Bilonda v. Insight Imaging Incorporated

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedDecember 15, 2022
Docket2:22-cv-01718
StatusUnknown

This text of Bilonda v. Insight Imaging Incorporated (Bilonda v. Insight Imaging Incorporated) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bilonda v. Insight Imaging Incorporated, (D. Ariz. 2022).

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Francoise Bilonda, No. CV-22-01718-PHX-DLR

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 United States of America,

13 Defendant. 14 15 16 Plaintiff Francoise Bilonda brings this wrongful death suit on behalf of herself and 17 other statutory beneficiaries of Decedent Elie Mamboleo. Defendants are several health 18 care providers. Plaintiff initially brought this action in state court, but it was removed to 19 this Court when the Attorney General certified that Defendants Faiza Naioom and the 20 Mountain Park Health Center were Public Health Service (“PHS”) employees under the 21 Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act (“FSHCAA”), 42 U.S.C. § 233. 22 Once removed, the United States substituted in for Naioom and Mountain Park 23 Health Center. The United States then moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter 24 jurisdiction. (Doc. 6.) Plaintiff filed a motion to retain subject-matter jurisdiction over the 25 state-law claims and to grant a stay but did not contest dismissal without prejudice. (Doc. 26 19.) The motions are fully briefed. (Docs. 20, 23.) 27 I. Motion to Dismiss 28 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction possessing only the authority 1 granted to them by the Constitution and Congress. Vacek v. U.S. Postal Serv., 447 F.3d 2 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 2006). Federal courts therefore lack subject-matter jurisdiction over 3 actions against the United States unless the United States has waived its sovereign 4 immunity. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). One waiver is the 5 Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). 28 U.S.C. § 1346. But such tort claims “‘shall be 6 forever barred’ unless the claimant [presents the claim] to the appropriate federal agency 7 for administrative review within two years after [the] claim accrues.’” United States v. 8 Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 405 (2015) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)). 9 Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff did not present her tort claim to the appropriate 10 federal agency within two years following Decedent’s death on April 28, 2020. (Docs. 6 11 at 4; 19 at 2-3.) As such, the Court must dismiss the claims against the United States for 12 lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Jerves v. United States, 966 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 13 1992). 14 The parties instead disagree whether the dismissal should be with prejudice or 15 without. The disagreement centers on whether an exception to the timeliness requirements 16 of the FTCA—supplied by the Westfall Act’s savings clause—applies. If it does, it allows 17 Plaintiff to timely exhaust her administrative remedies, possibly haling the United States 18 back into this Court if the administrative process affords her no relief. 19 The Westfall Act amends the timeliness requirements of the FTCA in specific 20 circumstances. For instance, a plaintiff might sue a defendant in state court and find out 21 only later that the defendant was considered a federal employee under the FTCA. The 22 following will happen: 23 • The Attorney General will then certify the defendant is a federal employee; 24 • The case will be removed to federal court; 25 • The United States will substitute in for the federal employee; 26 • The case will be considered brought under the FTCA. 27 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2679(d)(l) & (2); see also Santos ex rel. Beato v. United States, 559 F.3d 28 189, 193-94 (3rd Cir. 2009). If that case is thereafter dismissed for failure to exhaust 1 administrative remedies, the Westfall Act deems the action nevertheless “timely presented” 2 if it “would have been timely had it been filed on the date the underlying civil action was 3 commenced” and the plaintiff presents his claim “to the appropriate Federal agency within 4 60 days after dismissal of the civil action.” 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(5). 5 The United States argues that the Westfall Act’s savings clause does not apply to 6 certified PHS employees under the FSHCAA. (Doc. 20 at 2.) For this proposition, the 7 United States cites Patel v. United States, No. CV-20-01864-PHX-DLR, 2021 WL 8 2454048 (D. Ariz. June 16, 2021). The Court is not bound by this interpretation of the 9 FSHCAA, both because district court decisions are never precedential (they bind only the 10 parties before them), and because the Court’s discussion on this point was unnecessary to 11 the resolution of the motion before it. Patel instead turned on the fact that the plaintiffs 12 brought their lawsuit against the United States more than two years after the action accrued, 13 making their claims untimely even if the Westfall Act applied. Id. at *2. The United States 14 cites no other case supporting its argument. 15 And contrary to that argument, several courts have applied the Westfall Act to 16 FSHCAA actions. See, e.g., Brooks v. HSHS Med. Grp., Inc., 513 F. Supp. 3d 1069, 1086 17 (S.D. Ill. 2021) (“[T]he Westfall Act applies in FSHCAA cases.”); Booker v. United States, 18 No. CIV.A. 13-1099, 2015 WL 3884813, at *7 (E.D. Pa. June 24, 2015) (same); Celestine 19 v. Mount Vernon Neighborhood Health Ctr., 403 F.3d 76, 82-84 (2d Cir. 2005) (same). 20 The overarching reason is because “the FSHCAA makes the FTCA the exclusive remedy 21 for actions against employees of the PHS[.]” McLaurin v. United States, 392 F.3d 774, 22 777 (5th Cir. 2004). 23 The plain language of the FSHCAA bears this out. Once the Attorney General 24 certifies “that the defendant was acting in the scope of his employment,” the action will be 25 removed, the United States substituted for the federal employee, and “the proceeding 26 deemed a tort action brought against the United States under the provisions of Title 28,” 27 that is, under the FTCA. 42 U.S.C. § 233(c). In essence, the instant case is treated as if it 28 were an action brought pursuant to the FTCA, which includes the Westfall Act timeliness 1 exception. 2 The question, then, is whether Plaintiff can avail herself of the Westfall Act’s 3 protections. She can. Plaintiff’s action accrued on April 28, 2020. Plaintiff filed her state 4 court action on April 27, 2022, less than two years later. Dismissal without prejudice is 5 appropriate. 6 II. Motion to Retain Supplemental Jurisdiction Over State Law Claims 7 Both parties suggest that the Court has discretion to exercise supplemental 8 jurisdiction over the state-law claims against the non-federal defendants. (Docs. 19 at 7; 9 20 at 1-2.) It does not. When a case is removed based on the certification that a defendant 10 was a federal employee, “§ 2679(d)(2) renders the federal court exclusively competent and 11 categorically precludes a remand to the state court. . . Even if only state-law claims 12 remain.” Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 243, 245 (2007). The Court must retain 13 supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims against the non-federal defendants. 14 III.

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Related

United States v. Sherwood
312 U.S. 584 (Supreme Court, 1941)
United States v. Marion
404 U.S. 307 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Osborn v. Haley
549 U.S. 225 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Boakai v. Gonzales
447 F.3d 1 (First Circuit, 2006)
Mildred Jerves v. United States
966 F.2d 517 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)
Lockyer v. Mirant Corp.
398 F.3d 1098 (Ninth Circuit, 2005)

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Bilonda v. Insight Imaging Incorporated, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bilonda-v-insight-imaging-incorporated-azd-2022.