MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON (1) AMGEN’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF NON-INFRINGEMENT (DOCKET #861) AND (2) AMGEN’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF NON-EQUIVALENCE (DOCKET
#
882)
STEARNS, District Judge.
In an August 6, 1998
Markman
order (docket # 854), claim 1 of the ’702 patent was construed as follows.
To be covered by the patent, a plasmid vector must contain the entire PL0L of bacteriophage X as represented in Figure 6 of the patent and at least one endonuclease recognition site inserted at the converted
Hae
111 site at 73.1% of bacteriophage X or at another site downstream of
Hae
111, said endonuclease recognition site being within 300 base pairs of the
Hindi
site at -33, and prior to any sequences of X DNA downstream of the
Hae
111 site.
Based on this construction, defendant Amgen, Inc., moves for summary judgment, contending that its accused vector neither literally infringes Biogen, Inc.’s ’702 patent, nor infringes under the doctrine of equivalents.
LITERAL INFRINGEMENT
A comparison of the material differences between the structure of Amgen’s plasmid vector
and that of the vectors claimed by Biogen in the ’702 patent establishes literal non-infringement.
As described in Figure 6 of the ’702 patent the prototypical Biogen vector consists of 247 base pairs of bacteriophage X DNA spanning the sequence beginning at the
Sau
3A site at -133 and extending to the converted
Eco
RI
(Hae
111) endonuclease recognition site at +114. The sequence contains five structural elements: (1) the leftward'promoter PL;
(2) the leftward operator 0L;
(3) a transcription start site ( + 1); (4) the N utilization site
(nut
L) (+34 to +63); and (5) the
Hae
111 site.
Figure 6 also shows a 114 base pair DNA fragment terminating at the
Hae 111
site, the earliest point at which translation occurs.
The Amgen vector by contrast, while initiating at
Sau
3A, terminates at the
Xba
1 site at +13. The Amgen vector thus does not contain
nut
L or the
Hae
111 site. As opposed to the 114 base pair DNA fragment depicted in Figure 6, the DNA fragment in Amgen’s vector consists of 13 base pairs. The
Hae
111 recognition site depicted in Figure 6 is inserted outside of the PlOl sequence, while Amgen’s endonu-clease recognition site is inserted within PL 0L. And finally, Amgen’s vector inserts non-X DNA in PL0L between base pair positions +4 and +13. Because there can be no dispute that Amgen’s vector does not contain the entire sequence described in Figure 6 of the ’702 patent, under the court’s
Markman
construction Amgen is entitled to summary judgment on the claim of literal infringement. See
Litton Systems, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc.,
140 F.3d 1449, 1454 (Fed.Cir.198) (“Literal infringement requires that the accused device contain each limitation of the claim exactly; any deviation from the claim precludes a finding of literal infringement.”)
DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
A product or composition may not literally read on a patent claim and may yet infringe under the doctrine of
equivalents.
Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.,
520 U.S. 17, 25, 117 S.Ct. 1040, 137 L.Ed.2d 146 (1997). The doctrine of equivalents is not above reproach, given its propensity to assume “a life of its own, unbounded by the patent claims.” Id., at 28-29, 117 S.Ct. 1040. “In reconciling the uncertainty surrounding application of the doctrine of equivalents with the definitional and public-notice functions of the statutory claiming requirement, the Supreme Court [in
Wamer-Jen-kinson]
endorsed an element-by-element analytical framework for infringement.”
Litton
Systems,-140 F.3d at 1454. “Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to defining the scope of the patented invention, and thus the doctrine of equivalents must be applied to individual elements of the claim, not to the invention as a whole.”
Warner-Jenkinson,
520 U.S. at 29, 117 S.Ct. 1040.
While
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.,
339 U.S. 605, 70 S.Ct. 854, 94 L.Ed. 1097 (1950), set out what has become the familiar “triple identity” test of equivalence, comparing “the function served by a particular claim element, the way that element serves that function, and the result thus obtained by that element, ... the particular linguistic framework used is less important than whether the test is probative of the essential inquiry: Does the accused product or process contain elements identical or equivalent to each claimed element of the patented invention?” Warner
-Jenkinson,
520 U.S. at 39-40, 117 S.Ct. 1040.
The first task in applying the “all-elements” rule is to identify the material limitations of the disputed claim. An illustration is provided by
Litton Systems.
