Billy Leroy Dooley Jr. v. See, et al.

Opinion

BILLY LEROY DOOLEY JR., Case No. 1:26-cv-03745-BAM (PC) Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE TO v. ACTION SEE, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS ACTION, WITH PREJUDICE, FOR Defendants. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, FAILURE TO OBEY A COURT ORDER, AND (ECF No. 9) FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE I. Background Plaintiff Billy Leroy Dooley, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On July 7, 2026, the Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint and found that it failed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. (ECF No. 9.) The Court issued an order granting Plaintiff leave to file a first amended complaint or notice of voluntary dismissal within 30 days. (Id.) The Court expressly warned Plaintiff that failure to comply with the Court’s order would result in a recommendation for dismissal, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim, failure to obey a court order, and for failure to prosecute. (Id.) Plaintiff failed to file a first amended complaint or otherwise communicate with the Court, and the deadline to do so has expired. II. Failure to State a Claim A. Screening Requirement and Standard The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b); 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. B. Plaintiff’s Allegations Plaintiff is currently housed at California State Prison, Corcoran (“CSP-Cor”), where the events in the complaint are alleged to have occurred. Plaintiff names the following defendants: (1) Matthew See, Nurse Practitioner; (2) Dr. Hojilla, Chief Medical Officer; and (3) Dr. Igbinosh, Chief Executive Medical Officer. In Claim 1, Plaintiff asserts a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right involving medical care. Plaintiff alleges that since he got to CSP-Cor January 2022, he first talked with Doctor Phi to start the ball rolling with MRIs and x-rays; then “being sent to outside to Adventist Health Bakerfield, then Doctor Thomas Bzoskie P&S who sent [Plaintiff] back out to Adventist Health Bakerfield CA for an Echo Gram during this time Matthew See N.P. of C.S.P. Corc. CA and he was told by those he claimed that [Plaintiff] must go through physical therapy.” (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff claims that this is a stall tactic taken by medical at CSP-Cor by Defendant See, “[f]ailing diligence but prolonging the denial of medical care to [Plaintiff].” (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that as the court can see by the attached exhibits, the clear and blatant failure of Matthew See, as he is not a doctor but only a nurse practitioner, making medical calls that are harming those under his care. Plaintiff asserts the failure to do his job is causing Plaintiff physical, emotional, and financial pain. In Claim II, Plaintiff asserts a violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights involving medical care. Plaintiff alleges Dr. Hojilla, Chief Medical Officer (“CMO”), violated his Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care. Plaintiff claims that as can be seen by the attached exhibits, this issue has been going on from January 2026 to April 2026. The CMO at CSP-Cor “was not advised of this alleged memorandum was Not in effect until 2025 however the failure of this C.M.O to allow [Plaintiff] to be sent out to outside medical care for surgery sooner C.MO failed to fully do the job of C.M.O.” (ECF No. 1 at 4.) Plaintiff claims that this caused more harm to his health. He further claims that “[t]his very lack of these medical providers that failed due to plaintiff had a serous medical need and the defendant was aware of this need and was deliberately indifferent to it.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that by him failing to do this surgery, it caused Plaintiff mental, emotional, physical and financial pain and suffering due to the fact Plaintiff is disabled and unable to hold down a job. In Claim III, Plaintiff asserts a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right involving medical care. Plaintiff alleges Dr. Igbinosh, Chief Executive Medical Officer, willfully and knowingly violated Plaintiff’s health care order dated August 1, 2025. By the date of August 21, 2025, defendant willfully and with malice continued to cause injury to the Plaintiff, a clear and blatant lack under the code of ethics. Plaintiff asserts that it shows clear and blatant professional negligence or malpractice. Plaintiff further alleges that this “has shown [since] 2022 that the plaintiff has been cleared for surgery however this C.E.M.O of [CSP-Cor] started to enforce a rule that one must go [through] the therapist (P.T) delaying all medical that this plaintiff has been cleared for by those in medical authority.” (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff claims that by his failure to get this surgery, the C.E.M.O caused Plaintiff more pain and hardship. As relief, Plaintiff requests surgery, 5.5 million dollars, and defendants be removed from or subjected to disciplinary action. C. Discussion Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. at 1974). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–557. Plaintiff’s complaint is short, but it is not a plain statement of his claims. Plaintiff’s allegations are disjointed, repetitious, and conclusory, containing multiple legal citations. He does not clearly allege what happened, when it happened, or who was involved. Plaintiff may not simply refer to his exhibits, which total more than 50 pages. While “much liberality is allowed in construing pro se complaints, a pro se litigant cannot simply dump a stack of exhibits on the court and expect the court to sift through them to determine if some nugget is buried somewhere in that mountain of papers, waiting to be unearthed and refined into a cognizable claim.” Lam v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., No. 1:23-CV-01167 BAM PC, 2023 WL 8701254, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:23-CV-1167 JLT BAM PC, 2024 WL 201269 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2024) (quoting Samtani v. City of Laredo, 274 F. Supp. 3d 695, 698 (S.D. Tex. 2017)). “The Court will not comb through attached exhibits seeking to determine whether a claim possibly could have been stated where the pleading itself does not state a claim. In short, [Plaintiff] must state a claim, not merely attach exhibits.” Stewart v. Nevada, No. 2:09- CV-01063-PMP-GWF, 2011 WL 588485, at *2 (D. Nev. Feb. 9, 2011). Supervisory Liability Although not entirely clear, Plaintiff may be attempting to seek supervisory liability against Defendants Hojilla and Igbinosh based on their supervisory roles. However, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions or omissions of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77; Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Supervisors may be held liable only if they “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205–06 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009). Supervisory liability may also exist without any personal participation if the official implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of the constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations and quotations marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1970). Plaintiff does not adequately allege that Defendants Hojilla and Igbinosh personally participated in any alleged violations or failed to act to prevent. Plaintiff also does not allege that these supervisory defendants implemented a policy so deficient that it was the moving force of any constitutional violation. Eighth Amendment – Medical Care Although Plaintiff alleges violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, a prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment where the mistreatment rises to the level of “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). The two-part test for deliberate indifference requires Plaintiff to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. A defendant does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the defendant “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard,” Simmons v. Navajo Cty. Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 2010); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004), and is shown where there was “a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need” and the indifference caused harm. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a prisoner’s civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–06). Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990). Further, a “difference of opinion between a physician and the prisoner—or between medical professionals—concerning what medical care is appropriate does not amount to deliberate indifference.” Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989)), overruled in part on other grounds, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082–83 (9th Cir. 2014); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122–23 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1986)). Rather, Plaintiff “must show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances and that the defendants chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [his] health.” Snow, 681 F.3d at 988 (citing Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against any of the named defendants. Plaintiff does not adequately allege a serious medical need or that any defendant’s response to that need was deliberately indifferent. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations are not sufficient. As noted above, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with the Rule 8 standard and fails to allege what happened, when it happened, and who was involved. Further, to the extent Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Igbinosh or any other defendant engaged in medical malpractice or negligence, such allegations are not sufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. State Law Claims To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to bring any claim against defendants under state law, Plaintiff has failed to allege compliance with the claim presentation requirements of the Government Claims Act. California’s Government Claims Act1 requires that a claim against the State or its employees2 “relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to person” be presented to the Department of General Services’ Government Claims Program no more than six months after the cause of action accrues. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 905.2, 910, 911.2, 945.4, 950– 950.2. Presentation of a written claim, and action on or rejection of the claim, are conditions precedent to suit. State v. Super. Ct. of Kings Cty. (Bodde), 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1245 (Cal. 2004); Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995). To state a tort claim against a public entity or employee, a plaintiff must allege compliance with the Government Claims Act. Bodde, 32 Cal. 4th at 1245; Mangold, 67 F.3d at 1477; Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff has not alleged compliance with the claim presentation requirements of the Government Claims Act. III. Failure to Prosecute and Failure to Obey a Court Order A. Legal Standard Local Rule 110 provides that “[f]ailure . . . of a party to comply with these Rules or with

