Bindley v. Detroit River Tunnel Co.

253 F. 751, 1918 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 883
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedAugust 23, 1918
StatusPublished

This text of 253 F. 751 (Bindley v. Detroit River Tunnel Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bindley v. Detroit River Tunnel Co., 253 F. 751, 1918 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 883 (E.D. Mich. 1918).

Opinion

TUTTLE, District Judge.

After listening to unusually interesting and able oral arguments for four days, and now at the close of such oral argument, in accordance with my announced custom, I am going to dispose of this case.

[1] The manner of considering the particular art involved in a patent case is not unlike tracing the history of the explorations of a continent. If we start at a sufficiently early date, it is entirely undeveloped. Along come the different explorers, making it impossible for those who come after them to re-do what has already been done. Some are looking for gold, some for fountains of youth, some for fur-hearing animals, and some for homes. These ends desired give the general direction, while the topography of the country, savage natives, and other .obstacles to progress are deciding factors in choosing particular mountain passes. Some, like Columbus, do not know where they have landed. If they in reality discovered a continent, we give them credit for it, even though they died in ignorance of what they had accomplished. Others, like Balboa, try to claim, not only what they can see, but make broad and sweeping claims, assuming that [752]*752no one else has any rights. Still others, like our Pilgrim Fathers, prefer to settle down on a little patch and carefully fence it around, to indicate just what belongs to them. A discoverer cannot be content to take previous trails. A Roosevelt may find a river in the wilds of South America, and a Peary may discover the particular spot in the ice where the mbridian lines intersect, but the time is past for discovering continents. Those who simply walk in the tracks of their predecessors, and see only those landscapes which are plainly visible from tiróse paths, cannot be said to be discoverers. Such pretending discoverers are merely sightseers and students of geography. Such assumed inventors are in fact only mechanics and engineers.

Applying this thought to the subject of patents, the extent that an inventor is presumed to have explored beyond his actual path is the distance that a skilled mechanic or engineer is able to look from such tracks.' The extent of tire landscape is not to be determined as of the time the predecessor took the trail, but at the time the man who makes his claim for a patent went that way. He cannot receive credit for discovering those things which are so near to the old tracks that an ordinarily skilled mechairic or engineer, standing in those tracks, could have seen them without having them pointed out by the claimant. So in these patent cases we take the undeveloped portion of the art, and determine how much of what was open to discovery has actually been brought to light by tire patentee. A patentee is not entitled to all that is left by prior patents, publications, and uses. He receives only that portion of what is left which he shows and claims.

In this manner, having determined tire extent and scope of plaintiff’s claims, we may proceed either to determine the question of validity or infringement. If both questions are fairly in dispute, I usually consider first the question of infringement. By pursuing that course, the court is less likely to pass upon matters not in issue, and avoids doing unnecessary damage to plaintiff’s pateirt. In this manner we have studied the art of tunneling.

It is conceded that in 1903, when plaintiff’s decedent applied for four of the patents here in suit, there was known in the art the old drifting method, by which for many years mountains had been tunneled. Small rivers, in certain kinds .of soil, had also been tunneled by this method; but it was poorly adapted for going under the water. The shield method was another method which had been in use for tunneling under rivers, a well-known example of which is the Grand Trunk tunnel at Port Huron; the United States end being in this state and in this district: One difficulty with the shield method was that it was not possible to go near to the water. It had to go too deep, too far down. It made an unnecessary grade. A still greater objection, and one which ought to have made it prohibitive was the necessity for men working in such high air pressure that there was a tremendous loss of life. Both of tiróse methods had to do with getting under the river by starting in from the side and keeping deep down, far below the bed of the river. It was desirable to have the tunnel as near to the surface of the water as the rules of the War Department for the protection of navigation would permit.

[753]*753There were three possible methods for that sort of construction then in use. One, the caisson method, by which, as in the shield method, the men were compelled to work under a high air pressure. By this method the workmen by means of the device went down from the surface of the water and worked on the bottom of the river. Although there was no bottom to the device, they were able to keep the water from coming in at the bottom by means of compressed air. It was an undesirable method, because of the danger attendant upon the high air pressure. As they got to a great depth, the pressure became so great that it was impossible for the men to live. Then there was another method of doing the work from above, the cofferdam method, which was possible; but you would finally reach a depth great enough so that it was prohibitive, because of the great hydraulic pressure. The water would be forced in through the cofferdam walls, under the wall or through the bottom. By the cofferdam method the bed of the river formed the hase, and the walls were usually of sheet piling. Still another method was to construct the tunnel on shore, and Boat it to a place above the proposed site, and then sink it into position. No one of these three methods had been successfully employed in deep, broad rivers.

just how far beyond these admitted methods the art went there is some contention here. As I view this lawsuit, and the just disposition of it, it is not necessary for the court to split hairs over the exact extent to which this art had developed beyond these admitted and well-known methods of doing and attempting to do work of that kind. When the court feels very certain about the proper disposition of a case, it is just the time it is liable to be mistaken about it. In this case I have in my own mind no doubt as to the result that ought to be reached. That is not the situation in many patent cases. In the last one I disposed of I said on the record that I reached my conclusion with doubts on my own part; hut in this case I feel perfectly satisfied with the conclusion I reach. I feel that further study and thought would not change my views about it. I say that, knowing that those are just the times when a court is likely to he overlooking something.

[2] I will pass over the many intervening steps between those five admitted, well-known methods of the prior art and the patents in suit. There are many patents, like Weisker, O’Rourke, and Thomson, which ma'de serious inroads upon the art. The effect of these prior patents is in dispute. My conclusion is such that the scope and value of these prior patents would not change the result.

The defendant contends that McBean uses only the cofferdam methods, and says it is the cofferdam method with a roof on the cofferdam. The plaintiff assumes that it is a new and different method from any of the others, and calls it building a tunnel in a working chamber. As I view it, McBean is a combination of the caisson method and the cofferdam method.

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Bluebook (online)
253 F. 751, 1918 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 883, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bindley-v-detroit-river-tunnel-co-mied-1918.