There the district court construed the specification of a “Kaufman-type ion beam source” to include “[a]ny broad-beamed, multiapertured, gridded ion beam source, which includes any hollow cathode gun and any radio frequency gun.” Id. at 1454. The Federal Circuit disagreed. Looking more closely to the specification, the Court identified the components of an ion beam gun of the “Kaufman-type” to include “a hot-wire cathode, an anode, grids, and magnets.”
Because the
Litton Systems
jury had been instructed to consider whether the accused product incorporated a generic ion beam source rather than an ion beam gun with the essential components of the Kaufman-type gun described in the patent, its finding of infringement by equivalents could not stand under the all-elements rule. Id. at 1455.
Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is ordinarily a question of fact.
Bayer AG v. Elan Pharmaceutical Research Corp.,
212 F.3d 1241, 1251 (Fed.Cir.2000). “Thus summary judgment may be granted [only] when no material fact is in dispute, or when no reasonable trier of fact could find facts whereby the nonmoving party could prevail, even when all justifiable factual inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmovant.”
Canton Bio-Medical v. Integrated Liner Technologies, Inc.,
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON (1) AMGEN’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF NON-INFRINGEMENT (DOCKET #861) AND (2) AMGEN’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF NON-EQUIVALENCE (DOCKET
#
882)
STEARNS, District Judge.
In an August 6, 1998
Markman
order (docket # 854), claim 1 of the ’702 patent was construed as follows.
To be covered by the patent, a plasmid vector must contain the entire PL0L of bacteriophage X as represented in Figure 6 of the patent and at least one endonuclease recognition site inserted at the converted
Hae
111 site at 73.1% of bacteriophage X or at another site downstream of
Hae
111, said endonuclease recognition site being within 300 base pairs of the
Hindi
site at -33, and prior to any sequences of X DNA downstream of the
Hae
111 site.
Based on this construction, defendant Amgen, Inc., moves for summary judgment, contending that its accused vector neither literally infringes Biogen, Inc.’s ’702 patent, nor infringes under the doctrine of equivalents.
LITERAL INFRINGEMENT
A comparison of the material differences between the structure of Amgen’s plasmid vector
and that of the vectors claimed by Biogen in the ’702 patent establishes literal non-infringement.
As described in Figure 6 of the ’702 patent the prototypical Biogen vector consists of 247 base pairs of bacteriophage X DNA spanning the sequence beginning at the
Sau
3A site at -133 and extending to the converted
Eco
RI
(Hae
111) endonuclease recognition site at +114. The sequence contains five structural elements: (1) the leftward'promoter PL;
(2) the leftward operator 0L;
(3) a transcription start site ( + 1); (4) the N utilization site
(nut
L) (+34 to +63); and (5) the
Hae
111 site.
Figure 6 also shows a 114 base pair DNA fragment terminating at the
Hae 111
site, the earliest point at which translation occurs.
The Amgen vector by contrast, while initiating at
Sau
3A, terminates at the
Xba
1 site at +13. The Amgen vector thus does not contain
nut
L or the
Hae
111 site. As opposed to the 114 base pair DNA fragment depicted in Figure 6, the DNA fragment in Amgen’s vector consists of 13 base pairs. The
Hae
111 recognition site depicted in Figure 6 is inserted outside of the PlOl sequence, while Amgen’s endonu-clease recognition site is inserted within PL 0L. And finally, Amgen’s vector inserts non-X DNA in PL0L between base pair positions +4 and +13. Because there can be no dispute that Amgen’s vector does not contain the entire sequence described in Figure 6 of the ’702 patent, under the court’s
Markman
construction Amgen is entitled to summary judgment on the claim of literal infringement. See
Litton Systems, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc.,
140 F.3d 1449, 1454 (Fed.Cir.198) (“Literal infringement requires that the accused device contain each limitation of the claim exactly; any deviation from the claim precludes a finding of literal infringement.”)
DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
A product or composition may not literally read on a patent claim and may yet infringe under the doctrine of
equivalents.
Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.,
520 U.S. 17, 25, 117 S.Ct. 1040, 137 L.Ed.2d 146 (1997). The doctrine of equivalents is not above reproach, given its propensity to assume “a life of its own, unbounded by the patent claims.” Id., at 28-29, 117 S.Ct. 1040. “In reconciling the uncertainty surrounding application of the doctrine of equivalents with the definitional and public-notice functions of the statutory claiming requirement, the Supreme Court [in
Wamer-Jen-kinson]
endorsed an element-by-element analytical framework for infringement.”
Litton
Systems,-140 F.3d at 1454. “Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to defining the scope of the patented invention, and thus the doctrine of equivalents must be applied to individual elements of the claim, not to the invention as a whole.”
Warner-Jenkinson,
520 U.S. at 29, 117 S.Ct. 1040.
While
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.,
339 U.S. 605, 70 S.Ct. 854, 94 L.Ed. 1097 (1950), set out what has become the familiar “triple identity” test of equivalence, comparing “the function served by a particular claim element, the way that element serves that function, and the result thus obtained by that element, ... the particular linguistic framework used is less important than whether the test is probative of the essential inquiry: Does the accused product or process contain elements identical or equivalent to each claimed element of the patented invention?” Warner
-Jenkinson,
520 U.S. at 39-40, 117 S.Ct. 1040.
The first task in applying the “all-elements” rule is to identify the material limitations of the disputed claim. An illustration is provided by
Litton Systems.
There the district court construed the specification of a “Kaufman-type ion beam source” to include “[a]ny broad-beamed, multiapertured, gridded ion beam source, which includes any hollow cathode gun and any radio frequency gun.” Id. at 1454. The Federal Circuit disagreed. Looking more closely to the specification, the Court identified the components of an ion beam gun of the “Kaufman-type” to include “a hot-wire cathode, an anode, grids, and magnets.”
Because the
Litton Systems
jury had been instructed to consider whether the accused product incorporated a generic ion beam source rather than an ion beam gun with the essential components of the Kaufman-type gun described in the patent, its finding of infringement by equivalents could not stand under the all-elements rule. Id. at 1455.
Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is ordinarily a question of fact.
Bayer AG v. Elan Pharmaceutical Research Corp.,
212 F.3d 1241, 1251 (Fed.Cir.2000). “Thus summary judgment may be granted [only] when no material fact is in dispute, or when no reasonable trier of fact could find facts whereby the nonmoving party could prevail, even when all justifiable factual inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmovant.”
Canton Bio-Medical v. Integrated Liner Technologies, Inc.,
216 F.3d 1367, 1369 (Fed.Cir.2000). As will be noted, the material facts necessary for a resolution of this case are not in dispute, although many other facts are.
Turning to claim 1 of the ’702 patent, it is not enough, as
Wamer-Jenkin-son
and
Litton Systems
teach, to simply say that it describes a bacteriophage X
DNA vector with a leftward promoter and operator. More precisely, as depicted in Figure 6, the constituent structures of Biogen’s vector are: (1) the leftward promoter (PL); (2) the three leftward operator sequences (0L1, Ol2, and Ol3); (3) a transcription start site; (4) the N utilization site
(nut
L); and (5) an endonuclease
(Hae
111) recognition site.
That there are substantial similarities between Biogen’s and Amgen’s vectors is self-evident. Both rely on PL0L to mediate gene expression. Both contain the components essential for PL to function, specifically the -35 region, the -10 region (the Pribnow box), the +1 transcription start site, and the three 0L sequences, all identically spaced.
Both use an artificially constructed endonu-clease recognition site to insert the gene to be expressed. Both locate that site within 300 base pairs of
Hindi
to avoid transcription of contiguous downstream
X
DNA.