1 This Act was formerly known as the California Tort Claims Act. City of Stockton v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 4th 730, 741–42 (Cal. 2007) (adopting the practice of using Government Claims Act rather than California Tort Claims Act).

2 “‘State’ means the State and any office, officer, department, division, bureau, board, commission or agency of the State claims against which are paid by warrants drawn by the Controller.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 900.6. any order of the Court may be grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions . . . within the inherent power of the Court.” District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of that power they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate, . . . dismissal.” Thompson v. Hous. Auth., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action, with prejudice, based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action, failure to obey a court order, or failure to comply with local rules. See, e.g., Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53–54 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal for noncompliance with local rule); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260–61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with an order requiring amendment of complaint); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130–33 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to dismiss an action, the Court must consider several factors: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions. Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986); Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 1988). B. Discussion Here, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is overdue, and he has failed to comply with the Court’s order. The Court cannot effectively manage its docket if Plaintiff ceases litigating his case. Thus, the Court finds that both the first and second factors weigh in favor of dismissal. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal, since a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action. Anderson v. Air W., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor usually weighs against dismissal because public policy favors disposition on the merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). However, “this factor lends little support to a party whose responsibility it is to move a case toward disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes progress in that direction,” which is the case here. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Finally, the Court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the court’s order will result in dismissal satisfies the “considerations of the alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262; Malone, 833 at 132–33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. The Court’s July 7, 2026 screening order expressly warned Plaintiff that his failure to file an amended complaint would result in a recommendation for dismissal of this action with prejudice. (ECF No. 9.) Thus, Plaintiff had adequate warning that dismissal could result from his noncompliance. Additionally, at this stage in the proceedings there is little available to the Court that would constitute a satisfactory lesser sanction while protecting the Court from further unnecessary expenditure of its scarce resources. As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis in this action, it appears that monetary sanctions will be of little use and the preclusion of evidence or witnesses is likely to have no effect given that Plaintiff has ceased litigating his case. IV. Conclusion and Recommendation Accordingly, the Court HEREBY DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to randomly assign a District Judge to this action. Furthermore, the Court finds that dismissal is the appropriate sanction and HEREBY RECOMMENDS that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, for failure to obey a court order, and for Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute this action. *** These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Objections, if any, shall not exceed fifteen (15) pages. Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page limit may not be considered. Exhibits shall not be filed with objections, but they may be referenced by the document and page number. No new exhibits may be filed with objections. Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838–39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

Dated: August 17, 2026 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE