Complaint with this Court.

1 In keeping with the Court’s practice, Plaintiff’s full name will not be used in this Memorandum and Order due to privacy concerns. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 5.2(c) and the Advisory Committee Notes. Issue Raised by Plaintiff Plaintiff raises the following issue for judicial review: The ALJ erred when relying on the Vocational Expert’s (“VE”) incidence data method (JobBrowser) in determining that a significant number of jobs existed for Plaintiff. Legal Standard To qualify for DIB, a claimant must be disabled within the meaning of the applicable statutes. Under the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if he or she has an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a). In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ considers the following five

questions in order: (1) Is the claimant presently unemployed? (2) Does the claimant have a severe impairment? (3) Does the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of specific impairments enumerated in the regulations? (4) Is the claimant unable to perform his or her former occupation? and (5) Is the claimant unable to perform any other work? See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. An affirmative answer at either step 3 or 5 leads to a finding that the claimant is disabled. A negative answer at any step other than at step 3 precludes a finding of disability. The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps 1–4. If the claimant establishes an inability to

perform past work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show the claimant’s ability to engage in other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001). “The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive....” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Thus, the Court is not tasked with determining whether Plaintiff was disabled at the relevant time, but whether the ALJ's

findings were supported by substantial evidence and whether any errors of law were made. Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (internal citations omitted). In reviewing for substantial evidence, the Court considers the entire administrative record, but does not reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ. Burmester v. Berryhill, 920 F.3d 507, 510

(7th Cir. 2019). At the same time, judicial review is not abject; the Court does not act as a rubber stamp for the Commissioner. See Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 921 (7th Cir. 2010). Decision of the ALJ Here, the ALJ followed the five-step analytical framework with respect to Plaintiff’s application. He determined that the Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the amended onset date of July 18, 2018, and that he had the impairments of depressive, bipolar, and related disorders, along with anxiety and obesity (Tr. 15). He further determined

that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the impairments listed in 20 CFR Part 404 (Tr. 16). The ALJ found Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to be the following: Medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except for the following limitations. The claimant can have no use of hazardous machinery and no exposure to unshielded moving mechanical parts. The claimant can have no exposure to unprotected heights. There can be no driving of motor vehicles as part of the work function. The claimant is able to carry out detailed but uninvolved instructions in the performance of simple, routine and repetitive tasks in a low stress work environment with no fast-paced production requirements involving simple work-related decisions, and with only occasional judgment and work place changes. The claimant can have no interaction with the general public and only occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors with no teamwork or tandem work with coworkers.

(Tr. 18)

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