Where the vectors differ is that Biogen’s contains the
nut
L sequence (from +34 to +63), while Amgen’s does not. Whether this is a substantial difference requires an explanation of what the inventors (Fiers and Remaut) intended by including
nut
L in their claimed vectors.
As Biogen’s Dr. Losick pointed out,
nut
L was the only DNA sequence downstream of +1 in Figure 6 “that was known [at the time the ’702 patent application was filed] to have an effect, under some circumstances, on expression.” Losick Decl. ¶ 67. The “circumstances” that Dr. Losick referred to are those in which either the host cell or the plasmid vector contains an active N gene. When either does,
nut
L interacts with the N gene to override downstream termination sequences that would otherwise abort transcription. Chamberlain Deck, Ex. B ¶ 63.
Fiers explained that he and Re-maut were concerned that unanticipated termination sites in cloned eukaryotic genes
might preclude expression if the N gene were present. “It was not known, and this is precisely the reason that we anticipated possible transcriptional termination regions in the eukaryotic gene and therefore we developed the system which could be used plus or minus the N gene.” Fiers Dep., June 11, 1997, at 1550-1551. Fiers and Remaut did so by placing the endonuclease recognition site at
Hae
111, downstream of
nut
L. The ability of the ’702 vector to express DNA despite the presence of an active N gene in the
host cell was specified in the patent as one of its attributes.
The preferred vectors of this invention are also those in which active N genes ... are absent. Therefore, by choice of an appropriate host, i.e., one containing or lacking an active chromosomal N gene, any of the vectors of the invention may be employed for expression of DNA sequences in the presence or in the absence of the N gene product.
’702 patent, col. 4:26-32.
It is undisputed that
nut
L is present in every vector claimed by Biogen. See Am-gen’s Statement of Facts [docket #885] ¶ 41 and Biogen’s Statement of Facts [docket # 895] ¶ 41. And it is equally undisputed that Amgen’s vector does not contain
nut
L or use host cells that express the N gene. Id. at ¶ 46; Losick Decl. ¶ 67. In the Fiers and Remaut vectors the presence or absence of the N gene in the host cell is irrelevant because of
nut
L. The same is not true of Amgen’s accused vector. Thus, Biogen’s argument that “[a]ll of the proteins expressed in the patents-in-suit were expressed in N-minus systems (in which
nut
L is inactive), and two were expressed exclusively so,” simply underlines the ability of the claimed vector to achieve expression when the N protein is present. Biogen’s Statement of Additional Facts, [docket # 895] ¶¶ 17,18.
As Amgen accurately points out, “even Biogen admits that there are times when
nut
L is part of PL0L function. Either
nut
L is part of the invention or it is not. And if it is part of the invention, even sometimes, it is part of the invention for equivalents purposes.” Amgen Reply [docket # 902], at 39. Biogen’s refrain that because “the Amgen host/vector system neither contains the N gene nor produces N protein, ... the presence or absence of
nut
L in the Amgen system [is] irrelevant,”
simply proves Amgen’s point, that its vector lacks one of the structural components of Figure 6.
Whether that difference is material depends on whether
nut
L in fact performs a function in Biogen’s claimed vectors. (Merely eliminating a redundant or unnecessary element from a composition to invent around a patent is what the doctrine of equivalents is intended, at least in part, to prohibit). Here, there is no question but that
nut
L performs an essential function in the ’702 vector as both Fiers and Remaut explained in the patent (as quoted above) and in their depositions.
Q. Now in order to achieve that overriding of the transcriptional termination that you are referred to, your PL containing plasmid vector encodes a site known as N utilization, correct?
A. That is correct, yes.
Q. And your PL containing plasmid vector encodes that site in the DNA such that that site is transcribed into a hairpin loop like structure in the RNA emanating from your plasmid structure, correct?
A. That’s correct, yes.
Q. And by the existence of that N utilization structure, the N gene protein interacts with the structure on the mRNA so as to allow for an over
riding or an antitermination effect, correct?
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. So, in that sense, that is the provision in your PL containing'vector of a N utilization site, is it the case that your vector provides for a solution to unintended transcription stop signals occurring between the promoter and the structural gene sequence?
