Billy Dwight Coney v. Mr. And Mrs. Ainsworth Smith, Det. Douglas Mundy

Eleventh Circuit

Billy Dwight Coney v. Mr. And Mrs. Ainsworth Smith, Det. Douglas Mundy

738 F.2d 1199, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 19636

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

DecidedAugust 13, 1984

Docket83-5407

StatusPublished

Cited by25 cases

This text of 738 F.2d 1199 (Billy Dwight Coney v. Mr. And Mrs. Ainsworth Smith, Det. Douglas Mundy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Billy Dwight Coney v. Mr. And Mrs. Ainsworth Smith, Det. Douglas Mundy, 738 F.2d 1199, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 19636 (11th Cir. 1984).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM:

This appeal presents two issues that merit the consideration of this Court. In the first, Coney alleges in his § 1983 complaint that, although he pleaded guilty and was convicted on the basis of such plea and did not appeal therefrom, he alleges that his conviction was illegal because it was based on an illegal arrest and illegal search of his car. The trial court determined that the plea of guilty entered by Coney stood as a bar under the doctrine of collateral estoppel to the § 1983 action. It is not quite so simple. In Haring v. Procise, 462 U.S. 306, 103 S.Ct. 2368, 76 L.Ed.2d 595 (1983), the Supreme Court specifically held that a defendant convicted on a guilty plea in state court is not precluded from seeking recovery of damages under § 1983 for alleged Fourth Amendment violations that were never considered in state proceedings. 462 U.S. at -, 103 S.Ct. at 2378. (emphasis added). In a case involving very similar issues, Harvin v. City of Miami, 719 F.2d 405 (11th Cir., 1984), this Court *1200 remanded the case in light of Haring. However, it appears that Coney litigated the issue of illegality of arrest and search prior to his plea of guilty. Although the state court proceedings on the suppression issue were not made a part of the record before the district court, we may take judicial notice of the same. Moore v. Estelle, 526 F.2d 690, 694 (5th Cir.1976). Haring, therefore, does not apply.

The second issue relates to the claim that Coney’s automobile was seized and held for six months by the defendant, that the car was vandalized by the time it was returned and that his tape player, amplifier, speakers and several pieces of silver jewelry had been stolen. The state answers this contention correctly, we think, under the doctrine of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981) and Palmer v. Hudson, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393. Since there are available remedies under the state law for the recovery of damages for property improperly seized, even though intentionally seized by the authorities, Coney may not recover under a § 1983 claim. At -, 104 S.Ct. at 3205.

The judgment is AFFIRMED.

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PER CURIAM:

This appeal presents two issues that merit the consideration of this Court. In the first, Coney alleges in his § 1983 complaint that, although he pleaded guilty and was convicted on the basis of such plea and did not appeal therefrom, he alleges that his conviction was illegal because it was based on an illegal arrest and illegal search of his car. The trial court determined that the plea of guilty entered by Coney stood as a bar under the doctrine of collateral estoppel to the § 1983 action. It is not quite so simple. In Haring v. Procise, 462 U.S. 306, 103 S.Ct. 2368, 76 L.Ed.2d 595 (1983), the Supreme Court specifically held that a defendant convicted on a guilty plea in state court is not precluded from seeking recovery of damages under § 1983 for alleged Fourth Amendment violations that were never considered in state proceedings. 462 U.S. at -, 103 S.Ct. at 2378. (emphasis added). In a case involving very similar issues, Harvin v. City of Miami, 719 F.2d 405 (11th Cir., 1984), this Court *1200 remanded the case in light of Haring. However, it appears that Coney litigated the issue of illegality of arrest and search prior to his plea of guilty. Although the state court proceedings on the suppression issue were not made a part of the record before the district court, we may take judicial notice of the same. Moore v. Estelle, 526 F.2d 690, 694 (5th Cir.1976). Haring, therefore, does not apply.

The second issue relates to the claim that Coney’s automobile was seized and held for six months by the defendant, that the car was vandalized by the time it was returned and that his tape player, amplifier, speakers and several pieces of silver jewelry had been stolen. The state answers this contention correctly, we think, under the doctrine of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981) and Palmer v. Hudson, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393. Since there are available remedies under the state law for the recovery of damages for property improperly seized, even though intentionally seized by the authorities, Coney may not recover under a § 1983 claim. At -, 104 S.Ct. at 3205.

The judgment is AFFIRMED.

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738 F.2d 1199, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 19636, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/billy-dwight-coney-v-mr-and-mrs-ainsworth-smith-det-douglas-mundy-ca11-1984.

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