A. The vector has all of the necessary features to make use of the presence of an active N protein. And in that paper I was referring to, and also on other instances, we suggest to use a strain which applies the N protein entrance.
Remaut Dep., Sept. 12, 1997, at 1551-1552.
Q. Now, is it your understanding at the present time that the [mtíL] site is needed for the antitermination action of the N gene product?
A. Yes.
Q. Was it your understanding in September of 1980 that the [mtiL] site was needed for the antitermination action of the N gene product?
A. Yes.
Fiers Dep., January 23,1997, at 887.
As Dr. Losick stated in his Declaration: before Fiers and Remaut did their work, scientists believed that it was useful to have a functional N gene co-transcribed by the PL promoter to achieve high levels of expression (i.e., the PL-initiated transcript contained both the N gene coding sequence and the coding sequence of the gene of interest). For example, Bernard et al., “Construction Of Plasmid Cloning Vehicles That Promote Gene Expression From The Bacteriophage Lambda PL Promoter,” 5
Gene
59-76 (1979 ...), which was extensively discussed in the prosecution history, demonstrated greater PL0L-driven expression from vectors that included a co-transcriptional, functional N gene as compared to vectors which did not include a functional N gene. Hedgpeth et al, “Lambda Phage Promoter Used To Enhance Expression Of A Plasmid-Cloned Gene,” 163
Molec. Gen. Genet
197-203 (1978 ...), found that the
“X
N product was necessary to overcome transcriptional termination sites between
X
PL and the end of [the cloned gene].”
A skilled person who was familiar with Fiers and Remaut’s invention would have understood that Fiers and Remaut took a different approach. They placed the desired gene to be expressed upstream of the N gene coding sequence. A skilled artisan would have recognized that this difference distinguished the Fi-ers and Remaut vectors from those of the prior art.
Id. ¶¶ 78, 79.
Morris (the inventor of Amgen’s vector), on the other hand, deliberately eliminated
nut
L by placing the desired endonuclease recognition site prior to the
nut
L sequence.
And in that there are Nut sites that are very active and there is RNA’s three sites that are very active. And those sites lent a great deal of structural uncertainty. And so what I set out to. do when I was creating my systems was to totally eliminate them. And so that’s what I indicated in this. They were .completely , removed because I did not want to — I did not want those sequences present in my constructs. ■ So I removed them.
Morris Dep., August 8, 1996, at 731.
The result is a vector, that in the sense that Fiers and Remaut improved on the work of Horn and Wells and others by, among other things, placing the recognition site upstream of the N coding sequence, im
proved on Fiers and Remaut by eliminating what was perceived in 1989 (when the infringement is alleged to have occurred) as another potential source of downstream instability in the X phage vector. See August 6, 1998 Memorandum and Order, at 10-11.
There is a remaining issue. “Prosecution history estoppel provides a legal limitation on the application of the doctrine of equivalents by excluding from the range of equivalents subject matter surrendered during prosecution of the application for the patent.”
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc.,
138 F.3d 1448, 1460 (Fed.Cir.1998)
(en
banc). “Prosecution history estoppel can occur as a result of (i) amendments made to overcome pat-entability rejections or (ii) arguments made during prosecution that show ‘a clear and unmistakable surrender of subject matter.’”
Bayer,
212 F.3d at 1251. The application of prosecution history estoppel (as its name implies) is a matter of law.
Cybor,
138 F.3d at 1460.
Amgen’s estoppel argument centers on Biogen’s efforts, undertaken in 1988, to overcome the PTO’s objection that the ’702 patent was descriptively inadequate. Biogen offered a “compromise” to expedite allowance of the patent by amending its claims “to recite the specific structure of the plasmid vectors of the application.” According to Biogen, the new
Hae
111 limitation meant that “each plasmid of the application contains the PL
0L-Eco
RI modified X region of the pPLa23 as depicted in Figure 6.” June 22, 1988 Amendment, at 8. The fact that Biog-en’s amendment was intended to cure a descriptive inadequacy is significant because prosecution history estoppel is usually understood to apply to amendments made to avoid prior art. As Justice Thomas noted in
Warner-Jenkinson,
the PTO often requests changes in claim language “without the intent to limit equivalents or, indeed, with the expectation that language it required would in many cases allow for a range of equivalents.” Id., 520 U.S. at 32, 117 S.Ct. 1040. “Where the reason for the change was not related to avoiding the prior art, the change may introduce a new element, but it does not necessarily preclude infringement by equivalents of that element.” Id. at 33, 117 S.Ct. 1040. (As Biogen argues, “[e]ach of the Federal Circuit cases cited by Amgen found estoppel only when an amendment or argument was made in connection with an outstanding prior art rejection.” Biogen Memorandum [docket # 923], at 3).
Various Federal Circuit opinions do, however, more broadly imply that a paten-tee’s “clear and unmistakable” surrender of subject matter during the prosecution of a patent application will work an estoppel even though the concessionary statement is not made to overcome prior art. See, e.g.,
Sextant Avionique S.A. v. Analog Devices, Inc.,
172 F.3d 817, 828 (Fed.Cir.1999) (“On the other hand, if the claims were amended for a reason that was not ‘related to patentability,’ prosecution history estoppel does not apply
absent
a ‘clear and unmistakable surrender’ of certain subject matter”) (emphasis added);
Bayer,
212 F.3d at 1252 (“Unmistakable assertions made by the applicant to the .. PTO ... in support of patentability, whether or not required to secure allowance of the claim, ... may operate to preclude the patentee from asserting equivalency.”) The issue of just how broadly the doctrine of patent history estoppel sweeps was squarely framed by the Federal Circuit in granting a rehearing
en banc
in
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd.,
187 F.3d 1381 (Fed.Cir.1999).
The following questions may be addressed in the briefs:
1. For the purposes of determining whether an amendment to a claim creates prosecution history estoppel, is “a substantial reason related to patentability,”
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co.,
520 U.S. 17, 33, 117 S.Ct. 1040, 137 L.Ed.2d 146 (1997), limited to those amendments made to overcome prior art under § 102 and § 103,
or does “patentability” mean any reason affecting the issuance of a patent?
/A
If the Federal Circuit answers this question in the way I am inclined to think it will, estoppel would provide an additional or alternative ground on which summary judgment should enter for Amgen. To overcome the examiner’s rejection Biogen told the PTO:
[a]s stated in the specification, the vectors of the prior art are disadvantaged by the great distance “between the sites available for insertion of cloned genes and the PL promoter.” Applicants’ vectors and methods overcome the problem confronted by the prior art by introducing “an
Eco
RI site at a short distance downstream from PL.” Further, as disclosed in the specification as originally filed, applicants introduced the
Eco
RI site by converting the “single
Hae
111 site (73.1% X, Figure 1) located about 150 nucleotides downstream from PL.” Specification page 5, lines 19-25; page 6, lines 28-26; page 16, line 31 to page 17, line 11.
June 22, 1988 Amendment, at 7.
Based on this teaching, Biogen assured the PTO that “a person of skill in the art, employing the methods disclosed in the specification as filed, would not place a recognition site at any location other than in the region identified more precisely by the substitute claims.... Each of the plasmid constructions of this application utilizes the same region of phage X and the same operative site,
Hae
111 (reconstructed to
Eco
RI).” Id., at 8-9. Thus, “each plasmid of the application contains the PL
Ol-Eco
RI modified X region of the pPLa23, as depicted in Figure 6.” Id. at 8. From this language, a competitor would reasonably believe that Biogen had surrendered any claim to vectors lacking the elements of the Figure 6 sequence and, in particular, with recognition sites placed after or
before
the
Hae
111 region specified in claim 1. See
Bayer,
212 F.3d at 1253.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, Amgen’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Literal Infringement [docket # 861] is AL
LOWED.
Amgen’s Motion for Summary Judgment under the Doctrine of Equivalents [docket # 882] is also
ALLOWED.
Amgen’s remaining pending dispositive motions [docket 639, 643 and 739] are consequently
MOOT.
SO ORDERED,